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 Microfinance emerged in the 1970’s, aiming to help lift people out of poverty and promote economic 
growth by providing financial services to low-income households. Despite its global popularity, evidence 
supporting its net benefits is mixed; therefore, more comprehensive empirical testing is called for. This 
Dissertation aims to contribute to the on-going debate in microfinance in the following three dimensions: 
 In the first chapter, the impact of microfinance on macro economies is analysed. Motivated by limited 
knowledge of the economy-wide effects of microfinance, we aim to measure its impact on economic growth, 
financial sector development and reductions in income inequality. Measuring aggregate effects including those on 
non-recipients of microfinance programs constitutes an important contribution. We identify the “promised” impact 
of microfinance on economic growth measured by real GDP per capita, financial intermediation captured by broad 
money per capita and income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. We also estimate the reverse feedback 
of macro fundamentals on microfinance itself. To estimate the dynamic equations, we use panel vector 
autoregressions (VARs) based on Arellano-Bover’s (1995) and Blundell-Bond’s (1998) instrumental variable 
system estimator, which enables us to control for potential endogeneity of microfinance and macro fundamentals. 
To address potential parameter heterogeneity in a dynamic panel, we divide countries into three broad clusters 
based on economic development, poverty, financial sector development, and levels of control of corruption. Such 
clustering also enables us to address the external environment for microfinance, which is multidimensional. In 
general, the results indicate an important and significant impact of microfinance at the macro level. In particular, 
the growth of microfinance is found to be positively and significantly associated with economic growth. We further 
find support for the impact of microfinance on financial sector development captured by broad money circulation 
in an economy. A one percent increase in microfinance borrowers in a country leads to a USD 314 increase in 
broad money per capita, which is equivalent to 13.8% of the mean value for the whole sample. The effect clearly 
differs across clusters in response patterns of microfinance. Finally, we find a positive impact of microfinance on 
reductions in poverty, as indicated by measurable lessening of income inequality. The result is stable for sample 
integrity of the Gini coefficient and trimming for outliers.  Overall results indicate a significant role of microfinance 
and its potential to affect the broader economy. The impact and transfer dynamics, however, differ substantially 
by macro-institutional environment.   
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 The second and third chapters are devoted to analysis of the microfinance environment in Uzbekistan, 
based on the primary dataset, which constitutes the first evidence of the impact of microfinance from the Central 
Asia region.  
 The second chapter describes the microfinance environment in Uzbekistan, emphasizing two types of 
non-bank microfinance institutions - Credit Unions and Microcredit Organizations. The specific nature of these 
institutions provides new evidence of the commercially oriented microcredit model and SME lending, which is an 
emerging trend in mainstream microfinance. The chapter offers two important contributions. On the supply side of 
microcredits, we analyse the determinants of initial placement of MFIs in districts of Uzbekistan. We find that MFIs 
follow general economic principles when choosing locations. On the demand side, we analyse the actual margins 
of excess demand for microcredits by considering only the pool of eligible applicants. We find that the total 
probability of microcredit approval is, on average, only 0.5, which implies that actual margins of untapped market 
may be much lower than projected when the narrow definition of eligible applicants is taken into account. 
 In the third chapter, the causal impact of improved access to microcredits is measured in terms of 
geographical distance to the nearest non-bank MFI. Proximity matters because of travel, time and other pecuniary 
costs and, more importantly, in terms of knowledge diffusion and (dis)connection from the microfinance network 
causing “signal dissipation”. The methodology is based on propensity score matching as a second best solution 
for program evaluation in the absence of experimental intervention. We match the 25% of households residing the 
closest to MFIs with the 25% residing the farthest, which defines the “treatment” as having easy or difficult 
geographical access to microcredits. To ensure the validity of the matching technique, we re-create pre-treatment 
covariates using a set of retrospective questions embodied in a single cross-sectional design. The accuracy and 
memory recall of retrospective data is ensured by the use of “fundamental events” analogues to event studies in 
general finance literature. We therefore provide an additional contribution to impact assessment and program 
evaluation. Overall results indicate a positive and significant effect of improved access to microcredits. For the 
business channel, we find that having better access to microcredit results in clients running more efficient 
enterprises in terms of higher business income and profits, and reducing the numbers of employees under 
competitive pressures. We also observe significant changes in household consumption patterns. Households with 
better access to MFIs tend to invest more in human capital, captured by expenditures on health and education, 
and to reduce spending on non-durable items such as weddings. The findings suggest that better access to 














Mikrofinancování se objevilo v 70. letech 20. století s cílem vyvést lidi z chudoby a podpořit 
hospodářský růst pomocí poskytování finančních služeb pro domácnosti s nízkými příjmy. I přes 
celosvětovou popularitu tohoto nástroje jsou výsledky výzkumu hodnotící přínosy mikrofinancování 
smíšené, komplexnější empirické testování tohoto nástroje je tedy žádoucí. Tato práce si klade za cíl 
přispět k probíhající diskuzi o mikrofinancování v následujících třech dimenzích. 
V první kapitole je analyzován dopad mikrofinancí na ekonomiku z agregátního pohledu. 
Motivováni omezenými znalostmi dopadů mikrofinancí na makroekonomické úrovni si klademe za cíl 
změřit jejich dopady na hospodářský růst, rozvoj finančního sektoru a snížení příjmových nerovností. 
Důležitým přínosem této části práce je měření agregátních účinků mikrofinancování včetně dopadů na 
osoby neúčastnící se mikrofinančních programů. Identifikujeme "slibovaný" dopad mikrofinancování na 
ekonomický růst měřený pomocí reálného HDP na obyvatele, na finanční zprostředkování pomocí 
širokých peněz (broad money) na jednoho obyvatele a na příjmové nerovnosti měřené Giniho 
koeficientem. Dále odhadujeme zpětnou vazbu základních makroekonomických ukazatelů na 
mikrofinancování samotné. K odhadu dynamických rovnic používáme vektorových autoregresních 
modelů (VAR) s instrumentálními proměnnými podle Arellano-Bover (1995) a Blundell-Bond (1998), 
který umožňuje kontrolovat potenciální endogenitu mikrofinancování a makroekonomických ukazatelů. 
Abychom vyřešili problém potenciální heterogenity parametrů v dynamickém panelu, rozdělili jsme země 
do tří hlavních skupin na základě jejich hospodářského rozvoje, chudoby, rozvoje finančního sektoru a 
úrovně kontroly korupce. Toto rozdělení zemí nám také umožňuje zachytit multidimenzionální rozdíly ve 
vnějším prostředí, které jsou důležité pro mikrofinancování. Obecně lze říci, že výsledky naznačují velmi 
významné dopady mikrofinancování na makroekonomické úrovni. Výsledky ukazují, že růst 
mikrofinancování je pozitivně a signifikantně spojen s ekonomickým růstem. Výsledky také potvrzují 
dopad mikrofinancování na rozvoj finančního sektoru měřený pomocí oběhu širokých peněz (broad 
money) v ekonomice. Nárůst mikrofinančních dlužníků o jedno procento vede ke zvýšení širokých peněz 
v ekonomice o 314 dolarů na jednoho obyvatele, což odpovídá 13,8 % z průměrné hodnoty širokých 
peněz v celém vzorku. Dopady mikrofinancí jsou navíc velmi rozdílné v různých skupinách zemí. 
Výsledky konečně potvrzují i vliv mikrofinancování na zmenšení příjmové nerovnosti, což naznačuje i 
pozitivní dopad na snížení chudoby. Výsledky se nemění, ani když interpolujeme chybějící hodnoty 
Giniho koeficientu a vynecháme odlehlá pozorování. Celkově výsledky ukazují na velmi významnou 
úlohu mikrofinancování a jeho potenciál ovlivnit ekonomiku na makroekonomické úrovni. Velikosti a 
dynamika dopadu  mikrofinancování se ale podstatně liší podle makroekonomické situace a 
institucionálního prostředí v dané zemi. 
Druhá a třetí kapitola je věnována analýze mikrofinančního prostředí v Uzbekistánu, a to na nově 
nasbíraných datech, která tak přináší první důkaz dopadu mikrofinancování v oblasti Střední Asie. 
Druhá kapitola popisuje mikrofinanční prostředí v Uzbekistánu, a to s důrazem na dva typy 
nebankovních mikrofinančních institucí a to na družstevní záložny (Credit Unions) a mikroúvěrové 
organizace. Zvláštní povaha těchto institucí nabízí nová svědectví o komerčně orientovaném modelu 
mikroúvěrů a o úvěrech malým a středním podnikům, které jsou novým trendem v hlavním proudu 
mikrofinancování. Tato kapitola má hlavní přínos ve dvou bodech. Na straně nabídky mikroúvěrů 
analyzujeme determinanty původního rozmístění mikrofinančních institucí v jednotlivých oblastech 
Uzbekistánu. Zjistili jsme, že mikrofinanční instituce při výběru lokality dodržují obecné ekonomické 
principy. Na straně poptávky analyzujeme skutečný rozsah převisu poptávky po mikroúvěrech tím, že 
zvažujeme pouze skupinu způsobilých žadatelů. Zjistili jsme, že celková pravděpodobnost schválení 
mikroúvěru je v průměru pouze 0,5. To znamená, že když vezmeme v úvahu úzkou definici způsobilosti 
žadatele, ukazuje se, že skutečný nevyužitý potenciál trhu může být mnohem nižší, než se 
předpokládalo. 
Ve třetí kapitole měříme kauzální efekt zlepšení přístupu k mikropůjčkám, a to pomocí geografické 
vzdálenosti k nejbližší nebankovní mikrofinanční instituci. Vzdálenost je důležitá kvůli nákladům na 
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cestování, strávenému času a ostatním finančním nákladům, ale především kvůli šíření znalostí a 
možné „ztrátě signálu“. Metodika je založena na metodě párování pomocí pravděpodobnostního skóre, 
a je zvolena jako nejlepší možné hodnocení programu v nepřítomnosti experimentální manipulace. 
Spárovali jsme 25% domácností s bydlištěm nejblíže u mikrofinanční instituce s 25 % domácností, které 
bydlí nejdále, čímž definujeme manipulaci jako snadný, respektive obtížný geografický přístup k 
mikroúvěrům. Pro zajištění platnosti metody párování využíváme zpožděné nezávislé proměnné, které 
jsme získali z retrospektivních otázek začleněných jinak v jednorázovém průřezovém šetření. Přesnost 
a paměťové vyvolání retrospektivních dat jsou zajištěny použitím metody "základních událostí", která je 
analogií podobných studií z obecné finanční literatury. Dodatečným přínosem je proto přínos k metodice 
hodnocení dopadu programů. Celkové výsledky ukazují pozitivní a statisticky významný vliv zlepšení 
přístupu k mikroúvěrům. Pro podnikatelské aktivity jsme zjistili, že lepší přístup k mikroúvěrům 
způsobuje, že klienti řídí podniky efektivněji, pokud se jedná o vyšší příjmy z podnikání a zisky, a o 
snižování počtu zaměstnanců v prostředí konkurenčních tlaků. Pozorujeme také významné změny ve 
struktuře spotřeby domácností. Domácnosti s lepším přístupem k mikrofinančním institucím mají 
tendenci více investovat do lidského kapitálu, počítáno výší výdajů na zdravotnictví a vzdělávání, a 
naopak snížit výdaje na krátkodobou spotřebu, kam patří třeba svatby. Výsledky tak naznačují, že lepší 


































 About 1.4 billion1 people globally live on less than one dollar per day and face extreme poverty, 
social and financial exclusion. Historical evidence reveals that not all poverty eradication programs 
efficiently reach the poorest of the poor. Microfinance has emerged as a promising tool to address this 
problem, as it requires less investment yet still serves a large percentage of poor clients whom 
traditional banking finds unprofitable.   
 Microfinance is a non-standard provision of a broad range of financial services such as 
collateral free loans, savings deposits, insurance, remittances, leasing and money transfers to low-
income households that are used to support a family business or other types of productive activities 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). Bangladesh was the first country to establish a microfinance 
institution (MFI) - Grameen bank - on the initiative of Dr. Muhammad Yunus in 1970, and since then its 
successful lending practices, impact on poverty alleviation and empowerment of women has spread 
globally, attracting the attention of a large community. The United Nations proclaimed 2005 as the Year 
of Microcredit, and Dr. Yunus was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for his innovative 
microfinance practices.  
 The historical evolution of microfinance institutions has been different from cooperatives, self-
help and informal credit groups such as rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). NGOs 
appeared as new players in the late 1970s, which laid further foundations for Microfinance Institutions 
(Vanroose, 2007).  The industry is rapidly growing; according to Maes and Reed (2012) around 205 
million clients are served by 3,500 MFIs worldwide.  The success of microfinance is characterized by 
high (almost 95%) repayment rates, low probability of default and, most importantly - social impact. Poor 
people running a tiny business thanks to microfinance loans also improve their knowledge, skills, health 
and housing and often have alternative employment opportunities. Further, through access to 
microfinance, women’s participation in societies has rapidly increased, which is especially important for 
the least developed countries where family and child-rearing responsibilities inherently fall exclusively to 
women. 
 Most microfinance institutions catering to micro-borrowers have evolved under several 
ownership structures: credit unions, specialized NGOs and  specialized microfinance banks. Most obtain 
their funds in the form of subsidies from donor organizations and governments, which are further 
channelled to microfinance borrowers at adjusted rates. In microfinance jargon, MFIs are also referred 
to as “double-bottom line” organizations, as they require the meeting of two objectives which involve a 
trade-off: first, achieving financial sustainability (profitability) and becoming independent from the donor 
                                                          
1 World Bank estimates of poverty line. 
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subsidy by serving more, but less poor, clients (i.e. the extent of outreach) versus, second, pursuing a 
social mission to help the poorest of the poor and continuing to rely on donor subsidies even in the long 
run (i.e. the depth of outreach). There has been a continuous debate between advocates of these two 
camps, though recent evidence claims that financially strong MFIs which adopt the rationales of good 
banking will also be able to meet the poverty alleviation mission (Mersland, 2005).  
 Theoretical fundamentals of microfinance are characterized by its potential to address adverse 
selection, moral hazard and the reduction of transaction costs. They also have the ability to serve clients 
in a risky business environment with a weak judicial system. These are obstacles that plague traditional 
commercial lending and lead to market imperfections (Morduch, 1999). Group lending, flexible collateral 
requirement, early repayment rates, peer monitoring, deposit funds requirements, assortative matching 
of risky and safe borrowers, female clientele (who are generally more reliable), and progressive lending 
schemes are among the driving forces of the microfinance mechanism that address problems of 
asymmetric information and help to reduce the transaction cost of servicing many micro-borrowers but 
with small scale business operations.  
 There is a wide range of literature on microfinance, its diverse services, socio-economic impact 
and overall promised success in combating poverty by reaching low-income households. However, 
adequate empirical testing of theory and impact evaluation remains a challenging task due to limited 
good quality, comparable data and the difficulty of designing appropriate methodologies. Self-selection 
of borrowers, non-random placement of MFIs, difficult to identify treatment and control groups, 
endogeneity and other measurement issues create inconsistency in results which lead to mistaken 
conclusions about the ultimate benefit of microfinance programs. As a result the evidence is mixed, 
biased or limited to anecdotal surveys and subject to various critiques (Karnani, 2007; Dichter & Harper, 
2007; Morduch, 2001). 
 Motivated by this lack of empirical evidence, this dissertation aims to contribute to the 
microfinance literature in three ways. In particular, each chapter aims to shed more light on the impact of 
microfinance through various angles and levels, i.e.  aggregate macro (Chapter 1), country and 
microfinance institutions (Chapter 2) and finally households, the end beneficiaries of microcredits 
(Chapter 3). The overall dissertation therefore provides a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of 
microfinance based on a multi-dimensional approach.  
 The first chapter opens the Dissertation and aims to measure the impact of microfinance at the 
aggregate level using cross-country data. Since its birth in the 1970s, microfinance has transformed 
vastly and today is a global and self-sustaining industry of more than 3,500 reported microfinance 
finance institutions servicing 205 million clients (Maes & Reed, 2012). The globalization of microfinance 
today is characterized by two important trends: (1) the growing trend of mature MFIs to transform from 
12 
 
being NGOs to licensed and regulated financial institutions, thus integrating more with national financial 
systems, and (2) the entry of commercial banks into the microfinance market sector by offering new 
products, establishing separate branches or providing external financing for MFIs. All of these factors 
signal that microfinance is no longer an isolated marginal sector of informal means of financing, but 
rather constitutes a separate, lower-end segment of the broader financial system. Despite this, the net 
contribution of microfinance to broader economies remains ambiguous, given complementary or rivalry 
relationships with traditional banks and long-run redistributive effects (Ahlin et al. 2011; Buera et al. 
2012).    
Because most impact studies in microfinance primarily focus on finding the effect on a limited 
group of beneficiaries or analyse a particular country setting, a lack of systematic evidence at the 
aggregate level identifying general patterns across countries remains. More importantly, the effect of 
microfinance on whole populations remains unstudied. This motivates the study of microfinance impact 
at an aggregate country level, considering the spillover effects on the whole population and in a dynamic 
setting, which enables a researcher to trace the evolution of the impact over time. The aim of this 
chapter is therefore to provide a set of stylized empirical findings on the impact of microfinance on a 
broad economy and reduction in income equality at the cross-country level. We analyse both 
dimensions of the impact - via microfinance loan portfolios and number of borrowers, using the global 
data from Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) for 1292 MFIs, in 101 countries for 1995-2011 
span.   
We identify the “promised” impact of microfinance on economic growth measured by real GDP per 
capita, financial intermediation captured by broad money per capita and inequality measured by the Gini 
coefficient. To estimate the dynamic equations, we use panel vector autoregressions (VARs) based on 
the Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998) instrumental variable system estimators, which 
enable us to control for potential endogeneity of microfinance and macro fundamentals. To address 
potential parameter heterogeneity in a dynamic panel, we divide countries into three broad clusters 
based on economic development, levels of income inequality, financial sector development, and control 
of corruption. Such clustering also enables us to address the external environment of microfinance, 
which is multidimensional. We benefit from the earlier established empirical findings of Ahlin et al. 
(2011), Armendáriz & Vanroose (2009), Hermes & Meesters (2011), which identify the complementary 
or rivalry nature of microfinance on a number of macro-institutional factors. Finally, we perform impulse 
response functions to predict the evolution of the shock from microfinance at the bottom to macro 
fundamentals.  
 Overall results indicate an important and significant impact of microfinance at the aggregate 
level.  Expansion of microfinance in terms of intensive margin (loan portfolio of MFIs) is positively and 
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significantly associated with economic growth measured by real GDP per capita. The transfer dynamics, 
however, clearly differ across clusters. We further find evidence of a positive impact of microfinance on 
financial sector development measured in terms of broad money per capita. In line with previous 
empirical findings of Ahlin et al.(2011), greater financial depth is strongly associated with the lower 
default and operating costs of MFIs. We also find support for the market failure hypothesis that 
microfinance institutions flourish in weaker environments where formal financial institutions tend to fail. 
We find an aggregate impact of microfinance on reductions of inequality measured by the Gini 
coefficient. To conclude the analysis, we plot impulse response functions projecting the evolution of 
shock at the bottom of microfinance to macroeconomic fundamentals. The response clearly differs 
across clusters. As such, in more stable environments (cluster 1 and 2) strong growth potential is 
observed,  which is in line with previous findings that the outreach of MFIs is more developed in stable 
countries and operational costs are recovered when economic growth is stronger (Ahlin et al. 2011; 
Vanroose 2008; Armendáriz & Vanroose, 2009). In a weak environment (cluster 3), microfinance 
evolution is transferred through a concave function and “dies out” after a certain critical point. Impulse 
response function analysis generates interesting patterns and calls for further research to actually 
identify the state under which microfinance shifts from a complement to a substitution.  
To the best of our knowledge, the analysis and findings in Chapter 1 provide the first empirical 
evidence of the aggregate effect of microfinance, thus this is an important contribution to the literature. 
Overall results indicate a significant role of microfinance and its potential to affect the broader economy. 
The impact and transfer dynamics, however, differ substantially by macro-institutional environment.   
 
Chapters 2 and 3 are based on primary data on microfinance institutions and recipients of 
microcredits (household survey) in Uzbekistan, Central Asia region. The survey and data collection took 
place during 2010 – 2011 with the financial support of the Global Development Network (GDN), the 
Economics Education and Research Consortium (EERC) and the University Meets Microfinance (UMM) 
project of the European Microfinance Network. The data collection was greatly leveraged by local 
institutions in Uzbekistan, specifically the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) “Support to 
Microfinance Sector Development” Project, Westminster International University in Tashkent and the 
Center for Social Studies “TAHLIL”. Finally, the contribution of the managers of local non-bank 
microfinance institutions as well as all the participants in the survey is invaluable and gratefully 
acknowledged.   
The survey and the database provide the following two contributions. First, the dataset is the first 
evidence for Uzbekistan and the Central Asia region collected with academic rigour and a conceptual 
framework. More importantly, the specific evolution of microfinance in Uzbekistan has enabled evolution 
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of two types of non-bank financial institutions (i.e. Microcredit Organizations and Credit Unions). While 
most impact studies on microfinance in general literature focus on conventional (mostly donor funded) 
Grameen type group lending models, non-bank MFIs in Uzbekistan operate on a private commercial 
microcredit lending scheme corresponding to a so-called meso-finance or SME lending model, which is  
an emerging trend in the literature. The second contribution of this chapter is based on impact 
assessment methodology. In particular, the household survey and aftermath impact assessment is 
based on a retrospective design. We have developed and implemented a novel approach for conducting 
the impact assessment of development programs in a specific application on microfinance.  While 
experimental studies, so-called Randomized Control Trials (RCT), constitute the leading robust 
methodology for evaluating the impact of development programs, they are very costly, require extensive 
logistics, and tend to have quite a limited experimental intervention. Retrospective methodology is thus 
considered one potential method for rigorous impact evaluation which achieves time and cost efficiency, 
especially when RCT is not feasible or when the results are required promptly. The reliability and thus, 
the application of retrospective methodology is critically dependent on accuracy and memory recall as 
not all information about past events could be recalled accurately. Given the objectives of impact 
assessment and the aim of retrieving general events, a standardized interview method was applied 
where retrospective questions are embodied in a survey questionnaire. The retrospective methodology 
is based on a set of retrospective questions; respondents were asked about the year of and cost 
incurred for particular events which are psychologically significant, discrete, and therefore easily 
memorable. The accuracy of recall was additionally ensured through application of timelines, public 
landmarks and specific training of interviewers. We therefore consider that a retrospective methodology 
may be a promising and robust method of impact assessment.  
 
Chapter 2 provides a description of the microfinance environment in Uzbekistan, the historical 
evolution of bank and non-banking microfinance institutions, legal changes and benchmarking with 
regional and international peers for comparison. Special emphasis is given to two types of non-bank 
microfinance institutions - Credit Unions (CU) and Microcredit Organizations (MCO). Their private 
commercial nature provides new evidence of the commercially oriented microcredit model and SME 
lending, which is an emerging trend in mainstream microfinance. The chapter provides two important 
contributions.  On the supply side of microcredits, the determinants of initial placement of MFIs are 
analysed. Using district level data, we find that the determinants of MCO growth are closely associated 
with the household/family nature of business to which the microcredits are disbursed. In contrast, CUs 
serve middle class enterprises on a higher business and economic level, for which the economic 
development of the region and industrial composition is an important factor. The results suggest that 
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non-bank microfinance institutions in Uzbekistan follow general economic principles. Given that MFIs 
represent the local financial segment functioning based on competitive market principles, historical 
changes in the legal framework and other exogenous changes did not impede their free market 
functioning.  
On the demand side, the excess demand for microcredits is analysed. A specific contribution 
includes the identification of eligible non-participants, as not all visitors to MFIs end up eventually being 
granted a microcredit. Analysing the ratios from MFI managers and credit officers, we find that the total 
probability of microcredit approval is, on average, 0.5. This data is potentially important for policy 
makers, as the actual margins of the untapped market could shrink by as much as half when the narrow 
definition of eligible applicants is taken into consideration. 
Chapter 3 estimates the impact of microfinance on recipients of microcredits and a comparison 
group of households. In particular, we aim to measure whether geographical barriers to access to 
microcredits has any effect on business indicators and household consumption. Despite substantial 
improvement of access to finance, physical barriers to reaching financial institutions continue to 
constitute significant impediments. Over recent decades, microfinance institutions have gained 
worldwide recognition, reaching billions of poor people who are ineligible for traditional banking services. 
Despite greater flexibility in the provision of loans, geographical barriers to access to MFIs constitute an 
important obstacle.  
We aim to measure the causal impact of better access to microcredits in terms of distance to the 
nearest MFI on business indicators and household consumption behaviour. Additionally, the direct effect 
of distance is considered as a proxy for broader learning and spillover effects of microcredits, as 
beneficiaries share their knowledge and experience with others. Close or distant location from the 
nearest MFI thus indicates the strength of the knowledge diffusion operating as a “dissipating signal”. 
The data is based on a survey of 1,086 microcredit borrowers and non-borrowers in Uzbekistan. The 
microfinance environment in Uzbekistan provides evidence of private commercial non-bank MFIs 
supporting both consumer and business loans. The country’s geographical landscape validates the use 
of distance to the nearest MFI as an informative proxy.   
 The results indicate positive and significant effects of closer geographical location to 
microcredits. In particular, households with easier access to MFIs reveal more likelihood of starting a 
new business. A positive effect is found on business revenue and profit, but not enterprise size, as 
entities tend to reduce the number of employees. The findings are in line with a conventional microcredit 
model, which centers entrepreneurship activity as a primary channel for the impact. This is also justified 
by the private and commercial nature of MFIs in the study, which operate mostly with higher profile 
clients whose income levels are above the poverty line.  On the consumption side, households with 
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better access to microcredits are found to engage in more rational decision making. They invest more in 
human capital such as education and health and reduce spending on non-durable items such as 
weddings and other social events. The findings are in accord with experimental studies in the field which  
indicate that having access to microcredits incentivizes households to shift consumption patterns, to 
reduce expenditures on unnecessary goods and to re-invest more into business and other durable 
items. Finally, the diffusion effect of the distance to nearest MFI is analysed by comparing business and 
consumption outcome variables between the 1st- 3rd and 1st- 4th distance quantiles. The indicative 
distance between two quantiles equals roughly 40 km, which allows us to trace the learning effects. We 
find similar patterns of business and consumption behaviour across two distance quantiles, revealing 
the uniformity of the “radar signal” going in the same direction. This is a potential indication of a diffusion 
effect and the concept that geographical proximity matters.  
 The overall results of the study are in line with theoretical predictions of credit expansion and 
access to finance. Better access to microcredits causes positive changes in household behaviour. 
However, the dataset does not provide a clear division of the mechanism, i.e. whether it is entirely due 
to geographical proximity or knowledge diffusion. This calls for further research and empirical work.   
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What Do We Know About Microfinance at Macro Glance?2 
     
   
Abstract  
Motivated by a lack of empirical evidence of aggregate effects of microfinance on a broader economy, in 
this chapter we aim to identify the so-called “microfinance promise” by identifying the links between 
microfinance and economic growth, and financial sector development and reductions in income 
inequalities. Given that the majority of microfinance impact studies focus on finding the effect on a 
specific group of beneficiaries, we aim to identify the impact on whole economies, which is an important 
policy concern not previously addressed. To address heterogeneity across countries, we employ a novel 
approach by grouping countries into three broad clusters delineated by a set of macro-institutional 
determinants. We find evidence of a positive impact of microfinance on macroeconomic fundamentals 
and reductions in income inequality. The findings indicate a significant role of microfinance and its 
potential to affect broader economies in the long-term. However, the impact and transfer dynamics differ 
substantially across clusters determined by the macro-institutional environment.  The microfinance effect 
is more pronounced in weaker environments and tends to “die out” when reaching more stable 
environments where formal institutions are strong.  
 
 
1. Introduction and Motivation  
 
Microfinance emerged in the 1970s, with its primary mission aimed to reduce poverty by means of 
improved access to finance for low-income households. Since then microfinance has transformed vastly 
and has become a global and self-sustaining industry of more than 3,500 reported microfinance finance 
institutions (MFIs) serving 205 million clients (Maes & Reed, 2012). Today, microfinance is no longer 
perceived as a “magic bullet”, automatically lifting poor people out of poverty through microenterprise. 
Rather, it focuses on the graduation from poverty of low-income households by delivering a variety of 
good-quality financial services.  
The dramatic changes currently observed in the microfinance landscape are driven by two 
important phenomena. First, there is a growing trend of mature MFIs transforming from NGOs to 
licensed and regulated financial institutions, thus integrating more closely with established national 
financial systems3. Second, perceived profitability and a new market niche lure commercial banks into 
the microfinance segment. The banks then offer new products, establish separate branches or provide 
external financing for MFIs4. All of these factors signal that microfinance is no longer an isolated 
                                                          
2 An earlier version of this work was published in Maksudova, N. (2010). Macroeconomics of Microfinance: How Do the 
Channels Work?, CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, 2010, No. 423. All errors remaining in this text are the responsibility of 
the author.  
3 For example ACLEDA Bank in Cambodia; Xac Bank in Mongolia; Spandana and SKS in India.  
4 For example ICICI Bank, ABN-AMRO, Citibank, HSBC in India and China and ANZ Bank in Fiji.  
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marginal sector of informal means of financing, but rather constitutes a separate, lower-end segment of 
broader financial systems. Despite this fact, the net contribution of microfinance to the broader economy 
remains ambiguous, given a complementary or competitive relationship with commercial banks and 
long-run redistributive effects (Ahlin et al. 2011; Buera et al. 2012).    
Despite global promotion of financial inclusion, current estimates show that 2.5 billion adults, 
roughly half of the world, remain without a bank account (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012). This signals 
a large untapped demand for banking services and potential profit opportunities, indicating that 
microfinance might continue to expand, diffusing through specialist MFIs and banks. However, the 
speed and the nature of these processes have not been well explored. Moreover, little is known about 
the aggregate impact of microfinance expansion on national economic growth rates and national-level 
poverty rates, as acknowledged by Morduch (2013). What are the transfer channels of microfinance to 
the broader economy and how do they differ given the macro-institutional development of countries? 
Why does microfinance flourish in some countries and remain modest in others? These are specific 
questions that we address in the paper.  
While there have been numerous idiosyncratic and isolated studies measuring the impact of 
microfinance in various settings,5 a lack of systematic evidence at aggregate level general patterns 
across countries remains. The degree to which microfinance fulfils its promise of promoting identifying 
financial sector development and poverty reduction at a macro level remains unclear. More importantly, 
most recognized impact studies focus on measuring the impact of microfinance on limited groups of 
beneficiaries, while the general effect on larger population remains unstudied. This motivates our study 
of the impact of microfinance at aggregate country level, considering the spillover effect on national 
population, in a dynamic setting which enables us to trace the evolution of the impact over time. The aim 
of this chapter is therefore to provide a set of stylized empirical findings on the impact of microfinance to 
broad economies and reduction in income inequality at cross-country level. We analyse both dimensions 
of the impact - through microfinance loan portfolios and the number of borrowers.  
We identify the “promised” impact of microfinance on economic growth measured by real GDP per 
capita, financial intermediation captured by broad money per capita and inequality measured by the Gini 
coefficient. We also estimate the reverse feedback of macro fundamentals on microfinance itself. To 
estimate the dynamic equations, we use panel vector autoregressions (VARs) based on the Arellano-
Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998) instrumental variable system estimators, which enable to us 
control for potential endogeneity of microfinance and macro fundamentals. To address potential 
parameter heterogeneity in a dynamic panel, we divide countries into three broad clusters based on 
economic development, income inequality, financial sector development, and measured levels of 
                                                          
5 See Bauchet et al. (2011) for summary and review of recent randomized control trials in microfinance.  
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corruption. Such clustering also enables us to address the external environment for microfinance, which 
is multidimensional. We benefit from the earlier established empirical findings of Ahlin et al. (2011), 
Armendáriz & Vanroose (2009), Hermes & Meesters (2011), which identify the nature of microfinance as 
being complementary or competitive to a number of macro-institutional indicators. Finally, we perform 
impulse response functions to predict the evolution of the shock generated at the bottom from 
microfinance to macro fundamentals.  
 Overall results indicate the important and significant impact of microfinance at the aggregate 
level.  Expansion of microfinance in terms of intensive margin (loan portfolio of MFIs) is positively and 
significantly associated with economic growth measured by real GDP per capita. The transfer dynamics, 
however, clearly differ across clusters. We further find evidence of the positive impact of microfinance 
on financial sector development measured in terms of broad money per capita. In line with the previous 
empirical findings of Ahlin et al.(2011), greater financial depth is strongly associated with lower default 
and operating costs of MFIs. We also find the support for the market failure hypothesis that microfinance 
institutions flourish in environments where the formal financial institutions are weaker. We find an 
aggregate impact of microfinance on reductions of inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. Finally, 
we plot impulse response functions projecting the evolution of shock at the bottom of microfinance to 
macroeconomic fundamentals. The response clearly differs across clusters. As such, in stronger 
environments (cluster 1 and 2) strong growth potential is observed,  which is in line with previous 
findings that the outreach of MFIs is more developed in stable countries and operational costs are 
recovered when economic growth is stronger (Ahlin et al. (2011), Vanroose (2008), Armendáriz & 
Vanroose (2009). In a weak environment (cluster 3), microfinance evolution is transferred through 
concave function and “dies out” after a certain critical point. Several potential interpretations are 
provided for this. The findings generate interesting patterns and call for further research to actually 
identify the state under which microfinance transforms from a complement to a substitution.  
  
  
2. Literature Review   
2.1. Economy-Wide Effect of Microfinance: Theory and Empirics   
 The positive contribution of financial sector development to economic growth through banks and 
equity markets is proven and has been widely tested at the cross-country, industry and firm levels (King 
& Levine, 1993; La Porta et al., 1998; Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Beck, Levine & Loayza, 2000). While the 
main role of the financial sector is to reduce information, enforcement and transaction costs, Levine 
(2004) outlines five functions that a financial system serves in facilitating growth: savings mobilization, 
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provision of investment information, monitoring/governance, risk management and facilitation in goods 
and service exchange. Through these functions, the financial sector not only promotes private sector 
development, but also supports the public sector, infrastructure and the ability of households to invest in 
human capital and smooth consumption. Karlan & Morduch (2010) claim that the general empirical 
linkages between finance-and-growth cannot be directly projected to the expansion of household 
financial access, which is different than with firms, including the spread of microfinance. However, 
considering the fact that, in some developing countries microfinance already has a significant 
penetration, we could potentially draw reasonable inferences about their broad economy-wide impact. 
The contribution of microfinance to the economic growth at a country level could be measured through 
production created by small entrepreneurship, improvements in human development indicators (health, 
nutrition, education) and reduction in poverty (Ravallion, 2001). 
 The second important aspect of financial expansion is related to its distributional impact 
affecting poverty and inequality6 (Hermes & Lensink, 2011). Loury (1981) develops a model of 
intergenerational transmission of inequality, where redistribution due to financial deepening can improve 
economic efficiency. The basic result is that borrowing constraints reduce efficiency and exacerbate 
inequality by diverting capital from low-income households with high-return investments. Greenwood & 
Jovanovic (1990) build a model in which financial development can increase inequality as richer 
segments of a population invest in financial infrastructure first. Over time, a broader segment of the 
economy benefits, so that inequality first widens then narrows with financial development. Other 
mainstream theoretical literature explores the aggregate and distributional impacts of financial 
intermediation in models of occupational choice and financial frictions (Banerjee & Newman, 1993; 
Aghion & Bolton, 1997; Lloyd-Ellis & Bernhardt, 2000; Erosa & Hidalgo Cabrillana, 2008). According to 
the theoretical predictions of these studies, improved financial intermediation leads to more entry into 
entrepreneurship, higher productivity and investment, and increases in wages - which is considered a 
general equilibrium effect in the long-run.  
 In direct application of microfinance, Buera et al. (2012) develop a model to analyse the 
economy-wide effect when microfinance programs are first introduced. The authors quantitatively 
evaluate the short run (Partial Equilibrium) and long run (General Equilibrium) aggregate impact of 
microfinance in a model that incorporates occupational choice, endogenous wages and interest rates. 
Theoretical model predictions are then used to quantify the impact of microfinance on key 
macroeconomic indicators such as output, capital, TFP, wage, interest rate, and distributional effects. 
The redistributive impact of microfinance is found to be stronger in general equilibrium than in partial 
                                                          
6 See Karlan & Morduch (2010, pp. 4713-4714) for a detailed review of theoretical models on financial deepening and 
poverty reduction.  
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equilibrium, but the impact on aggregate output and capital is smaller in general equilibrium. Buera et al. 
(2012) claim that in the long run, the scaling up of microfinance programs will have only a small impact 
on per-capita income. Despite this fact, the vast majority of a population will be positively affected by 
microfinance through the increase in equilibrium wages (Buera et al. 2012). The bottom line of the 
theoretical model and calibration is that introduction of typical microfinance programs can have 
significant aggregate and distributional impacts economy wide.  
The empirical evidence testing the general effect of microcredit expansion is based mainly on two 
experimental studies. First, Kaboski and Townsend (2012) evaluate the short- and long term impact of 
Thailand’s “Million Baht Village Fund” program, which is considered the largest scale government 
microfinance initiative, from which the funds have been injected randomly into 77,000 villages. This has 
been found to increase short-term credit, consumption, agricultural investment and income growth, but 
to decrease overall asset growth. There is also evidence of (localized) general equilibrium effects in 
terms of positive impacts on village-level wages. 
Banerjee et al. (2010) conducted one of the biggest randomized expansions of “Spandana” MFI 
branches in the new urban market of Hyderabad, India. Fifty two communities were randomly selected 
for the opening of new MFI branches offering loans to self-formed groups of mostly women. The follow-
up survey to evaluate its impact was conducted 18 months after the loans had been disbursed. The 
results indicate a heterogeneous effect of access to microcredits. Existing business owners were found 
to invest more in durable goods, while their nondurable consumption did not change. Households with a 
high propensity to start a new business increased their durable goods spending and decreased 
nondurable consumption, given the need to pay a fixed cost as a business start-up. Households with a 
low propensity to become business owners increased their nondurable spending. The study indicates a 
positive and significant effect of microfinance economy-wide, including both program participants and 
non-participants.   
The theoretical models and experimental studies to date indicate a significant effect of microfinance 
at the aggregate level. The effect, however, is expected to differ in short- and long-run contexts. We 
therefore empirically estimate the economy-wide effect of microfinance on the whole sample of 






2.2. Macroeconomic Determinants of Microfinance Performance   
Analysis of macroeconomic factors determining the uneven distribution of MFIs and the impact of 
country-level aggregates is an emerging trend in the literature.  
Macro economy: The most relevant study to date is by Ahlin et al. (2011), and is based on data 
from 373 MFIs, determining their success based on macroeconomic and macro-institutional features. 
Evidence is found of complementarity between MFI performance and broader economy. MFIs are more 
likely to cover costs when economic growth is stronger. Not only the level of growth, but its composition 
also matters: microfinance loans grow faster where the share of the manufacturing sector is high, 
foreign direct investment is large, and labor force participation is extensive (Ahlin et al. 2011; Leegwater 
& Shaw, 2008). In contrast, a rivalry or substitutability is also observed. In particular, higher workforce 
participation is associated with slower growth in MFI outreach. Performing a cross-country analysis for 
115 countries, Vanroose (2008) finds that the microfinance sector is more present in the richer countries 
of the developing world. MFIs are also found to have better outreach in countries that receive more 
donor aid and where population density is high.  Based on stylized facts, Armendáriz & Vanroose (2009) 
find that, contrary to the original poverty eradication mission of microfinance, the outreach of MFIs is 
more developed in regions that are relatively less poor such as Latin America and in fast-growing South 
Asian countries.  
Financial sector development: The maturity of the financial sector is an important determinant of 
MFI performance. Hermes et al. (2009) investigate the direction of causality between a country’s 
financial development and the efficiency of MFIs through cost reduction. Using data on 435 MFIs for 
1997–2007, the authors find that a stronger financial environment tends to generate more efficient MFIs, 
as intense banking competition provides incentives for MFIs to improve their operational efficiencies. 
Ahlin et al. (2011) find that greater financial depth is strongly associated with lower default and operating 
costs of MFIs, thus benefiting micro-borrowers in the end. Hermes & Meesters (2011) find a clear and 
robust association of MFI cost efficiency with economic growth and financial sector development.  
The market failure hypothesis suggests that microfinance is normally a good complement to 
mainstream banking, as it fills the gaps where standard banking services are not used. Therefore, the 
rapid growth of the microfinance sector may signal weaknesses in the formal banking sector. In such 
cases, MFIs tend to be used as a substitute for conventional banks. Empirically investigating this claim, 
Cull et al. (2009) find positive and robust evidence of competition from formal banks pushing micro-
banks. The intensity of the competition is associated with micro-banks serving poorer markets and more 
women. Using data on 1,073 MFIs for 1997-2006, Vanroose & D’Espallier (2009) empirically test the 
market failure hypothesis and find that MFIs reach more clients and are more profitable where access to 
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the formal financial system is low. In line with the hypothesis, MFIs are found to respond to needs that 
banks do not fulfill and to flourish where the formal banking sector fails. In addition, Vanroose & 
D’Espallier (2013) find that MFIs are less profitable when interest rates and inflation are high, which 
indicates their dependency on banking systems for external financing and the stability of formal financial 
system.  
Formal institutions and their quality: The institutional environment and its quality is an important 
determinant of a business and microfinance development. Hermes and Meesters (2011) define the 
following measures of institutional environment as relevant to microfinance: rule of law, establishment of 
property rights, regulatory quality, government effectiveness and control of corruption and political 
stability (based on methodology and data collected by Kaufmann, Kray, Mastruzzi (2008)). Ahlin et al. 
(2011) also include a set of “ease of doing business” indicators based on the World Doing Business 
survey dataset. The influence of the institutional environment on microfinance operations can go in both 
directions. On one side, an environment with well-developed institutions and controlled corruption is 
favorable for business activity and hence ensures sufficient demand for microfinance products. On the 
other side, a strong environment reflected by effective government implies a significant number of 
regulations imposed on business owners, which in turn translates into an increase in their cost of 
operations. Due to this, there may be less demand for MFIs in a well-developed and controlled 
environment. Empirical evidence suggests a mostly negative relationship, meaning that better 
institutions increase transaction costs for business owners, which in turn translates into higher cost for 
MFI operations (Crabb, 2007; Hermes & Meesters, 2011; Ahlin et al. 2011). 
Age of microfinance and industrialization stage: Based on their analysis of stylized facts and 
empirical findings, Armendáriz & Vanroose (2009) claim that the age of microfinance, as proxied by the 
number of years since the sector was introduced, is an important determinant when trying to explain the 
scale, scope and rapid growth of microfinance activity. They claim that there is a potential country-wide 
learning curve which could explain the growth of the microfinance sector. This argument is in line with 
the different recognized stages of microfinance industrialization, which consist of evolution, expansion 
and then consolidation of MFIs. Complete industrialization of microfinance is a long process and 
requires substantial public reforms, enormous subsidies, and deep transformations in government 
decision-making. It also requires an acceptance of microfinance as a separate segment, which is in 
contrast to the concept of heavily subsidized lending or extensive reliability on donor funds (Morduch, 
1999; Hulme & Moore, 2005). Pioneering countries in microfinance such as Bangladesh, Bolivia, India 
and Indonesia have passed through long decades of such deep transformations. Grameen models 
originated in these countries have been frequently replicated in both developed and developing parts of 
the world as successful models of microlending (Hulme & Moore, 2005; Martowijoyo, 2007). In support 
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of this argument, Bateman (2010) claims that the financial systems of many developing countries are 
significantly restructured towards microfinance, through progressive lending to the SME sector. There is, 
however, either little or no evidence of the performance of this microfinance-dominated financial sector 
nor, more importantly, on its impact on growth and sustainable development. The limited case studies 
so far suggest that the presence of a “microfinance saturated”7 segment within a domestic financial 
system has been quite destructive for sustainable development and poverty reduction objectives, given 
the displacement effects and negative spillover effects to other productive sectors (Bateman, 2010).  
Drawing the bottom line, existing empirical findings and stylized facts suggest that the external 
environment is an important factor in explaining the performance of microfinance institutions. Most 
studies, however, focus on the role of the external environment on microfinance performance. 
Conversely, in this chapter we aim to find the reverse effect - the impact of microfinance itself on a 
broad economy. Most related studies merely represent a correlation analysis or set of qualitative 
studies. The causal inference at aggregate country level remains unstudied. We therefore aim to draw a 
Granger-type causal link from microfinance on principle macroeconomic fundamentals, such as 
economic growth, financial deepening and inequality, which are also linked to the original mission of 
microfinance. Moreover, the myriad of macro-institutional determinants, coupled with various 
industrialization stages of the microfinance segment, suggest that countries are heterogeneous based 
on multidimensional characteristics. We therefore group countries into clusters based on identified 
macro-institutional determinants and try to capture unobserved heterogeneity. We also consider a 
dynamic setting as opposed to cross-country analysis, which enables us to trace the evolution of the 
impact of microfinance over time.  
 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1. Linking Economic Fundamentals and the Extent of Microfinance Development 
VAR Model using Dynamic Panel Data  
 
 The primary objective is to estimate the causal link running from microfinance to 
macroeconomic fundamentals and reversely. Therefore, we estimate the following four vector 
autoregressive model (VARs) in the following dynamic panel data settings.  
 
                                                          
7 According to Bateman (2010) these markets include Bangladesh, the most famous example of a financial system structured 










where , and  are i.i.d.  
 
 
 Equations (1) and (2) specify the dynamic effects of microfinance on real economy growth and 
the development of the financial sector respectively. Equation (3) describes the reverse effect of these 
two key macroeconomic fundamentals on the microfinance itself. Finally, equation (4) is used here to 
study a link from microfinance at a country level. 
 We will discuss definitions of variables in more detail in Section 4 (Data), but let us note here 
that we will measure economic growth [GDP] by the real GDP per capita8 and  financial sector 
development  by real the real broad money per capita [broad money]. Though broad money is partly a 
decision making choice of Central Banks in domestic economies, we nevertheless use this indicator to 
capture the financial sector development.  This is based on earlier findings of Rousseau and Wachtel 
(2000). Broad money (M3), as opposed to ratio of private credit to GDP, is a comprehensive measure of 
financial depth and includes currency, demand deposits, all time deposits, and the liabilities of money 
market mutual funds. Further, Microfinance will be captured by either the percentage of microfinance 
borrowers (in relation to total population) or by the gross loan portfolio of MFIs scaled by the real GDP.  
To find evidence of a link from microfinance to economic growth (1) we test the null hypothesis 
H0: , jointly for  j=1, ..p3. Similarly, to study the effect of microfinance on financial sector 
development (2), we test the null hypothesis H0: , jointly for  j=1, ..q3. Reverse effects, i.e. a link 
from macroeconomic fundamentals to microfinance (3) can be studied and tested via coefficients  
and  respectively.  Finally, the effect of microfinance development on income inequality (4) can be 
tested by the null hypothesis H0: , jointly for  j=1, ..s3. 
                                                          
8 We employ GDP per capita in levels and not in growth rates for consistency measures with other equations and the 
methodology employed.  
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In a dynamic model such as this, with fixed effects, classical estimation techniques yield biased 
(inconsistent) estimates. The magnitude of bias can be quite large for short time series with strong 
dynamic effects (Nickel, 1981). In order to obtain consistent estimates, we employ a dynamic panel-data 
model following Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), and 
Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000).9 Therefore, to find the existence of a link from microfinance and 
estimate equations (1)-(4) we use the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator with two lags of 
dependent variables included as regressors, covariates treated endogenously and a robust variance-
covariance matrix. This is a linear dynamic panel-data estimation implemented through “xtdpd” 
command in Stata 12. 
Tests for validity of instruments used as well as specification-type test for equations (1)-(4) 
including the lengths of lags p, q, r or s will be conducted using the Sargan test (Overidentifying 
restriction test; e.g., Sargan, 1958; Hansen, 1982).10 Estimation results revealed that, at most, the 
second lag was significant. Therefore, we present estimation results for all equations for two lags.  
 
3.2. Unobserved heterogeneity and clustering   
 Given that the objective is to examine the size and direction of the dynamic relationship 
between microfinance and macro fundamentals, we employ panel data vector autoregressions as 
mentioned in the previous subsection. This focus on the nature of transition paths is more advantageous 
than a cross-section approach as it is more informative of identification of the causal link running from 
microfinance (Rousseau & Wachtel, 2000). Despite this fact, application of the panel data implies 
potential bias driven by parameter heterogeneity (Hsiao, 1986).  As a result, there is a high probability of 
the Sargan test rejecting the null hypothesis and finding appropriate instruments.  In addition, countries 
differ not only by income level; many other macroeconomic and institutional characteristics define the 
external environment. Therefore, we group the countries in homogeneous clusters based on similar 
macro-institutional determinants. This grouping enables us to address unobserved heterogeneity in a 
dynamic panel and capture multidimensional external environments for microfinance. To identify the 
variables for clustering, we benefit from the established empirical findings of Ahlin et al. (2011), 
                                                          
9 Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a linear instrumental variables technique that uses the predetermined lags of the 
system variables as instruments to exploit a large set of overidentifying restrictions and deliver consistent coefficient 
estimates. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the lagged-level instruments in the Arellano-Bond estimator become weak as 
the autoregressive process becomes too persistent. Building on the work of Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond 
(1998) proposed a system estimator that uses moment conditions in which lagged differences are used as instruments for 
the level equation, in addition to the moment conditions of lagged levels as instruments for the differenced equation. 
10 The null hypothesis in this case is that instruments used in equations (1)-(4) are exogenous. The Sargan test is therefore a 
test for overidentified restrictions. 
27 
 
Vanroose (2007; 2008), Hermes & Meesters (2011), Vanroose & D’Espallier (2013).  We select the 
following seven indicators for clustering:  
[1] Macroeconomic growth [captured by real GDP per capita]. Overall economic growth in 
countries is a strong predictor of microfinance performance, suggesting complementarity between the 
two. MFIs are found to cover costs better when macroeconomic growth is higher, due in large part to 
lower default rates and operating costs (Ahlin et al.2011).  
[2] Financial depth [captured by domestic credit to the private sector, as a percent of GDP]. 
The microfinance sector is part of the broader financial system and, therefore, overall development of 
the financial sector is a significant determinant. In addition, financial depth is also strongly associated 
with lower default and operating costs of microfinance institutions. This in turn translates into lower 
interest rates rather than into greater MFI self-sufficiency. Ahlin et al.(2011) claim that this suggests that 
(potential) financial market competition is good for micro-borrowers, if not MFIs. MFIs are found to reach 
more clients and are more profitable where access to formal financial systems is low (Vanroose & 
D’Espallier, 2013).  
[3] Foreign Direct Investment [captured by FDI, net inflows, as a percent of GDP]: the overall 
business environment is a strong predictor of the competitive climate in which MFIs operate. As such, 
inflow of foreign direct investment reflects the business climate and the competiveness of the local 
economy. In addition, Ahlin et al. (2011) find that microfinance loans grow faster where there is more 
FDI. Vanroose & D’Espallier (2013) find that more FDI is associated with higher microfinance outreach 
and profitability. This in turn implies that more open countries develop larger microfinance markets.  
[4] Industry share [captured by industry value added, as a percent of GDP]: certain 
macroeconomic determinants are substitutes or rivals for microfinance. As such, Ahlin et al. (2011) find 
that the industry share of GDP is a negative predictor of extensive growth of MFIs captured by number 
of borrowers.  
[5] Inequality [captured by the Gini coefficient]: the original mission of microfinance is to reduce 
poverty and income inequality.  Empirical evidence of the relation of poverty and microfinance is 
supported by Ahlin et al. (2011). In particular, higher inequality is found to be associated with much 
higher default and operating costs, higher interest rates, and lower MFI sustainability. 
[6] Level of corruption [captured by control of corruption index]: the level of control over 
corruption is one of the important institutional variables that determine the socio-economic development 
of a country. In terms of microfinance, Ahlin et al. (2011) find that MFIs grow their clientele more slowly 
where there is more corruption. Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013) find that countries with less corruption 
have higher microfinance outreach and higher profitability.  
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 [7] Stability [captured by estimates of political stability and the absence of violence/terrorism]: 
some microfinance programs appear in post-conflict environments and in the course of peace keeping 
missions. Therefore, political stability and an absence of violence is an important institutional 
determinant (Hermes & Meesters, 2011; Vanroose, 2008). Microfinance institutions often serve more 
clients living in economically unstable environments, which is an indicator of the difference between 
MFIs and formal financial institutions (Vanroose, 2007). Ahlin et al. (2011) find that in countries in which 
citizens have a stronger political voice and politicians are held accountable, the costs of microlending 
are higher, given that MFIs have better responsiveness and transparency.  
 We divide all countries in the sample into more homogeneous groups with respect to their 
economic development and quality of institutions using clustering around the mean values of [1]-[7] 
identified variables. In particular, we employ kmeans command in Stata 12. Since the results of 
clustering serve as a basis for further estimation, they will be presented early in Section 5 (results). The 
number of clusters may range from three to more. In our setting, we identify three main broad clusters 
that distinguish the external environment of microfinance: rich, stable, controlled corruption defined as 
“rich” (cluster 1), developing or moderate (cluster 2), and underdeveloped, unstable environment and 
with high corruption entitled “poor” (cluster 3).  
To visualize the effect of microfinance on macroeconomic fundamentals, we complement our    
empirical analysis by plotting impulse response functions to identify the transmission of the shock 
coming from microfinance. The impulse response functions represent the following autoregressive 
AR(p) process:  
  (5) 
Consider  and application of the same model will result in the following 
vector autoregression model (VAR), where instead of coefficients, we have matrices of coefficients:  
              Therefore, we estimate the VARs by clusters for the three main dynamic equations: growth, 





  (6) 
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4. Data, Descriptive Statistics and Data Cleaning      
4.1 Data sources 
 
 Microfinance data: was downloaded from Microfinance Information eXchange (as of 
September 2012). This is a global microfinance platform and captures 1292 MFIs, in 101 countries for 
1995-2011.  We use two main indicators to capture microfinance: [i] gross loan portfolio of MFIs scaled 
by real GDP in USD to unify the currency and [ii] number of borrowers scaled by country population. We 
also collect institutional determinants of MFIs including age, legal, regulatory and profit status, share of 
microfinance operations, and data quality captured in diamonds11.   
 Macroeconomic data: [i] Economic growth is captured by real GDP per capita, PPP in constant 
2005 international USD, and was retrieved from the World Development Indicators (September 2012 
release). [ii] Financial sector development is proxied by broad money in constant USD, retrieved from 
World Development Indicators (September 2012 release). [iv] Income inequality measures is based on 
the Gini coefficient. We use the UN World Income Inequality Database and World Development 
Indicators (September 2012 release) to create the balanced coefficient for the entire sample. Further, 
we employ a linear interpolation of the Gini coefficient within the sample to ensure a sufficient number of 
observations. Even though there are direct measures of poverty (i.e. poverty gap at the national poverty 
line (%)), we employ the Gini coefficient, given its sample representation and coverage of data across all 
countries. Data on direct measures of poverty available at the World Bank World Development 
Indicators is rather scant and does not allow panel data estimation, which is essential for our research 
question.  
 Institutional data: [i] Foreign Direct Investment is captured by FDI, net inflows, as a percent of 
GDP is based on World Development Indicators (September 2012 release). [ii] Industry share is 
captured by industry value added, as a percent of GDP is based on World Development Indicators 
(September 2012 release). [iii] Levels of corruption are captured by control of corruption index (-2.5 to 
2.5) from World Governance Indicators. [iv] Stability is captured by an estimate of political stability and 
absence of violence/terrorism (-2.5 to 2.5) from World Governance Indicators.  Summary statistics of 








                                                          
11 In this version of the chapter we do not distinguish between MFI institutional and legal status. Respective sensitivity 
analysis could be performed further, which remains as a focus for further research.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics of the variables  
Category:  Name:  Description:  Countries/ 





dev. Min  Max  
Microfinance  Portfolio  Loan portfolio/real GDP 
in USD   96 1091 7.8 15.6 0.0 147.5 
Borrowers  Percent, number of 
borrowers/population*1
00 people  
96 1091 1.26 2.26 0.0 16.18 
Macroeconomic  Economic 
growth  
Real GDP per capita in 
constant prices 95 1069 4331 3891 248 24080 
Poverty  Gini coefficient  38 781 43.0 8.7 22.3 67.4 
Financial 
development  
Broad money per 
capita, real USD  90 1043 2277 3236 12.0 29763 
Institutional  FDI  Foreign direct 
investment, net inflows 
(% of GDP) 
96 1070 4.1 5.2 -14.4 46.8 
Industry 
share  
Industry, value added 
(% of GDP) 84 1009 29.8 10.6 10.8 77.4 
Lack of 
corruption 
Control of corruption 
index (-2.5 to 2.5) 91 800 -0.6 0.5 -1.8 1.6 
Stability Political Stability and 
Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism: 
Estimate (-2.5 to 2.5) 
91 802 -0.6 0.8 -3.1 1.1 
Source: authors’ computation 
 
4.2 Data cleaning 
 To ensure the homogeneity of the sample and to minimize the impact of outliers, we perform 
two types of data cleaning. First, we drop observations where the percentage of microfinance borrowers 
is lower than 0.05% of the whole population in an economy. This ensures that there is a certain “critical 
mass” of microfinance borrowers in an economy, which is also justified by the self-reported nature of 
MFIs into the MIX database. Second, acknowledging the multi-dimensional nature of clusters, we 
performed a procedure to identify outliers in multivariate data. The procedure is based on identification 
of multiple outliers in multivariate data, using the blocked adaptive computationally efficient outlier 
nominators algorithm proposed by Billor, Hadi, Velleman (2000).12  We performed identification of the 
outliers based on 5-15% trimming. Different trimming levels can serve as a sensitivity analysis and also 






                                                          
12 The algorithm is implemented in Stata 12 as a procedure BACON (Stata Journal, 2010). The procedure typically creates a 
new variable equal to 1 if an observation is an outlier and equal to 0 otherwise. As a parameter p we set a maximum 
percentage of outliers to be potentially identified. As shown in the Stata Journal (2010), the BACON procedure is scale-
invariant, which is a necessity when dealing with variables of different magnitudes or with different units.  
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5. Results, Discussion and Implications  
5.1. Cluster analysis  
 
 Based on the methodology of clusters presented in section 3.2., we provide descriptive statistics 
(Table 2). Countries grouped in stable environments (cluster 1) are characterized by having USD 10,941 
real GDP per capita. In comparison, in “moderate” countries (cluster 2), mean GDP is USD 5,422 while 
in “poor” (cluster 3) countries - it is USD 1,722. Clusters differ substantially in terms of the stability of 
environment and control of corruption. Table 3 summarizes the difference across clusters in terms of 
macro-institutional factors and their interpretation.  
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of clusters  
 
  










obs. 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
min 8373 -1.11 -0.97 27 15 1.31 17 
mean  10941 0.02 0.02 45 45 4.37 31 






obs.  22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
min 3784 -1.75 -1.21 30 9 1.51 19 
mean  5422 -0.43 -0.49 44 40 3.95 33 





obs.  48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
min 414 -2.51 -1.62 28 3 0.13 12 
mean  1722 -0.83 -0.75 41 17 3.29 28 





obs.  84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
min 414 -2.51 -1.62 27 3 0.13 12 
mean  4228 -0.58 -0.55 42 28 3.65 30 
max 15122 0.89 1.39 67 135 12.21 75 
Source: authors’ computation 
 
Table 3. Interpretation of clusters 
 
 Cluster 1 - Stable  Cluster 2 - Moderate Cluster 3 - Poor 
Real GDP rich developing (less rich) poor 
Stability stable moderately stable unstable 
Control of corruption controlled less controlled uncontrolled 
Inequality greater inequality greater inequality moderate inequality 
Private Credit banking is developed banking is less developed banking is underdeveloped 
FDI developed business 
environment/ country 
openness 






Industry share industrialized most industrialized less industrialized 
Source: authors’ computation 
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We also visualize clusters by plotting the mean value of macro-institutional determinants (Figure 
1). As can be seen, for each individual variable there is a clear separation by three clusters.  This in fact 
ensures that countries in the sample are grouped appropriately and clusters are homogenous, which 
ensures the validity of methodology and clear identification of a link to microfinance.    
 






 We also characterize the clusters in terms of geographical coverage (Table 4) and income 
group (Table 5).  As can be seen, most countries in a stable environment are in East Asia and the 
Pacific and South Asia regions. In contrast, Cluster 2 (moderate) includes mostly the emerging 










































































Table 4. Clusters by geographical regions   
 Cluster 1 - Stable  Cluster 2 - Moderate Cluster 3 - Poor Total:  
Other  22 (1)  22 (1) 
East Asia and the Pacific 51 (4) 3 (1) 46 (4) 100 (9) 
Europe & Central Asia 30 (1) 56 (5) 65 (6) 151 (12) 
Latin America & the Caribbean 14 (1) 97 (9) 107 (8) 218 (18) 
Middle East & North Africa 8 (1)  66 (6) 74 (7) 
South Asia 65 (5)  9 (1) 74 (6) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 281 (25) 16 (2) 33 (3) 330 (30) 
Total:  449 (37) 194 (18) 326 (28) 969 (83) 
Source: authors’ computation 
Notes: The table reports the total number of observations per country and year and total number of countries in 2009 
(in parentheses).   
 
 
Table 5. Clusters by income groups   
 Cluster 1 - Stable  Cluster 2 - Moderate Cluster 3 - Poor Total:  
High income: OECD  15 (2)  15 
High income: non-OECD  7 (1)  7 (1) 
Low income 276 (22)   276 (22) 
Lower middle income 173 (15)  207 (18) 380 (33) 
Upper middle income  172 (17) 119 (10) 291 (27) 
Total:  449 (37) 194 (18) 326 (28) 969 (83) 
Source: authors’ computation 
Notes: The table reports the total number of observations per country and year and total number of countries in 2009 (in 
parentheses).   
 
As can be seen from the descriptive analysis, there is clear and definite identification of clusters, 
which ensures they are homogenous and correctly grouped. The latter is important for econometric 
identification and further panel data estimation.  
 
5.2. Dynamic panel estimation of the VAR components 
We present estimation results of panel VARs based on (1) – (4) equations: growth, broad 
money, microfinance and inequality. We provide both extended version of results reporting coefficients 
for all lags, as well as equilibrium conditions in two versions: the sum of all coefficients and sums of only 
significant coefficients (available in the Appendix).  
Given that the whole sample combines various countries with different levels of macro-
institutional development, there is a potential significant unobserved heterogeneity (Table 6a). This is 
particularly observed in the example of growth equation as instruments are weak. Therefore, we control 





5.2.1. Economic growth  
 
Table 6a. Growth equation (levels), full specification     

















GDP p.c. -1 -0.447*** 0.057 -0.787** -0.038 0.562 0.671*** 0.426** -0.313 
 (0.151) (0.146) (0.377) (0.286) (0.373) (0.172) (0.183) (0.239) 
GDP p.c. -2  0.492***     -0.918** -0.010    
  (0.128)     (0.439) (0.186)    
Microfinance -1  365*** 56.6*** 826*** -1.8 67.5 35.6*** -80.4* 268*** 
 (74.0) (11.4) (280) (4.022) (125) (8.885) (45.7) (67.5) 
Microfinance -2  -10.8   11.3* 241   146.6**   
  (11.6)   (6.326) (151)   (59.3)   
BMoney p.c.  -1  0.937*** 0.740*** 1.102*** 1.027*** 0.925*** 0.459** 0.432* 0.688*** 
 (0.136) (0.127) (0.374) (0.314) (0.286) (0.205) (0.225) (0.233) 
BMoney p.c.  -2  -0.807***   -0.329 0.001 -0.608*** -0.046   
  (0.122)   (0.341) (0.341) (0.207) (0.229)   
Constant  3593*** 1480*** 11745*** 982*** 3795*** 1645*** 560*** 9217*** 
 (351) (263) (2071) (267) (1230) (301) (159) (1369) 
         
No of obs.  709 604 104 246 210 210 246 96 
Sargan test, 
value 86.6 36.8 15.4 9.6 16.5 25.7 17.6 25.4 
Sargan test,  
p-value 0.000 0.024 0.162 0.380 0.056 0.262 0.610 0.185 
Notes: The table reports estimation results from the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator with two lags of dependent 
variables included as regressors, endogenous covariates and a robust variance-covariance matrix based on equation (1) The 
dependent variable is real GDP per capita in constant prices. Data was cleaned, limiting microfinance borrowers at a minimum of 
0.05% and using the identification procedure for outliers (BACON) with maximum trimming less than 15%.   *, **, and *** denotes 
10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.      
 
 At first glance, there is evidence of a link running between microfinance and economic growth. 
The effect is more pronounced through extensive margin [borrowers] compared to intensive margin 
[portfolio]. A 1% increase in the share of MF borrowers in the country leads to a USD 365 increase in 
real GDP per capita, which is equivalent to 8.4% of mean GDP per capita of whole sample (Table 6a). 
The effect clearly differs across clusters. In relative terms, an increase in the percent of microfinance 
borrowers leads to an increase of mean GDP per capita for each cluster: USD 826 or 7.5% of cluster 
mean GDP in cluster 1 [rich-stable-controlled corruption] and USD 66.213 or 3.8% of cluster mean GDP 
in cluster 3 [poor-unstable-corrupt]. The effect is insignificant in cluster 2. The microfinance effect 
measured in terms of loan portfolio is relatively modest: USD 56.6 or 0.5% of cluster mean GDP in 
cluster 1, USD 11.3 or 0.2% of cluster mean GDP for cluster 2 and USD 268 or 15.6% of cluster mean 
GDP for cluster 3 (Table 6b).     
The effect of microfinance is therefore stronger when measured in terms of loan portfolio, in 
developing and more stable environments:  cluster 1 and cluster 2. The result is consistent with 
Vanroose (2008) and Armendáriz & Vanroose’s (2009) stylized facts that microfinance is more 
                                                          
13 Based on sum of both lags.  
35 
 
developed in regions that are not less relatively poor, such as Latin America and fast-growth South Asia 
countries. In fact, cluster 1 and cluster 2 in our sample include countries from these regions such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela (Table 10 in Appendix).  
 The dynamics of microfinance transfer also differs across clusters. As poorer and more corrupt 
environments [cluster 3], where microfinance was originally born and where the demand for it is 
stronger, its impact is transferred through the second lag. In countries with more stable and developed 
institutions, the effect dies out, as the transfer occurs in the first lag [cluster 1 and 2].  
 
 Table 6b. Growth equation, equilibrium conditions based on sum of all coefficients 
  
  

















GDP  p.c. -0.447*** (0.151) 






-0.356   
(0.381) 
   0.661***   
(0.168) 




Microfinance   365*** (74.0) 














BMoney p.c. 0.937*** (0.136) 




0.698**   
(0.238) 
0.92**   
(0.422) 
-0.148    
(0.297) 




              
No. of obs. 709 604 104 246 210 210 246 96 
Notes: The table reports estimation results from the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator with two lags of 
dependent variable included as regressors, endogenous covariates and a robust variance-covariance matrix. The dependent 
variable is real GDP per capita in constant prices. Coefficients represent equilibrium moments. In the case of two lags, 
corresponding standard errors were computed from the variance-covariance matrix using Stata procedure LINCOM. %.   *, **, 
and *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.   
 
 We also estimate the impact of microfinance on economic growth measured by the growth rate 
of real GDP per capita (Table 6aa and Table 6bb). This is in line with common growth-and-finance 
literature (i.e. King and Levine, 2993), where the growth rate of GDP is used to estimate the link 
between finance (microfinance) and economic growth.   
As can be seen from an overall comparison of Table 6a and Table 6aa the impact of 
microfinance on economic growth when measured by growth rates remained the same. In particular, the 
sign of the coefficient is the same when in levels and growth rates, although the magnitude of 
coefficients has decreased when measured in growth rates.    
There are, however, slight changes in the impact across clusters. In the group of rich and 
developed countries (Cluster 1), the impact of microfinance on the economic growth rate is found to be 
positive (0.031) when measured in growth rates, whereas it was negative when measured in levels (-
1.8) in first lag (Table 6aa). However, the equilibrium conditions reveal an overall positive and significant 




Table 6aa. Growth equation (growth rates), full specification     

















GDP growth rate -1 -0.301*** -0.638*** -0.413** -0.387* -0.413** -0.438** 0.755** -0.387* 
 (0.179) (0.237) (0.199) (0.259) (0.237) (0.253) (0.221) (0.259) 
GDP growth rate -2 -0.172** -0.237*     0.097   
 (0.108) (0.322)     (0.198)   
Microfinance -1  -0.006 0.002** 0.038**    0.031*** 0.038** 0.002*** -0.087*** 0.031*** 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.002) (0.014) (0.016) 
Microfinance -2 0.012 -0.002 -0.014  -0.014    
 (0.010)  (0.022)  (0.050)    
BMoney p.c.  -1  0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BMoney p.c.  -2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000  -0.000 -0.000     -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant  0.116*** 0.151***    0.064***     0.285***   0.064***  0.055**    -0.337**     0.285*** 
 (0.021) (0.036) (0.020) (0.081) (0.027) (0.033) (0.103) (0.081) 
         
No of obs.  606 599 241 81 241 254 205 81 
Sargan test, 
value 30.5 27.0 22.7 10.4 22.1 21.7 15.0 0.886 
Sargan test,  
p-value 0.135 0.211 0.333 0.886 0.333 0.355 0.181 0.187 
Notes: The table reports estimation results from the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator with two lags of dependent 
variables included as regressors, endogenous covariates and a robust variance-covariance matrix based on equation (1) The 
dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita in constant prices. Data was cleaned, limiting microfinance borrowers at 
a minimum 0.05% and using the identification procedure for outliers (BACON) with maximum trimming less than 15%.   *, **, and *** 
denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.      
 
 
Table 6bb. Growth equation, equilibrium conditions based on the sum of all coefficients 
  
  

































































         
No. of obs. 606 599 241 81 241 254 205 81 
Notes: The table reports estimation results from the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator with two lags of 
dependent variable included as regressors, endogenous covariates and a robust variance-covariance matrix. The dependent 
variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita in constant prices. Coefficients represent equilibrium moments. In case of 
two lags, corresponding standard errors were computed from variance-covariance matrix using Stata procedure LINCOM. %.   
*, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.   
 
5.2.2. Financial Sector Development  
 Given the original mission of microfinance to improve access to finance, we estimate the 
promised impact on financial intermediation captured by broad money circulation in the economy (Table 
7a, 7b).  Microfinance has a positive and significant effect on broad money, both through extensive [MF 
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borrowers] and intensive [MF portfolio] margins. A one percent increase in microfinance borrowers in a 
country leads to a USD 314 increase in broad money per capita, which is equivalent to 13.8% of the 
mean value for the whole sample. In comparison, a dollar increase in microfinance loan portfolios 
causes a USD 40 increase in broad money per capita (Table 7b).  
 
Table 7a. Broad money equation, full specification     

















BMoney p.c.  1  -0.068 0.089 0.558*** -0.291 0.774*** 0.359** 0.758*** 0.462*** 
 (0.136) (0.144) (0.092) (0.317) (0.055) (0.156) (0.076) (0.120) 
BMoney p.c.  -2 -0.631*** -0.661***  -0.235     
 (0.139) (0.134)  (0.268)     
Microfinance -1  137.6* 40.0*** 24.57* -0.26 40.9** 31.4** 31.2 271*** 
 (81.1) (8.7) (13.6) (1.9) (18.0) (12.3) (24.4) (87.3) 
Microfinance -2 176.5*     -7.2   
 (95.8)     (14.0)   
GDP p.c. -1 0.705*** 0.495*** 0.261*** 0.474** 0.078 0.125 0.116*  
 (0.197) (0.174) (0.085) (0.232) (0.055) (0.161) (0.070)  
GDP p.c. -2 0.488** 0.701***  0.768**  0.188   
 (0.225) (0.152)  (0.340)  (0.174)   
Constant  -1934*** -2083*** -148** -911*** 195 -143 69.1 2402*** 
 (452.6) (442.7) (73.9) (291.9) (186.6) (303.4) (242.7) (440) 
         
No. of obs.  611 604 291 246 239 210 212 96 
Sargan test, 
value 47.1 44.7 78.3 10.2 87.4 34.5 46.2 20.0 
Sargan test, p-
value 0.001 0.003 0.184 0.329 0.103 0.043 0.063 0.520 
Notes: The table reports estimation results from the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator with two lags of dependent 
variable included as regressors, endogenous covariates and a robust variance-covariance matrix based on equation (2). The 
dependent variable (broad money per capita in real USD) data was cleaned, limiting microfinance borrowers to minimum 0.05% 
and using the identification procedure for outliers (BACON) with a maximum trimming of less than 15%.   *, **, and *** denotes 
10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
 
 Disentangling the impact by clusters, we observe that microfinance outreach is more 
pronounced in more stable and developed environments, i.e. cluster 1. In relative terms, a one percent 
increase in microfinance borrowers causes a USD 24.5 [equivalent to 0.9% of cluster mean value] 
increase in broad money in cluster 1, USD 40.9 [equivalent to 0.8% of cluster mean value] in cluster 2, 
and USD 31.2 in cluster 3 [equivalent to 6.5% of cluster mean value]  (Table 7b). The result is consistent 
with Ahlin et al’s (2011) findings that greater financial depth is strongly associated with lower default and 
operating costs for MFIs, which ultimately is beneficial for micro-borrowers. The impact of microfinance 
through the intensive margin [USD 40] is found to be mainly driven by cluster 2 [USD 31.4] and cluster 3 
[USD 271], i.e. less developed and weaker environments (Table 7a). This finding is line with the market 
failure hypothesis and related findings of Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013) that MFIs flourish where the 




Table 7b. Broad money equation, equilibrium conditions based on sum of all coefficients 
  
  

















BMoney p.c. -0.698**   (0.205) 






























1.19***   
(0.204) 











(0.070)   
                  
No. of obs.  611 604 291 246 239 210 212 96 
Notes: The table reports estimation results from the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator with two lags of 
dependent variable included as regressors, endogenous covariates and a robust variance-covariance matrix. The dependent 
variable is broad money per capita in real USD. Coefficients represent equilibrium moments. In the case of two lags, 
corresponding standard errors were computed from variance-covariance matrix using Stata procedure LINCOM. %.   *, **, 
and *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.   
 
5.2.3. Microfinance  
 Table 8a, 8b and 8c present the estimation result of reverse effect and the impact of 
macroeconomic fundamentals [GDP, broad money] on microfinance itself. First, the observed significant 
coefficient of microfinance first lag indicates a potential auto regression or diffusion effect.  
 
Table 8a. Microfinance equation, full specification     

















Microfinance -1  1.211*** 1.046*** 0.490* 0.081 1.740*** 1.309*** 1.225*** 0.350** 
 (0.220) (0.127) (0.255) (0.276) (0.388) (0.167) (0.258) (0.164) 
Microfinance -2    0.461** -0.628*  -0.410  
    (0.180) (0.332)  (0.270)  
BMoney p.c.  -1  -0.002 -0.006 -0.006*** -0.002 0.004* -0.001 -0.001** -0.018 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.000) (0.032) 
BMoney p.c.  -2 -0.008*** -0.040*** 0.001   -0.006  -0.093*** 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.003)   (0.006)  (0.036) 
GDP p.c. -1  0.002 -0.011 0.005* 0.001 -0.003* -0.003 0.001** 0.072* 
 (0.002) (0.012) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.041) 
GDP p.c. -2 0.006*** 0.046*** 0.002   0.003  0.042 
 (0.002) (0.012) (0.002)   (0.007)  (0.036) 
Constant  -10.8* -50.8 -5.7** -2.3 6.3 13.6 -3.9* -92.7*** 
 (5.5) (31.5) (2.3) (10.7) (4.7) (10.2) (2.2) (27.4) 
         
No. of obs.  611 604 246 81 210 210 88 246 
Sargan test, 
value 20.0 9.9 20.6 7.1 12.9 6.0 14.7 11.1 
Sargan test, p-
value 0.029 0.441 0.421 0.621 0.226 0.810 0.677 0.265 
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Notes: The table reports estimation results from the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator with two lags of dependent 
variable included as the regressors, endogenous covariates and a robust variance-covariance matrix based on equation (3) The 
dependent variable is the number of microfinance borrowers scaled by country population, in ‘000 people [MF borrowers] and the 
outstanding gross loan portfolio of microfinance institutions scaled by real GDP in USD [MF portfolio]. Data was cleaned limiting 
microfinance borrowers at a minimum 0.05% and using the identification procedure for outliers (BACON) with maximum trimming 
to be less than 15%.   *, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
 The impact of the financial sector development [broad money] is mostly negative, which could 
be interpreted as indicating that a stronger financial sector has negative effects on microfinance 
performance, both in terms of depth [MF portfolio] and outreach [MF clients]. The effect becomes 
smaller when it reaches cluster 3 (Table 8a). The finding is consistent with the initial hypothesis that in 
more developed and stable environments where formal institutions are strong, there is limited scope for 
microfinance. The impact of economic growth on microfinance is clearly heterogeneous across clusters. 
A positive and significant coefficient of GDP per capita implies that stronger economic growth fosters the 
development of microfinance. The patterns clearly differ across clusters. In cluster 3, the environment is 
potentially more favourable for microfinance origination and an increase in GDP slightly boosts 
microfinance [a 0.001% increase in microfinance borrowers] (Table 8b). In cluster 2, with moderate 
development, where microfinance is expected to reach its peak, more economic development in fact has 
a negative effect on  microfinance outreach [a -0.003% decrease in microfinance borrowers]. Reaching 
the most developed and stable region captured by cluster 1, the effect increases [0.007%] (Table 8b).  
 In this regard, we can potentially draw a concave curve of microfinance evolution as a function 
of a country’s macro-institutional economic development. Microfinance is born in mostly weak and 
unstable environments [cluster 3], reaches its peak in moderately developed economies with high 
growth potential [cluster 2], and dies out when reaching the richer and more stable environments where 
formal financial institutions are assumed to be strong and mature [cluster 1].  
 
Table 8b. Microfinance equation, equilibrium conditions based on sum of all coefficients 
  
  






















0.54**   
(0.219) 








BMoney p.c.   -0.009** (0.002) 
-0.046**   
(0.016) 










-0.11***   
(0.035) 
GDP p.c.   0.007** (0.002) 
0.035*   
(0.015) 










0.113***   
(0.032) 
          
No. of obs.  611 604 246 81 210 210 88 246 
Notes: The table reports estimation results from the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator with two lags of 
dependent variable included as regressors, endogenous covariates and a robust variance-covariance matrix. The dependent 
variable is the number of microfinance borrowers scaled by country population, in 1‘000 people [MF borrowers] and the 
outstanding gross loan portfolio of microfinance institutions scaled by real GDP in USD [MF portfolio]. Coefficients represent 
equilibrium moments. In the case of two lags, corresponding standard errors were computed from variance-covariance 
matrix using Stata procedure LINCOM. %.   *, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
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5.2.4. Income inequality  
 Finally, we estimate the keystone “microfinance promise” of reduction in income inequality14. 
Tables 9a, 9b and 9c report the estimation result of microfinance impact on income inequality captured 
by the Gini coefficient15. To ensure comparable units with income inequality measure, the impact of 
microfinance is captured in terms of borrowers only and not in the loan portfolio.  Given the low number 
of available observations, we use both versions: raw data and linear interpolation of the Gini coefficient 
for missing years and countries within the sample. We present two versions of results: first, those of the 
whole sample without any procedures for outliers and second, those derived from multidimensional 
trimming using BACON at 5%, given the potential effect of influential observations (Billor et al. 2000).  
 The microfinance effect on reduction of income inequality is presented in Tables 9a, 9b and 9c. 
Observed negative coefficients on lagged values of the Gini coefficient indicate a lessening of income 
inequality.  
 
Table 9a. Inequality equation, full specification  
 No trimming for outliers   BACON at 5%  






MF borrowers MF borrowers MF borrowers MF borrowers 
Gini -1  -1.345*** -0.869*** -1.369*** -0.904*** 
 (0.330) (0.185) (0.349) (0.184) 
Gini -2 -1.143*** -0.724*** -1.155*** -0.789*** 
 (0.297) (0.165) (0.307) (0.171) 
Microfinance -1  6.719 5.083** 6.957 4.488** 
 (4.273) (2.373) (4.263) (2.223) 
Microfinance -2 -9.043* -6.029** -9.432** -5.306** 
 (4.623) (2.862) (4.689) (2.689) 
GDP p.c. -1 0.005 -0.001 0.006 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
GDP p.c. -2 -0.007 -0.000 -0.008 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Constant  11.854 5.507 12.848 6.217* 
 (9.325) (3.482) (8.968) (3.252) 
       
No. of obs.  183 582 180 571 
Sargan test, value 5.360 9.691 4.842 14.389 
Sargan test, p-
value 0.718 0.287 0.774 0.072 
Notes: The table reports estimation results from the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator with two lags of 
dependent variable included as regressors, endogenous covariates and a robust variance-covariance matrix based on 
equation (4) The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient. Data was cleaned, limiting microfinance borrowers at minimum 
0.05% and using the identification procedure for outliers (BACON) with a maximum trimming to be less than 5% in last two 
columns.   *, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
                                                          
14 To estimate the impact of microfinance on poverty and thus to derive stronger statements on poverty reduction, one should 
use direct poverty measures, which is beyond the scope of this chapter and remains for further research. 
15 For interpretation of coefficients, a low Gini coefficient indicates a more equal distribution, with 0 corresponding to 
complete equality, while a higher Gini coefficient indicates a more unequal distribution, with 1 corresponding to complete 




  Negative and significant coefficients in GDP per capita imply that, as countries strive for better 
economic growth, they experience improvements in inequality. There is evidence of microfinance 
causing reductions in income inequality. The impact varies from -0.946 [linear interpolation of the Gini 
coefficient] to -2.324 [linear interpolation of the Gini coefficient], reflecting sensitivity to sample integrity 
(Table 9b). The results are robust to trimming procedures where the poverty reduction effect is more 
pronounced when using the BACON procedure.  
 
Table 9b. Inequality equation, equilibrium conditions based on the sum of all coefficients 







MF borrowers MF borrowers MF borrowers MF borrowers 





















         
No. of obs.  183 582 180 571 
Notes: The table reports estimation results from the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator with two lags of 
dependent variable included as regressors, endogenous covariates and a robust variance-covariance matrix. The 
dependent variable is the Gini coefficient. Coefficients represent equilibrium moments. In the case of two lags, 
corresponding standard errors were computed from variance-covariance matrix using Stata procedure LINCOM. %.   *, **, 






5.3. Impulse response functions  
  
 As a conclusion to the empirical analysis, we visualize the impact of microfinance by plotting 
impulse response functions (Figures 2, 3 and 4). The initial level of the impulse of microfinance is set at 
5%. Potential example of shock coming from microfinance could be an outside donor supporting 
microfinance in the country, i.e. large donor supported microfinance investment into the country and its 
impact on macroeconomic and financial indicators. The period of the impact of the shock is chosen for 
12 periods as being the reasonable time for evolution of the impact. We visualize the effect of 
microfinance as disenabling across three clusters. Given that the effect of microfinance is primarily 
captured through its outreach, we present the impulse response functions for microfinance borrowers 
only. We also model the microfinance market as finite and assume a saturation point at around 3% of 
the population.  
 Figure 2 represents the impact of microfinance shock on economic growth measured in terms of 
real GDP per capita. Figure 3 - the impact on financial sector development captured by broad money 
per capita, and finally the effect of microfinance itself (Figure 4).   
We observe that there are similar patterns in the same cluster across equations. We observe a 
strong growth potential of microfinance in clusters 1 and 2. This is in line with earlier findings of Ahlin et 
al. (2011), Vanroose (2008), Armendáriz & Vanroose (2009) that the outreach of MFIs is more 
developed in stable countries and operational costs are recovered when economic growth is stronger. 
The most interesting situation is observed in cluster 3, which captures countries with weak and 
unstable environments. In this group of countries, the evolution of microfinance is transferred through a 
concave function and “dies out” after a certain critical point. This might potentially indicate two effects. 
First, it might be that in weaker environments microfinance does not have sufficient capacity to grow and 
expand. Second, it could be due to potential “mobility” across clusters as developing countries grow, 
and “graduate” from cluster 3 to cluster 2. Ahlin and Jiang (2008) develop a model examining the long-
run effects of micro-credit on development in an occupational choice model. According to theoretical 
predictions, microcredit could raise or lower long-run GDP, inequality and poverty. In this regard, the key 
to microcredit’s long-run effect is the “graduation rate”, defined as the rate at which self-employed 
workers build up enough wealth to start full-scale firms.  
A concave response to microfinance shock to economic growth might potentially indicate its 
cyclical or countercyclical influence in times of macroeconomic crises. For example, microfinance acted 
as a shock-absorber amidst severe economic collapse in Indonesia between 1998–2000, while there 
was an opposite situation in Bolivia, where microfinance declined even more severely than the national 




Figure 2. Effect of microfinance (number of borrowers) on real GDP per capita   
  
 
Notes: the figure represents impulse response functions of the shock from microfinance at 0.5%. Additional modelling is 
made so that there is a potential saturation of microfinance market at 3%.  
 
 In particular, the rapid growth of the microfinance sector observed and its impact on financial 
sector development (Figure 3) in clusters 1 and 2 is connected to the relation between conventional 
financial institutions (commercial banks) and MFIs, which may be co-operative or competitive depending 
on competition on the market. Cull et al. (2009a) finds positive and robust evidence of competition from 
conventional banks pushing MFIs to serve poorer markets and more women. In this regard, our findings 
indicate a potential saturation point where microfinance clients grow and “graduate” to become clients of 
conventional financial institutions.  
 
Figure 3. Effect of microfinance (number of borrowers) on broad money per capita  
   
Notes: the figure represents impulse response functions of the shock from microfinance at 0.5%. Additional modelling is 
made so that there is a potential saturation of the microfinance market at 3%.  
 
 Finally, the observed diverse impact of microfinance across clusters could potentially be 
explained by the “age” of microfinance activity as proxied by the number of years since the sector was 
introduced in a country (Armendáriz & Vanroose, 2009). As they claim, there is a potential country-wide 
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Figure 4. Microfinance’s own effect (number of borrowers)  
   
Notes: the figure represents impulse response functions of the shock from microfinance at 0.5%. Additional modelling is 
made so that there is a potential saturation of the microfinance market at 3%.  
 
Impulse response analysis indicates that a further avenue for research could be the 
identification of the state under which the microfinance shifts from being a complement to being a 
substitution. This could potentially be done using a non-parametric discrimination analysis, where 
countries are placed in three types of environments and the nature of microfinance as a complement or 




 Motivated by limited knowledge of the economy-wide effects of microfinance, we aimed to 
measure its impact on economic growth, financial sector development and reductions in income 
inequality. This constitutes an important contribution to the literature, as it is the first evidence of 
measurement of the aggregate effect of microfinance including that on non-recipients of microfinance 
programs. Acknowledging the multidimensional nature of the external environment of microfinance, we 
divide countries into three broad clusters based on macro-institutional determinants established in the 
previous literature.  
 In general, the results indicate an important and significant impact of microfinance at a macro 
level. In particular, the expansion of microfinance is found to be positively and significantly associated 
with economic growth. The effect is stronger in developing and more stable environments when 
microfinance is measured in terms of the loan portfolio of MFIs. This is consistent with previous findings 
on the complementarity of microfinance with macroeconomic indicators (Ahlin et al. 2011). The transfer 
dynamics of microfinance are found to differ depending on macro-institutional development.  
 We further find support for the impact of microfinance on financial sector development captured 
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borrowers in a country leads to a USD 314 increase in broad money per capita, which is equivalent to 
13.8% of the mean value for the whole sample. The effect clearly differs across clusters. Greater 
microfinance outreach is found in more stable and developed environments. This is in line with Ahlin et 
al.’s (2011) findings that greater financial depth is strongly associated with lower default and operating 
costs for MFIs. In contrast, the effect through the loan portfolio is more pronounced in less developed 
and weaker environments. This is in line with the market failure hypothesis that MFIs flourish where the 
formal financial institutions are weak.  
 Finally, we find a positive impact of microfinance in reducing income inequality. The results are 
stable for sample integrity of the Gini coefficient and trimming for outliers. More research is needed to 
make a stronger claim on any direct poverty reduction effect of microfinance. Nevertheless, we believe 
that our findings provide evidence of a positive impact on income inequality at aggregate impact.   
 Overall results indicate that microfinance plays a significant role and provide evidence of its 
potential to affect broader economies. The impact and transfer dynamics of microfinance, however, 
differ substantially according to the macro-institutional environment of countries.   
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Table 10. List of countries by clusters  
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Albania Argentina Afghanistan Moldova 
Azerbaijan Bulgaria Angola Madagascar 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Brazil Armenia Mali 
Bolivia Chile Burundi Mongolia 
China Costa Rica Benin Mozambique 
Colombia Croatia Burkina Faso Malawi 
Dominican Republic Hungary Bangladesh Niger 
Ecuador Mexico Cote d'Ivoire Nigeria 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Panama Cameroon Nicaragua 
Guatemala Poland Congo, Rep. Nepal 
Jordan Russian Federation Ethiopia Pakistan 
Kazakhstan Turkey Georgia Philippines 
Macedonia, FYR Venezuela, RB Ghana Papua New Guinea 
Namibia South Africa Guinea Rwanda 
Peru  Guinea-Bissau Senegal 
Paraguay  Honduras Sierra Leone 
El Salvador  Indonesia Chad 
Syrian Arab Republic  India Togo 
Thailand  Iraq Tajikistan 
Tunisia  Kenya Tanzania 
Ukraine  Kyrgyz Republic Uganda 
  Cambodia Vietnam 
  Sri Lanka Yemen, Rep. 
  Morocco Zambia 
 
Table 11. Correlation table of main outcome variables by clusters   
 
MF portfolio MF clients 
Whole Sample: Whole Sample: 
 MF portfolio GDP Gini Broad Money  
MF 
portfolio GDP Gini 
Broad 
Money 
MF portfolio 1.000    MF portfolio 1.000    
GDP -0.091 1.000   GDP -0.028 1.000   
Gini -0.072 0.146 1.000  Gini -0.044 0.138 1.000  
Broad Money -0.097 0.813 0.074 1.000 Broad Money -0.032 0.813 0.072 1.000 
Cluster 1: Cluster 1: 
 MF portfolio GDP Gini Broad Money  
MF 
portfolio GDP Gini 
Broad 
Money 
MF portfolio 1.000    MF portfolio 1.000    
GDP 0.226 1.000   GDP 0.337 1.000   
Gini 0.107 -0.033 1.000  Gini 0.121 -0.033 1.000  
Broad Money -0.054 0.407 -0.330 1.000 Broad Money -0.028 0.407 -0.330 1.000 
Cluster 2: Cluster 2: 
 MF portfolio GDP Gini Broad Money  
MF 
portfolio GDP Gini 
Broad 
Money 
MF portfolio 1.000    MF portfolio 1.000    
GDP -0.124 1.000   GDP -0.060 1.000   
Gini 0.089 -0.409 1.000  Gini 0.254 -0.344 1.000  
Broad Money 0.008 0.613 -0.107 1.000 Broad Money -0.001 0.622 -0.069 1.000 
Cluster 3: Cluster 3: 
 MF portfolio GDP Gini Broad Money  
MF 
portfolio GDP Gini 
Broad 
Money 
MF portfolio 1.000    MF portfolio 1.000    
GDP 0.410 1.000   GDP 0.287 1.000   
Gini -0.162 -0.141 1.000  Gini -0.233 -0.141 1.000  
Broad Money 0.328 0.757 -0.253 1.000 Broad Money 0.419 0.757 -0.253 1.000 
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Table 12. Microfinance scatterplots with main indicators  
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Microfinance Environment in Uzbekistan: 





This chapter describes the microfinance environment in Uzbekistan, with an emphasis on two types of 
non-bank microfinance institutions - Credit Unions and Microcredit Organizations. The specific nature of 
these institutions provides new evidence of the commercially oriented microcredit model and SME 
lending, which is an emerging trend in mainstream microfinance. The chapter offers two important 
contributions. On the supply side of microcredits, we analyse the determinants of initial placement of 
these MFIs in districts of Uzbekistan. We find that MFIs follow general economic principles when 
choosing the location for establishment. On the demand side, we analyse the actual margins of excess 
demand for microcredits by considering only the pool of eligible applicants. We find that the total 
probability of microcredit approval is on average only 0.5, which implies that the actual margins of 
untapped market could be just half of that projected when the narrow definition of eligible applicants is 
taken into account. 
 
JEL Codes: O16, C34 
 




















1. Introduction and Motivation  
 
Since its birth in the 1970s with a simple microcredit model pioneered by Muhammad Yunus, 
the microfinance movement has been growing widely across the globe. Currently the sector represents 
2100 registered microfinance institutions (MFIs) serving more than 160 million customers. The 
expansion of microfinance is determined not only by internal MFI factors but also by macroeconomic 
and macro-institutional features (Ahlin et al., 2011; Vanroose, 2008; Vanroose & D’Espallier, 2009). 
Diverse models of microlending have evolved under the common microfinance umbrella, which is 
primarily reflected by the different types of financial institutions.16 While microfinance is present in most 
developing and developed countries, the landscape and microfinance models differ depending on the 
maturity of the overall financial system, availability of relevant infrastructure, population density, and 
poverty levels.  
With rapid industrialization of the microfinance movement and recognized trade-offs between 
reaching social and sustainability objectives, increasing emphasis has been given to a commercially 
oriented microfinance models and small and medium enterprises (SME) lending. Critics of microcredits 
suggest that job creation which boosts economic growth and hence reduces poverty is better done by 
larger enterprises and SMEs (Karnani, 2007). Mohammed Yunus’ original model assumed that small, 
informal microenterprises supported by microloans can be absorbed by the weak local economies of 
developing countries, without limit. However, these microenterprises ultimately did not have enough 
capacity to scale-up, diversify and innovate, resulting in economies that remained underdeveloped and 
creating negative externalities to existing productive businesses (Bateman, 2010). The focus of 
development finance thus shifted more toward middle level, growth-oriented SMEs, the so-called 
missing layer.  
This chapter thus contributes to the general microfinance literature providing the first evidence 
from Uzbekistan. The particular development path of the microfinance sector in Uzbekistan has led to 
the emergence of two types of non-bank MFIs: Credit Unions (CUs) which follow a mid-level, a growth 
oriented SME lending model, and Microcredit Organizations (MCOs), which practice a canonical 
microfinance model, albeit with for profit status.  
The chapter first describes the microfinance environment in Uzbekistan (Section 2). The 
description presents the historical evolution of the market and the establishment of MFIs, profiles of 
lending institutions and concludes with data on regional benchmarking.  
                                                          
16 The global Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) platform recognizes the following types of MFIs by legal status: (i) commercial 
banks - some of which specialize in microfinance activities only, while others represent traditional banks that downscale part of their 
operations or branches into microfinance activities; (ii) non-bank microfinance institutions which are mostly non-profit oriented 
organizations leveraged by donor or external funding; (iii) non-profit non-governmental organizations and (iv) rural banks. 
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Second, using district level data the determinants of the initial placement of non-bank MFIs are 
described (Section 3). The analysis of initial placement is different from ex-post performance measures 
predominant in the literature, thus serving as an important contribution. Given their private and 
commercial nature, MFIs are established in urban areas where population density and the share of 
economically active populations are high. We also find that infrastructure quality and economic 
development of the regions are significant determinants of MFI placement. The determinants of MCO 
growth in particular are closely associated with the prevalence of household and family type businesses 
the microcredits are disbursed to. In contrast, CUs serve middle class enterprises with greater business 
prospects, and for which the economic development of the region and industrial composition are 
important factors.  
Finally, the supply-side analysis is complemented by an analysis of the demand side, where the 
excess demand for microcredits is estimated (Section 4). The particular contribution of the analysis is 
based on the identification of overall probability of obtaining microcredits from non-bank MFIs based on 
non-participation of the eligible clients. Given that the overall probability of getting microcredits is found 
to be on average 50%, this chapter claims that careful consideration is needed when advocating that a 
huge demand for microcredits exists. The actual margins of the untapped market could shrink to half 
when considering a narrow definition in terms of eligible applicants.   
 The chapter also serves as a complementary reading for Chapter 2 of this dissertation work on 
measuring the improved access to microcredits in Uzbekistan.   
 
2. Microfinance Environment  
 
2.1. Historical Evolution  
 
Uzbekistan is a lower middle-income country located in heart of the Central Asia and is a former 
member of the Soviet Union, having gained independence in 1991. With 28.2 million inhabitants, the 
country accounts for 40% of the population of the Central Asia region. After gaining independence, 
Uzbekistan adopted a gradualist approach to transition and state-led development aimed at import 
substitution, and energy and food supply self-sufficiency. The population of Uzbekistan is characterized 
by a strong human capital and entrepreneurial savvy which is a key accelerator of business and 
economic development, including microfinance programs. More detailed macro analysis, including a 
regional comparison is provided in Table 7 of the Appendix.   
The microfinance movement in the country has emerged in a stable environment, mainly aimed 
at smoothing the hardship of the transition period, poverty alleviation and improving access to 
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household finance. From the perspective of industrialization stages17, overall development of the 
microfinance market in Uzbekistan during 1998 - 2012 can be divided into three periods (UNDP, 2011). 
(1) The first evolution (1990s): “Microcredit” and “microfinance” were first legally introduced in 
Uzbekistan as a means of financing SMEs and private entrepreneurship in early transition to ease the 
restructuring process in the agriculture sector. Primarily commercial banks lent microcredits requiring 
standard collateral on an individual basis. The first non-bank microcredit programs were initiated by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1998, through the implementation of two pilot projects. 
The objective of these projects was to improve access to financial resources among low-income groups 
to support their trade, small-scale production and micro-business activities. These pilot projects 
heralded the establishment of the first non-profit non-bank NGO microfinance institutions (NGO-MFIs). 
NGO-MFIs operated similarly to the classical Grameen Bank type group lending under joint liability, 
dynamic incentives and no collateral terms. The NGO-MFI movement was further supported by other 
donor projects and by 2006, their numbers had grown to 14.  
(2) Development and establishment of MFIs (2000-2006): During this period most of the legal 
framework18 for microfinance was grounded, which fostered the rapid growth of the sector. The 
institutionalization stage of the microfinance sector of that period was also characterized by the new role 
of the Central Bank of Uzbekistan as a regulator and licensing body of all bank and non-bank MFIs.  
On the basis of adopted laws, the CU movement was first launched in Uzbekistan with donor 
support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) in 
2002. From a policy perspective, CUs were expected to foster access to finance for low income people 
and businesses through well-established branches nationwide, forming a single cooperative over the 
long term (Tadjibaeva & Muradov, 2010).  In compliance with international standards, CUs were 
engaged in both microlending and the attraction of deposits. However, as a national peculiarity, by 
Uzbek law, business entities were allowed to be members of CUs. This led to the divergence of Uzbek 
CUs from a closed, professional, for-member focus and development to commercial microfinance 
institution status over time.  
In 2006, the Uzbek government instituted two laws – “On Microfinance” and “On Microcredit 
Organizations” – to provide a legal basis for the operations of non-bank lending institutions. A general 
lack of clarity in legislation for NGO-MFIs, however, created the need for a variety of restrictions on 
microcredit operations (Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX), 2008). As a result, NGO-MFIs were 
ultimately required to re-register under the new legislation to comply with profit making activities. Since 
                                                          
17 Complete evolution of the microfinance sector implies four stages: first evolution, development, rapid expansion and sustainable growth 
with a consolidation trend of MFIs (Christen et al., 2003).   
18 The Law on “Credit Unions” was adopted in 2002, the laws “On Microfinance” and “On Microcredit Organizations” were adopted in 2006.  
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then, several donor NGO-MFIs have been closed entirely, while others have reduced their outreach. Re-
registration of the remaining MFIs changed their status from NGO to Microcredit Organizations (MCOs), 
thus laying the foundation for a new type of non-bank MFIs. By law, MCOs may be funded by any 
private domestic entity and engage in profit making by channelling microlending services, except deposit 
attraction. It is important to note that MCOs inherited the joint liability, group-lending model of NGO-
MFIs.  
(3) Rapid growth (2007-2012): Three factors contributed to the rapid growth of the sector in 
this period: (i)  new commercial models of MCOs and CUs boosted the demand for microcredits among 
the population, (ii) adoption of the “State Program of Microfinance Development for 2007-2010” in which 
the sector was acknowledged as an important segment of the country’s financial system and household 
welfare improvement and (iii) the establishment of a specialized “Mikrokreditbank” as a leading bank-
MFI with extensive countrywide branches offering individual and group microcredits at subsidized 
interest rates below the market average19 (UNDP, 2011). While “Mikrokreditbank” is dominant on the 
microcredit market in terms of loan portfolio features such as collateral requirement, obligatory business 
registration and non-cash operations constitute the disadvantages of bank microlending compared to 
MCO and CU lending. 
Over a relatively short period, the number of CUs increased dramatically, reaching 121 by 2011.  
The number of MCOs also grew, albeit moderately due to constraints on deposit attraction and 
restrictions on external donor support. Rapid expansion of the non-bank microfinance sector in terms of 
depth and outreach motivated their integration into centralized credit bureaus20. Figure 1 summarizes 










                                                          
19 “Mikrokreditbank” is an open joint-stock company and its largest shareholder remains the Ministry of Finance. Following the required re-
registration procedures of NGO-MFIs in 2006, any foreign donor funding in support of microfinance activities was assigned through 
“Mikrokreditbank” including further channeling to other MFIs. The latter mechanism, however, is not operationally defined for MCOs. MCOs 
and CUs can’t directly attract grants and loans from foreign and international donor organizations.   
20 There are two bureaus of credit information exchange – the National Institute for Credit Information and the Interbank Credit Bureau – 
which mainly serve the banking sector. Non-bank MFIs (CUs, MCOs, pawnshops) are in the process of joining the system. There is an 
ongoing initiative to create private information bureaus and a draft law is being reviewed by Parliament.   
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               Figure 1. Cumulative growth non-bank MFIs in Uzbekistan, 1998-2011 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on official data from the Central Bank of Uzbekistan web site www.cbu.uz 
 
Overall, the legal umbrella has played an essential role in shaping the development of the 
sector.  The legal framework of microfinance in Uzbekistan is characterized by the regulation of 
microfinance services through the issue of new licenses for non-bank MFIs with the Central Bank being 
the principal regulatory-supervising body. This is also a unique law in the Central Asia region, which 
explicitly defines the term “microfinance”21  (Tadjibaeva, 2011). Rather tight regulation of the sector 
features the application of prudential regulation even for non-depository institutions, i.e. MCOs. This 
regulatory model is similar in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and Malaysia. While it is essential to ensure 
the safety of deposits, prudential regulation is not usually applied during the early development stages, 
consequently the sector is tightly regulated. Prudential supervision and monitoring, however, 
substantially increases operational costs forcing MFIs to limit the client outreach and product variety 








                                                          
21 The law “On Microfinance” adopted in 2006 expanded the legal notion of “microfinance” in terms of the amount pegged to the minimum 
monthly salary (MMS) rate established by the government. As of August 2012 the MMS constituted 72 300 Uzbek soums (38 USD). A 
“microloan” is defined as not exceeding 100 times MMS, “microcredit” as not exceeding 1000 times MMS and “microleasing” as not 
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Law "On Credit Unions" Law "On Microfinancing" 
Law "On Microcredit Organizations" 
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2.2. Current Situation22  
As of January 2011, the profile of the microfinance sector in Uzbekistan is represented by 
downscaling banks, specialized “Mikrokreditbank”, and commercial non-bank MFIs (CUs and MCOs) 
(Table 1).  
 





























interest rate  
on loans 
Specialized 
“Mikrokreditbank” Profit Bank 1 51074 165001 3231 56540 1511 1.2% 
Downscaling23 
Commercial banks  Profit Bank 2 7478 37409 5003 n/a n/a n/a 
Credit Unions  Profit Non-bank 121 52965 121792 2300 153063 654 3.7% 
Microcredit 
Organizations    Profit 
Non-
bank 34 9574 3853 402 0 0 4.8% 
Total:    138 121091 328055 10936 209603 2165  
Source: MIX, NAMOCU, UNDP (2011); n/a indicates that data is not available. 
 
At this time, the outstanding volume of deposits of MFIs constituted 231 billion Uzbek soums 
(125.5 million USD), which is still 19.3 times lower than that of banks (2416.8 million USD) (UNDP, 
2011). Despite their limited share, MFIs revealed a strong potential in financial intermediation, reaching 
the rate of 0.824 due to trust among the population and attractive returns on deposits. The high demand 
for and popularity of microcredits is also explained by increasing urbanization in the country due to rapid 
economic growth and completion of agriculture reforms. Consumer credits have become a vital tool for 
the young and rapidly growing urban population. In terms of outreach, with 246 400 clients, the 
microfinance sector has captured 0.9% of Uzbekistan’s population25. More importantly, non-bank MFIs 
have demonstrated the capacity to provide free market based access to microcredits, as opposed to 
conventional banks. A closer look at the operations of these MFIs follows: 
Commercial banks: According to the World Bank methodology, the quantitative threshold 
between microcredit and SME loans is defined as 250% of GNI per capita26. Based on this methodology 
commercial banks in Uzbekistan offer primarily SME loans with an average loan balance above 3 200 
                                                          
22 The analysis is as of January 2011 given the data availability.  
23  Existing financial institutions enter the microfinance segment by offering loans of a lower amount, i.e., direct lending to 
end-users.  
24 This implies that 80% of the loan portfolio is financed from the deposit attraction. In comparison, commercial banks 
reached the same indicator only in 2007.  
25 In comparison the average penetration ratio for the EECA region in 2011 was 2.6%. Compared to other Central Asia peers: 
3.8% in Kazakhstan, 8.3% in Kyrgyzstan, 2.2% in Tajikistan (MIX & CGAP, 2011).    
26 The threshold is calculated as 250% of GNI per capita, Atlas method in USD (World Bank, 2007). In Uzbekistan with GNI 
per capita equivalent to USD 1280 in 2010, this threshold is equivalent to USD 3200.   
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USD. This loan amount is 1.4 times (2 300 USD) lower for CUs and 8 times lower (402 USD) for MCOs, 
suggesting that non-bank MFIs hold the primary niche on microcredits (Table 1). According to Uzbek 
legislation, there is clear distinction of the loan amount and the threshold is quantified in terms of 
multiplications of minimum monthly salary27 (MMS) set by the government. A “microloan” is defined as 
not exceeding 100 times MMS (3800 USD) and “microcredit” as not exceeding 1000 times MMS (38000 
USD). The upper niche of bank microlending is therefore characterized by high value transactions, well 
suited for larger businesses, with longer maturity and lowest interest rates, but requiring substantial 
collateral and relatively burdensome application procedures. Despite their dominance in loan portfolios, 
the client base of banks is 8.2% lower than that of non-bank MFIs (UNDP, 2011).  
Despite being cheap relative to CUs and MCOs, bank microlending is distinguished by a 
number of obstacles that divert individuals and MSEs toward non-bank MFIs. The strongest obstacle is 
a limitation on cash disbursement28 and repayment of loans, which is vital for entrepreneurs engaged in 
trade and working with liquidity. Even for consumer lending, banks require the transfer of the loan to the 
contractor, shop or other registered transfer system, which limits the use of loans and causes an 
increase in the actual cost of the credit.  
Credit Unions: Unlike credit unions in other countries, CUs in Uzbekistan have a for-profit 
nature, operate far beyond the professional circle of the members, and are open to a broad layer of the 
population including businesses.  As of January 2011, CUs had captured 95% of the credit portfolios of 
all non-bank MFIs29. This massive share is explained by internal (deposit mobilization) and external 
(wholesale loans from commercial banks) growth opportunities, which are lacking in MCOs. CUs also 
demonstrate a sound capacity for deposit mobilization, stronger than banks, which indicates significant 
trust among the population. Constituting 70% of CU assets, deposits represent mainly (90%) term 
deposits of individuals (Tadjibaeva, 2011). CUs issue commercial loans to medium size businesses and 
individual enterprises, consumer loans (16.5%)30 and credits for other non-commercial purposes (3.9%). 
On the microfinance market, CUs issue the largest share of consumer loans and support higher scale 
enterprise individual lending. The average loan size is 2200 USD and the average deposit size is 600 
USD (UNDP, 2011). Despite the downward trend, the interest charged on CU loans (3.7% p.m.) is still 
higher than comparable bank loans (1.2%) though lower than in MCOs (4.8%) (Table 1). CUs offer 
mainly individual loans requiring collateral or a third party guarantee similar to commercial banks. In 
comparison to banks, however, the loan application procedures in CUs are less burdensome and 
                                                          
27 As of December 2012 MMS constituted 79 590 Uzbek soums (38 USD). 
28  This is related to overall the macroeconomic and monetary system with elements of cash control.  
29  The remaining share is MCOs (3%) and pawnshops (2%) (Tadjibaeva, 2011).  
30  Popular ones include the purchase of cars, consumer durables, household appliances, livestock, payment of college 
tuition fees, housing repair.  
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faster31. Other attractive features include cash based disbursement, and a flexible and customized 
approach which is not observed in bank lending.  CUs in Uzbekistan are thus characterized by their 
profit oriented nature and focus on higher value transactions. Though they are free from a number of 
obstacles typical to banks, CU loans are yet not designed for low income borrowers. 
 Microcredit Organizations: legally founded in 2006, MCOs were modelled similarly to the 
classical Grameen Bank type non-bank MFIs, capturing the best true social objectives of microfinance. 
In comparison to CUs, the growth and outreach of MCOs has been quite modest over 2006-2012, 
representing only 3% of the credit portfolio of all non-bank MFIs (Tadjibaeva, 2011). The number of 
clients in MCOs decreased substantially, constituting only 32% of the 2006 level. This is mainly 
explained by legal limitations on deposit mobilization, and the fact that borrowing from commercial 
banks is not operational as MCOs are unable to pledge sufficient collateral.  MCOs issue microcredits 
and microloans for business and consumer purposes. Between 2006 – 2010 the average loan size in 
MCOs increased from 136 USD to 530 USD (3.9 times), which is still much lower compared to banks 
and CUs (UNDP, 2011). The smaller loan size is justified by the predominant group lending 
methodology inherited from NGO-MFIs32. Group lending envisages dynamic incentives and very limited 
collateral pledges33. The average group size is 3-4 people and members are free to initiate a group. 
Given that MCOs primarily grow through returns on portfolio, the interest rates charged on loans is the 
highest (4.8% p.m.) compared to banks and CUs. Similar to the canonical microcredit model, MCOs 
work predominantly with female clients given the smaller loan amount and joint liability. Individual 
lending is also practiced by MCOs, though MCOs require higher value collateral and limit the maximum 
loan amount.   Application procedures, loan issue procedures and cash based operations in MCOs are 
very similar to CUs. Given their relatively lower outreach and dependency on portfolio yield, MCOs 
reveal more prudent control over repayment and delinquency than CUs. Loan officers usually 
investigate the group members before group loan approval, and during the disbursement. Dynamic 
incentives and limitations on loan size limit the growth potential of mature clients, thus motivating them 
to graduate to CUs or banks. MCOs thus operate with smaller size microcredits focusing primarily on 
group lending with active female participation.  
Regional comparison:  The microfinance sector in Uzbekistan is relatively isolated from global 
microfinance markets, which results in limited funding of MFIs, stunted growth and high interest rates 
(UNDP, 2011). Even though Uzbekistan is the most populous country in Central Asia, microfinance 
                                                          
31  Time for a loan approval varies from a few hours to a maximum of 5 days, depending on the previous borrowing history of 
clients and the purpose of the loan. A comparable loan at commercial banks (and “Mikroreditbank”) takes from two weeks to 
a month to complete including the required (costly) registration of the businesses.  
32  Compared to international practice and similar lending in Grameen Bank, this balance is still higher than 15USD - 50USD 
size.   
33  Not more than 5% of the credit amount. Typical collateral includes gold jewelry, a vehicle or a third party guarantee.   
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institutions are the smallest in the EECA region with a median Gross Loan Portfolio (GLP) of 179200 
USD. Based on medium values, the number of borrowers of Uzbek MFIs34 is most comparable to their 
Kazakh and Russian peers (MIX, 2011; Figure 2). Uzbek MCOs offer the lowest loan balances in the 
region at 358 USD, due to limitations on external financing35 and upper bounds for loans (Figure 3). 
However, the depth of outreach36 is quite similar to peers in the region with strong upward dynamics: it 
increased from 9% in 2005 to 33% in 2009 (UNDP, 2011; Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 2. Trends in outreach and scale for a median MFI (2009)  
 
Source: MIX (2011) based on data from MIX Market, 2009. The data is based only on MFIs that voluntarily 











                                                          
34 This is based on 21 MFIs (4 CUs and 14 MCOs), out of 131 total, in Uzbekistan that voluntarily report to the MIX market.  
35 MCOs are not allowed to attract deposits. Borrowing from commercial banks is not operational by law given that MCOs can’t provide 
sufficient collateral.  
































Figure 3.  Depth of outreach: average loan balance, in USD and as percentage 
of GNI per capita (2009)  
 
Source: MIX (2011) based on data from MIX Market, 2009. The data is based only on MFIs that voluntarily 
report to the MIX market. Data represent medians. 
 
 Uzbek MFIs have the highest revenues in Central Asia, with a reported ratio of financial 
revenues to total assets higher than 51% (MIX, 2011). Other characteristics of the Uzbek microfinance 
market include a wide variation of interest rates charged on microcredits. The interest rate varies 
depending on MFI type, loan size, lending methodology and target population (Table 1). While the global 
differences37 in microcredit interest rates are dramatic, Uzbekistan has been cited as having among the 
highest worldwide (MIX, 2011).  Small loan sizes are the most commonly cited reason for high interest 
rates, given the “high-touch” nature of microcredit business (Kneading & Rosenberg, 2008). This is 
particularly true in MCOs which operate with smaller amounts characterized by group lending. CUs face 
high operational costs associated with high financial costs on small deposits.  
 The high financial revenues of Uzbek MFIs are also reflected in the portfolio yield. With a 
median portfolio yield of 63.4%, Uzbekistan was the highest at almost double that of regional peers: 
37.2% in Kazakhstan, 32.66% in Kyrgyzstan, 36.31% in Tajikistan and 31.38% in Russia (MIX, 2011).  
Relatively low competition and constraints on external funding have led to a high yield on loan portfolios 
in Uzbekistan. Judging the differential (30.5 percentage points) between the portfolio yield and operating 
expenses ratio, MCOs in Uzbekistan have almost double the room for external borrowing as peers in 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia. This suggests that MFIs can access a large market that is willing to 
absorb loans at a very high price. 
                                                          
37 While the global average is about 35% p.a., in Uzbekistan the average is above 80% p.a. and in Sri Lanka - around 17% 
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 Efficiency and productivity: The efficiency of MFIs is illustrated by operating expenses and 
cost per borrower. High operating costs can be explained by the relatively young microfinance sector in 
Uzbekistan, where the mean operating costs in relation to loan portfolio add up to 39% (Kneading & 
Rosenberg, 2008). As such, the operating expenses of Uzbek MFIs remain the highest in the region at a 
median level of 28.7%. In terms of cost per borrower, Uzbek MFIs are as efficient as their peers in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In contrast, other peers in Kazakhstan and Russia have much higher costs 
per borrower (Figure 4). This difference may be explained by the higher cost of labour in these 
countries.  
 
 Figure 4. Efficiency of MFIs (2009)  
 
Source: MIX (2011) based on data from MIX Market, 2009. The data is based only on MFIs that 
voluntarily report to MIX market. Data represent medians. Cost per borrower includes administrative 
and operational expenses.   
 
  Figure 5.  Assets productivity and returns (2009) 
 
Source: MIX (2011) based on data from MIX Market, 2009. The data is based only on MFIs that 
voluntarily report to the MIX market. Data represent medians.  
 
Figure 5 reflects the higher productivity of MFIs in Uzbekistan compared to regional peers. With 
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This could be explained by the higher interest rates charged by MFIs in Uzbekistan previously 
discussed.   
Non-bank MFIs thus represent an important, competitive market based segment of the financial 
sector of the economy in Uzbekistan. The chapter next identifies the determinants of their placement in 
the regions.  
 
3. Determinants of Non-bank MFIs’ Placement    
 
The historical evolution of non-bank MFIs in Uzbekistan reveals the efficiency of competitive 
market forces. The commercial nature of institutions has significantly boosted the demand for 
microcredits and savings mobilization demonstrates trust and the high absorptive capacity of the market. 
Given the private and unrestricted nature of non-bank institutions, an important remaining goal is to 
identify the regional determinants of their appearance. This is particularly motivated by the uneven 
distribution of MCOs and CUs. In comparison to the commercial banks’ extensive coverage (1.97 
branches per 1000 km2), which is high in Uzbekistan compared to its Central Asian neighbours38, non-
bank MFIs are more concentrated nearby the capital of the country. 35% of MCOs and 39% of CUs are 
located in the capital and the surrounding areas.  
 There are 14 regions in Uzbekistan with a total of 184 districts; on average 8-16 districts per 
region. Non-bank MFIs are distributed unevenly with wide regional variations. The probability of CU 
appearance varies from 25% in the capital (Tashkent), to 17.4% in Fergana and 12.4% in Andijon 
regions, which represent the most densely populated areas of the country. In comparison, in remote or 
industrially underdeveloped regions, the probability of CU appearance is the smallest, equivalent to 
1.7%. Given historical and regulatory constraints, the overall number of MCOs is 3.5 less than CUs, 
numbering 34 by 2011. Most MCOs are crowded in the area near the capital. The probability of MCO 
appearance varies from 11.8% to 2.9% in other regions.   
 Uneven distribution of non-bank MFIs also reflects regional variations in terms of socio-
economic development and structure of the economy. While the urbanization trend is observed country-
wide, the number of people living in urban areas varies from 1 000 to 275 000 people per district (Table 
7). Regional variations in infrastructure provision are reflected in the coverage of water pipes, medical 
points and gas supply, which varies from 0% to 100% coverage depending on rural and urban areas. 
The structure of regional economies is highly dependent on the location and specialization of the 
regions in terms of manufacturing and share of agriculture production captured in gross regional product 
                                                          
38 In comparison this indicator was 0.15 for Kazakhstan and 1.34 in Kyrgyzstan in 2009. Source: new IMF “Financial Access 
Survey” indicators. Retrieved from  http://fas.imf.org/   
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(GRP). Given that most of the microcredits support businesses and private entrepreneurship, regional 
variations persist in the share of SMEs in GRP as well (Table 7). Table 7a reports a t-test comparison of 
the main district level determinants across districts with MFIs and without MFIs.  
In the mainstream microfinance literature, analysis of macroeconomic factors influencing MFI 
performance has been an emerging trend. The focus of existing studies to date can be divided into three 
broad categories: (a) the analysis of MFI specific determinants of performance such as contract design, 
lending methodology and corporate governance (Hartarska &  Nadolnyak, 2007; Hermes et al., 2009; 
Hatarska, 2005),  (b) examination of macroeconomic factors determining the uneven distribution of MFIs 
and the impact of country-level aggregates such as growth, inflation, poverty and  corruption (Marconi &  
Mosley, 2005; Honohan, 2004, 2008; Vanroose, 2007, 2008; Vanroose & D’Espallier, 2009) and (c) the 
analysis of macro-institutional determinants of MFI success by disentangling the impact of MFI 
sustainability factors and the external environment they operate in (Hermes et al., 2009; Ahlin et al., 
2010). The common conclusion of these studies is that the country level macroeconomic and financial 
environments have a significant impact on MFI performance indicators including profitability, outreach 
and cost reduction.   
 This analysis contributes to this strand of the literature in the following ways. First, we aim to 
identify the determinants of initial placement of MFIs, which is different from ex-post performance 
measures. This is an important question from the investment perspective and could serve as a useful 
complement to the performance indicators. Second, there are few studies that analyse within-country 
determinants of MFI placement, a gap to fill in (Vanroose, 2007). Use of regional and district level data 
to identify within-country variation is more informative than aggregate country level indicators. Third, 
non-random placement of MFIs has been a significant challenge for microfinance impact assessment 
studies. Known as supply-side selection, its direction may be upward or downward. Poverty oriented 
donor MFIs can emerge in poorer areas, thus causing a downward bias. In contrast, an upward supply-
side bias stems from the fact that profit oriented MFIs evolve in economically advantageous areas or 
regions with better infrastructure and credit facilities. Given the absence of donor participation and the 
commercial focus of non-bank MFIs in Uzbekistan, an upward supply-side selection is expected. In this 
regard, we provide additional evidence of the determinants of the placement of profit oriented non-bank 
MFIs. Finally, given that MCOs and CUs have a specific development path, the aggregate effect is 
disentangled across MFI types. This allows for more clarity on the operations of these institutions and 
the respective niches they hold.  
 The data for supply-side determinants is based on district level cross-section data as of 2001. 
Following the historical evolution of non-bank microfinance institutions, the movement of CUs was 
established in 2002 after the law “On Credit Unions” was adopted. The movement of MCOs commenced 
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in 2006. By studying a relatively long period of data, from 2001, we control for the reverse effect of the 
capacity of MFIs to affect the market.   
 For district level determinants we include the following three sets of variables. Summary 
statistics of listed variables are provided in Table 6 of the appendix.   
 (i) Socio-demographics indicators mainly capture the demand for microcredits and are 
associated with the cost efficiency of MFIs. Ahlin et al. (2010) find that microfinance loans grow faster 
when there is greater work force participation. Therefore we include the economically active population39 
and share of registered unemployed people, which represent the overall labour force propensity to 
become the clients of MFIs. The share of small and medium size enterprises in gross regional product 
(SME share in GRP) controls for the entrepreneurship level. We also include the urban population in 
districts to control for urbanization trends.   
 (ii) Infrastructure indicators: Schreiner & Colombet (2001) claim that an absence of adequate 
infrastructure hinders the development of microfinance. The infrastructure level is therefore captured by 
housing stock, provision of medical points, water pipes, gas in districts and road density. These 
variables are important determinants not only for the standard of living, but also are critical factors for 
opening and successfully running business enterprises. 
 (iii) Economic growth and structure of the economy: Ahlin et al. (2010) find that MFIs cover 
costs better when macroeconomic growth in the country is higher due to lower default rates and 
operating costs. Integrating this finding, we include gross regional product (GRP). In addition to growth, 
the structure of the economy has an important influence. Ahlin et al. (2010) find that a larger service 
sector predicts faster MFI growth, while a larger agriculture sector predicts significantly lower default, 
operating costs and interest rates. With the available data, we control for the composition of the regional 
economy share of industrial production in GRP, trade saldo, per capita manufacturing and agricultural 
sales.  
Probability of MFI appearance: First, the probability of non-bank MFI appearance is estimated 
using a probit model (Table 2). The dependent variable is an MFI dummy that is equal to 1 if there is 
either an MCO or CU in the district and 0 otherwise. There is evidence of up-side selection by non-bank 
MFIs. Location in the urban part of a district increases the probability of a non-bank MFI opening by 
82%, and by 68% for a Credit Union, thus confirming the priori hypothesis. The economically active 
population has a significant marginal effect for MCO establishment only and none for CUs. This can be 
explained by the presumably stable occupation of MCO clients in addition to their entrepreneurship 
activities, whereas CUs hold a significant niche for consumer lending and deposits. The marginal effect 
of population density is significant for the probability of MCO establishment only and not for CUs. As 
                                                          
39 In Uzbekistan the economically active age constitutes 18-55 years old for women and 18-60 for men.  
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expected, infrastructure development is a significant factor in the establishment of non-bank MFIs, which 
is captured by housing stock. Housing stock could be also interpreted as a proxy of household wealth, 
as investments in immovable property can be seen as a savings buffer and potential collateral for 
borrowings.  
 
Table 2. Predicting probability of appearance of non-bank MFIs  [Probit]  
 
Variables:    Var. mean: 
(1) Probability of MCO 
and CU (2) Probability of  MCO (3) Probability of CU 














 Econ. active population, ‘000 66.03 0.010 0.003 0.014*     0.000* 0.008   0.002  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.005)  
Unemployed, % of econ. active 
ppl 0.34 
-0.938 -0.322 -0.738    -0.041 -0.865   -0.222 
 (0.690)  (0.884)  (0.717)  









  -0.000 
 








Housing stock, sq. meters per 
capita  14.13 
0.090**   0.031** 0.091**   0.005** 0.077**  0.019** 
 (0.036)  (0.045)  (0.035)  
Medical points, number per 
10’000 ppl 152 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.006    -0.000 0.001   0.000 
 (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.002)  
Water pipes, % provision   77.97 0.014 0.004 -0.003 -0.000 0.018*   0.004*  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.010)  
Gas, % provision 77.26 0.000 0.000 0.003  0.000 0.001   0.000  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.007)  











SME share in GRP 2.98 0.275*  0.094* 0.035  0.002 0.288** 0.074**  (0.156)  (0.268)  (0.140)  
Gross Regional Product, bln 
UZS 2914 
-0.000   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Industrial production, % of GRP 0.57 1.420** 0.487** 0.988 0.055 1.157** 0.297**  (0.591)  (0.847)  (0.605)  
Trade saldo, million USD 
7.53 
0.000        
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Manufacturing sales,’000 UZS 




10 1.39e-09 3.58e-10 
 (3.85e-09)  (3.87e-09)  (3.80e-09)  
Retail sales, ’000 UZS p. c. 0.57 5.79e-09 1.99e-09 9.15e-10 5.12e-11 7.89e-09 2.03e-09  (7.70e-09)  (7.74e-09)  (6.40e-09)  
Constant    -6.942***  -3.744  -7.293***   (1.947)  (2.966)  (1.860)  
 
 Number of obs.  184 184 184 
 Pseudo R2  0.48 0.53 0.42 
 DoF  15 15 15 
 LR chi2  108 64 87 
Note: The table reports coefficient estimates and marginal effects from probit regression where the dependent variable is an MFI 
dummy equal 1 if there is a non-bank MFI in the district and 0 if none. Non-bank MFIs include Microcredit Organizations (MCO) and 
Credit Unions (CU), as of 2011 year end. The statistical significance of the marginal effects are taken from the coefficients. Local 
currency is Uzbek soum (UZS). The official exchange rate is 2100 Uzbek soums to US dollar, in September 2013.Summary statistics 





Number of MFIs: To predict the number of MFIs in districts, the Poisson regression model is 
estimated. The Poisson model is the most popular model for count data and is justified in this case, 
given that there are few MFIs per district. Poisson regression imposes a very strong assumption that 
conditional variance equals a conditional mean. Therefore, we first verify the equality for all dependent 
variables, and plot the distributions which are found to be skewed, thus validating the Poisson 
regression40. Robust standard errors are used for the parameter estimates as recommended by 
Cameron and Trivedi (2009) to control for mild violation of the distributional assumption that the variance 
equals the mean.  
Plotting the distribution of MFIs, a truncation around zero is observed, given that there is a 
sufficiently high number of a district without any MFI (Table 3).  
 





Frequency Percent Cumulative 
 0 130 70% 70% 
 1 33 18% 88% 
 2 4 2% 90% 
 3 7 4% 94% 
 4 2 1% 95% 
 5 2 1% 96% 
 6 1 0.5% 96% 
 7 1 0.5% 97% 
 8 3 1.6% 98% 
 12 1 0.5% 99% 
 13 2 1% 100% 
 Total: 186 100%  
 
Therefore we estimate the probability of observing  number of MFIs given that , 
where  is a truncation point, is given by the following formula (Cameron and Triverdi, 1998). In this 




 Table 3 reports estimation results from the truncated Poisson regression.  In line with the a priori 
hypotheses and their dual private commercial nature, MFIs are established in urban areas where 
population density and the share of economically active population is high. Infrastructure provision 
measured by housing stock, and provision of water and gas pipes is found to be a significant 
                                                          







0 5 10 15
total number of both MCOs and CUs in district
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determinant of the presence of non-bank MFIs. Economic development of the regions also plays a 
significant role in institutional growth.  We find industrial production as a percentage of Gross Regional 
Product and volume of retails sales to be significant determinants of non-bank MFI growth. This is in line 
with the findings of Ahlin et al. (2010) that a larger service sector predicts faster MFI growth.  
 Given the heterogeneity of the lending mechanism, we separate the analysis for MCOs (model 
2) and CUs (model 3) (Table 4). An important finding is that we are able to identify different patterns of 
supply-side determinants across these MFIs. The determinants of MCO growth (population density, 
share of urban population, and housing stock) are closely associated with the household/family nature of 
business to which the microcredits are disbursed. In contrast, CUs serve middle class enterprises a 
higher business and economic scale, for which the economic development of the region and industrial 
composition is an important factor. This is exactly observed in the data and captured by industrial 
production and volume of retails sales. The share of the economically active population in districts is an 
important determinant for CU growth and reflects the employment capacity of higher profile SMEs 
funded by microcredits.  
 
   Table 4. Predicting number of non-bank MFIs   [Truncated Poisson]  
 
Variables: Var. mean: (1) Number of  MCO and CU 
(2) Number of  
MCO 










Econ. active population, ‘000 66.03 
 
    0.008*** 0.006     0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.005)  (0.002) 
Unemployed, % of econ. active ppl 0.34            -0.120 0.146 -0.373 
 (0.484) (0.846)  (0.613) 
Density, total ppl over territory  626 0.000*   0.000** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Urban population  46.37 0.004** 0.008*  0.004** 













  0.069** 
0.088* 0.069* 
 (0.023) (0.051) (0.028) 




           -0.001 
-0.006 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.004)  (0.001) 
Water pipes, % provision   77.97 
 
0.025** 0.002    0.032** 
 (0.009) (0.018)  (0.010) 
Gas, % provision 77.26 
 
0.019** 0.024 0.019* 
 (0.008) (0.017)  (0.009) 
Road densities  1.33 
 
-0.206 -0.608 -0.148 











SME share in GRP 2.98 
 
0.105 0.386 0.174 
 (0.111) (0.368)  (0.121) 




  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Industrial production, % of GRP 0.57 0.990* 0.353 1.089** 
 (0.424) (1.069) (0.495) 
Trade saldo, million USD 7.53 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 




 (2.05e-09) (3.44e-09) (2.71e-09) 
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Retail sales, 0’000 UZS p. c.  0.57 1.01e-08** 7.42e-09 1.11e-08** 
 (3.20e-09) (8.06e-09) (3.55e-09) 
Constant    -6.816*** -3.163 -8.069*** 
 (1.409) (3.843) (1.604) 
 
 Number of obs.  184 184 184 
 Pseudo R2  0.49 0.61 0.47 
 DoF  15 15 15 
 LR chi2  302 179 251 
Note: The table reports estimation results from a truncated Poisson regression model for count data, with robust 
standard errors. The dependent variable is an MFI number (number of MCOs and CUs), MCO number and CU number 
in districts. Non-bank MFIs include Microcredit Organizations (MCO) and Credit Unions (CU). All models passed the 
goodness-of-fit specification test. Equality of means and variances of dependent variables have been tested and 
confirmed. Local currency is the Uzbek soum (UZS). The official exchange rate was 2100 Uzbek soums to US dollar, in 
September 2013. Summary statistics of supply-side determinants are presented in Table 6. Standard errors in 
parenthesis.  *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 0% significance levels. 
 
Overall, the results of probit and truncated Poisson models suggest that non-bank microfinance 
institutions in Uzbekistan follow general economic principles. Given that these institutions represent the 
financial segment functioning based on competitive market principles, historical changes in the legal 
framework and other exogenous changes did not affect their free market functioning.  
We also find evidence of an upward selection of MFIs. As expected, they evolve in the areas 
with better infrastructure, stronger human capital and better growth opportunities. Albeit within-country 
evidence, the findings are in line with relevant macro-level studies by Vanroose (2008), Vanroose & 
D’Espallier (2009), Hermes et al. (2009) and Ahlin et al. (2010). The macro (regional) and institutional 
environment is a significant determinant of MFI appearance and growth.  
It should also be stressed that while we are able to identify the trends and decomposition of 
supply side determinants, the economic significance of estimated coefficients is quite low. This might be 
explained by the relatively nascent development stage of the microfinance sector in Uzbekistan and 
large untapped potential for growth.  
Robustness checks: Observing relatively few significant determinants in Probit and truncated 
Poisson regression models, we performed a diagnostic test for potential multicolliniarity of the variables. 
A variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis did not reveal any multicolliniarity issue either at the individual 
variable or at mean value, which is equal to 2.45 (Table 8). We also performed a sensitivity analysis41 by 
dropping one of the variables on an identified pair of correlated variables (Table 9).  The results of Probit 
and truncated Poisson regression results did not change in the significance of coefficients or in their 
sign. We therefore re-confirm the stability of the findings on the supply-side determinants of MFIs.  
Finally, we performed a factor analysis for the set of infrastructure related variables (population 
density, housing, medical points, water pipes, road density) given that they all measure similar things. 
Table 9 and 10 reports eigenvalues and factor loadings of three extracted factors: Factor 1 
                                                          
41 Results of the sensitivity analysis are available from the author upon request.  
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(urbanization), Factor 2 (housing) and Factor 3 (roads). Re-estimation of the Poisson model with Factor 
1 (urbanization) and Factor 2 (housing) did not reveal major changes of original findings (Table 3 
compared to Table 12 and Table 13).   
 
4.  Excess Demand for Microcredits   
 
 For a holistic vision of the microfinance sector, we complement the supply-side analysis with a 
demand-side one by assessing the excess demand for microcredits in Uzbekistan. This is important for 
policy agendas as, according to global data, 2.5 billion adults, almost half of the world’s population, do 
not use formal financial services (Chaia et al., 2009).  Despite this number, the true margins of the 
untapped market are not yet clear.   
 There are numerous estimates of excess demand for microcredits in Uzbekistan as well, 
provided primarily by donor evaluation reports. The estimates are stated in monetary terms or by 
numbers of people. According to the Word Bank (2007) estimates, in 2006 the microfinance market in 
Uzbekistan was deeply underserved: outstanding loans of non-bank MFIs were equivalent to 1 USD per 
capita. In comparison, bank loans to households and small enterprises averaged 7 USD per capita or 
1.2% of GDP. Based on an international comparison of the microfinance segment and assuming an 8% 
penetration rate, the estimated demand for microcredits was 500 million USD, which represented one 
third of the broad money circulating outside the banking system in 2006 (Word Bank, 2007). According 
to a UNDP (2011) forecast, the demand for microcredits is equal to 735 million USD in 2012 and is 
predicted to grow to 5772 million USD by 2020.  
However, a huge untapped demand does not necessarily mean that all are eligible to receive 
microcredit. It is also important to distinguish between use of and access to microcredits which are two 
different concepts (Figure 6).  People who are voluntarily self-excluded are not expected to demand 
microcredits. Involuntary exclusion from financial services and microcredits in Uzbekistan can be caused 
by lack of required collateral, insufficient income, high risk profile, lack of financial literacy, absence of 












Figure 6. Distinguishing access to and use of financial services  
 
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Honohan (2009) 
  
Therefore we focus on estimating the excess demand for the use of microcredits. The particular 
value added is based on the identification of eligible non-participants (ENP), as not all visitors to MFIs 
end up eventually getting a microcredit due to various reasons. This might be an important policy 
question, relevant for investment decisions and helpful in defining the actual boundaries of the markets. 
The latter is of particular concern for saturated and highly competitive markets as the pool of “good” 
clients shrinks. The methodology is based on ratio analysis of received and approved loan applications 
by non-bank MFIs. MFI managers and credit officers were asked to provide two ratios: (A) ratio of credit 
applications that are sent for application procedures, i.e., pre-screening, and (B) ratio of ultimately 
approved credit applications from the pre-screened pool. The total probability of microcredit approval by 
non-bank MFIs was found to be on average 0.5 (Table 4).  
   
 The average range for both (A) and (B) ratios is given in Table 5. While there are minor 
differences between types of MFIs, both MCOs and CUs pre-screen initial credit applications and 
inquires. Once the loan application passes initial pre-screening, there is a very high probability of final 










Yes, pproval of 
microcredit 
application 
1-(A) ratio 1-(B) ratio 
(A) ratio “good” applicants   go to 
microcredit application   
All microcredit 
applicants/enquires that 
come to MFI “bad” applicants  rejected 
orally, pre-screening  






Table 5. Total probability of obtaining microcredit in non-bank MFIs 
 
Non-bank MFI: 
(A) ratio, range (B) ratio, range (A)*(B), range 
probability of being 
successfully pre-
screened and being 
sent to  compile 
microcredit application 
folder 
probability of final 
approval of microcredit 
application 
total probability of 
microcredit approval, which 
also reflects the pool of 
eligible non-participants 
Credit Unions  0.3 - 0.8 0.80 - 0.87 0.24 – 0.7 
Microcredit Organizations  0.2 - 0.9 0.90 - 0.96 0.18 – 0.86 
 
Average for MFIs:  0.25 – 0.85 0.85 – 0.91 0.21 – 0.78 
Average of the range:  ~ 0.56 ~ 0.88 ~ 0.49 
 
The microcredit approval rate also slightly varies for CUs, depending on the seasonality of 
businesses and portfolio quality given the balance on the deposit side. Possible sources of variations in 
the above mentioned (A) and (B) ratios are potentially defined by urban/rural location of MFIs, and the 
pool of eligible and potential clients. For instance, urban clients are found to be more “capricious and 
demanding”42 than rural ones, which is reflected in difficulties in loan repayment and enforcement. Non-
bank MFIs also maintain a stable pool of loyal clients, which also guarantees a minimum level of 
demand. Some CUs and MCOs also apply marketing tools (i.e. chain marketing, promotion of credit 
products to targeted clients43) to boost demand, increase market share and diversify their credit 
portfolio.  
Based on this ratio analysis, we therefore conclude that careful consideration is needed when 
advocating that there is huge demand for microcredits. The actual margins of the untapped market could 
shrink by as much as half when the narrower definition of eligible applicants is taken into consideration. 
The result conveys policy relevance, especially when tailoring recommendations on microfinance 











                                                          
42  In-depth interviews with MFI credit officers and management.  





The chapter describes the microfinance environment in Uzbekistan with a special focus on two 
types of non-bank microfinance institutions - Credit Unions and Microcredit Organizations. The private 
commercial nature of these MFIs provides new evidence on the commercially oriented microcredit 
model and SME lending, which is an emerging trend in mainstream microfinance.  
 
The chapter provides two important contributions.  
 
On the supply side of microcredits, the determinants of initial placement of MFIs are analysed. 
Using district level data, we find that the determinants of MCO growth are closely associated with the 
household/family nature of business to which the microcredits are disbursed. In contrast, CUs serve 
middle class enterprises on a higher business and economic scale, for which the economic development 
of the region and industrial composition is an important factor. The results suggest that non-bank 
microfinance institutions in Uzbekistan follow general economic principles. Given that MFIs represent 
the financial segment functioning based on competitive market principles, historical changes in the legal 
framework and other exogenous changes did not impede their free market functioning.  
 
On the demand side, the excess demand for microcredits is analysed. The specific contribution 
is based on identification of eligible non-participants, as not all visitors to MFIs end up eventually getting 
the microcredit. Analysing the ratios from MFI managers and credit officers, we find that the total 
probability of microcredit approval is on average 0.5. This data is potentially important for policy makers, 
as actual margins of the untapped market could shrink by as much as half when the narrow definition of 
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Figure 7. Distribution of non-bank MFIs (MCO and CU) in Uzbekistan, as of January 2011 
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Table 6. Selected economic, human development and business environment indicators for 
Uzbekistan   








Population, total, million  28.2 890.2 1236.1 6840.5 
Population growth (annual %) 1.4 0.4 0.6 1.1 
GDP (current USD) billion 39 20053 42809 63124 
GDP growth (annual %) 8.5 2.4 3.1 4.2 
GDP per capita (current USD) 1384 22527 34631 9228 
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 7.0 2.1 2.4 3.0 
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 18.5 2.0 1.3 4.4 
     
 
[B] Business Environment Indicators: 
 
Uzbekistan rank 









Starting a business:  96    
Procedures, number   6 6 5 7.1 
Time, days  14 16 12 28 
Cost, % of income per capita  6.4 8.3 4.7 30.1 
Getting credit:  159    
Strength of legal rights index (0-10) 2 7 7 6 
Depth of credit information index (0-6)  3 5 5  3.4 
Public registry coverage (% of adults) 5 16.2 9.5 8.4 
Private bureau coverage (% of adults) 3.6 29.4 63.9 23.7 
Paying taxes:  157    
Payments (number per year) 41 37 13 28 
Profit tax (%) 1.1 9.3 15.4 15.6 
Total tax rate (% profit) 97.5 40.4 42.7 42.7 
Registering property 136    
Enforcing contracts 43    
Protecting investors 133    
Ease of doing business index (1=most business-
friendly regulations, out of 183 countries) 
166    
     










GNI per capita (constant 2005 USD, PPP 
terms)44   2’967 1’585 5’276 11’579 
GNI per capita [Living standards index] 0.486 0.396 0.568 0.681 
Life expectancy at birth  [Health index] 0.752 0.611 0.784 0.838 
Expected and mean years of schooling 
[Education index] 0.711 0.392 0.561 0.715 
Human Development Index [HDI] value 0.641 0.456 0.630 0.741 
Notes: the table provides a set of indicators for Uzbekistan compared with Europe and the Central Asia region, OECD countries 
and the world average. Data on [A] Macroeconomic indicators are based on World Bank World Development Indicators and the 
Global Development Finance on-line database. Data on [B] Business environment indicators are based on the “Doing Business 
Report 2012” report and on-line database.[B] Human development indicators are based on the UNDP on-line database. The HDI 
index is a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a long and 






                                                          
44 GNI per capita in Atlas method of the World Bank (current USD) was 1280 USD as of year 2010. Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 2011 database.  
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Table 7. Summary statistics district level determinants of non-bank MFIs 











population, ‘000  
economically active population, 
thousand people 66.03 41.16 7.6 252.40 
Unemployed, % of econ. 
active ppl  
number of registered unemployed 
people 0.34 0.38 0.01 2.93 
Density, total ppl over territory  total population over territory of 
the district 626 1391 1 10805 
Urban population district urban population, ‘000 








Housing stock, sq. meters per 
capita  
housing  stock, sq. meters per 
person in districts 14.13 4.06 7.10 32.70 
Medical points, number per 
10’000 ppl 
number of medical points (i.e. 
medical points, doctors, beds, 
medical receptions, doctors and 
other health infrastructure)  per 
10.000 people in districts 
152.07 59.03 27.30 380.50 
Water pipes, % provision   provision with centralized water 
pipes, % 77.97 19.75 19.70 139.90 
Gas, % provision provision with natural gas, % 77.26 22.25 0.00 100.00 
Road densities  density of roads in district, km of 











SME share in GRP  share of SME in gross regional 
product 2.98 2.76 0.00 15.65 
Gross Regional Product, 
billion UZS 
gross regional product, billion UZS 2914.8 1767.7 795.4 8502.8 
Industrial production, % of 
GRP  
industrial output,  percent of GRP 0.57 0.33 0.26 1.21 
Trade saldo, million USD  export volume – import volume, 
million USD  7.53 2.25 3.22 12.58 
Manufacturing sales,’000 UZS 
per capita  
manufacturing volume, ’000 UZS 
per capita 2915 1768 795 8503 
Retail sales, ’000 UZS per 
capita 
retail sales volume, ’000 UZS per 
capita 0.57 0.33 0.26 1.22 
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of district level variables that determine the appearance of non-bank MFIs in 
Uzbekistan. There are 14 regions in Uzbekistan with a total 184 districts. There are 184 numbers of observations per each variable. 












































population, ‘000  56 129 -43.01 60.06 72.00 -7.42 183 0.000 
Unemployed, % of econ. 
active ppl  0.24 0.39 0.15 0.034 0.27 2.53 183 0.994 
Density, total ppl over territory  








Housing stock, sq. meters per 
capita  15.21 13.65 -1.55 -2.82 -0.29 -2.42 183 0.008 
Medical points, number per 
10’000 ppl 178 140 -37.89 -55.75 -20.04 -4.18 183 0.000 
Water pipes, % provision   89.6 72.9 -16.69 -22.45 -10.93 -5.71 183 0.000 
Gas, % provision 85.83 73.53 -12.30 19.11 -5.49 -3.56 183 0.000 











SME share in GRP  8.54 7.08 -1.46 -2.13 -0.78 -4.24 184 0.000 
Gross Regional Product, 
billion UZS 3979 2456 -1523 -2037 -1010 -5.85 184 0.000 
Industrial production, % of 
GRP  0.66 0.53 -0.13 -0.23 -0.028 -2.50 184 0.006 
Trade saldo, million USD  -281 92.5 374 150 598 3.29 184 0.999 
Manufacturing sales,’000 UZS 
per capita  1.46 6502 -8144 -2.03 4004 -1.32 183 0.093 
Retail sales, ’000 UZS per 
capita 8892557 8051581 -840975 -890476 7222807 -0.205 183 0.418 
Notes: The table reports the results of a t-test for the main determinants of the placement of non-bank MFIs across districts with MFIs 



























Table 8. Test for multicollinearity 
 
 Variables: Variance Inflation Factor  1/Variance Inflation Factor  
(i)
    
    







. Economically active population, ‘000  2.27 0.440 
Unemployed, % of econ. active ppl  1.35 0.738 
Density, total ppl over territory  2.25 0.443 










Housing stock, sq. meters per capita  1.28 0.781 
Medical points, number per 10’000 ppl 1.61 0.620 
Water pipes, % provision   1.50 0.665 
Gas, % provision 1.46 0.684 
Road densities  3.54 0.282 
(iii
)  
    
    









 SME share in GRP  5.76 0.173 
Gross Regional Product, billion UZS 2.69 0.371 
Industrial production, % of GRP  2.13 0.468 
Trade saldo, million USD  4.76 0.210 
Manufacturing sales, ’000 UZS per capita  1.25 0.802 
Retail sales, ’000 UZS per capita 1.55 0.644 
 Mean VIF: 2.45  
Notes: The table reports the test results of multicollinearity measured by Variance Inflation Factor [VIF] as a post-estimation of linear 
probability model. A variable whose VIF values are greater than 10 indicate multicollinearity (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006). Tolerance, 
measured by 1/VIF, is used to check for degree of multicollinearity. A tolerance value of is chosen of 0.1 compared to a VIF of 10. 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Factor: Eigenvalue: Difference: Proportion: Cumulative: 
Factor 1 1.92 0.75 0.32 0.32 
Factor 2 1.16 0.15 0.19 0.51 
Factor 3 1.01 0.22 0.16 0.68 
Factor 4 0.78 0.16 0.13 0.81 
Factor 5 0.62 0.144 0.10 0.92 
Factor 6 0.48 . 0.08 1.00 
Notes: The table reports the results of factor analysis of infrastructure related determinants: population density, housing, medical 
points, water pipes, road density.  Based on eigenvalues the first three factors are chosen for further analysis.  





Density 0.76 0.10 0.17 0.37 
Housing -0.05 0.91 0.00 0.15 
Medical points 0.63 0.15 0.04 0.57 
Water pipes 0.72 -0.19 -0.28 0.35 
Gas 0.51 0.60 -0.07 0.36 
Road densities  -0.00 -0.01 0.96 0.06 
Notes: The table reports the results of rotated factor loadings based on the factor analysis of the following infrastructure related 




Table 12. Predicting the number of non-bank MFIs in districts of Uzbekistan, factor analysis  
[Factor 1 and Factor 2]           





- Econ. active population, ‘000     0.015***      0.015***      0.014***  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Unemployed, % of econ. active ppl -0.415 0.629 -0.882 








Factor 1[Urbanization]     0.655*** 
(0.07) 
     0.913*** 
(0.18) 
     0.590*** 
(0.08) 
Factor 2 [Housing]      0.538*** (0.12) 
  0.661* 
(0.28) 











SME share in GRP  0.272* -0.015    0.349** 
 (0.11) (0.20) (0.11) 
Gross Regional Product, billion UZS -0.000* 0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industrial production, % of GRP     1.500*** 0.455 1.667*** 
 (0.35) (1.03) (0.39) 
Trade saldo, million USD 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Manufacturing sales, 0’000 UZS p. c. -5.663e-10 3.833e-10 -1.174e-09 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Retail sales, 0’000 UZS p. c.  1.442e-08*** 9.080e-09 1.594e-08*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant   -4.6295*** -4.5884* -5.3140*** 
 (1.29) (1.83) (1.39) 
 
 Number of obs. 184 184 184 
 Pseudo R2 0.48 0.41 0.44 
 DoF 10 10 10 
 LR chi2 225 83 187 
Note: The table reports estimation results from a truncated Poisson regression model for count data, with robust standard errors. 
The dependent variable is a MFI number (number of MCOs and CUs), MCO number and CU number in districts. Non-bank MFIs 
include Microcredit Organizations (MCO) and Credit Unions (CU). All models passed the goodness-of-fit specification test. 
Equality of means and variances of dependent variables have been tested and confirmed. Infrastructure variables have been 
replaced by Factor 1 and Factor 2 based on factor analysis. Local currency is the Uzbek soum (UZS). The official exchange rate is 
2100 UZS/USD, as of September 2013. Summary statistics of supply-side determinants are presented in Table 6. Standard errors 


















Table 13. Predicting number of non-bank MFIs in districts of Uzbekistan, factor analysis [Factor 1]           
 





- Econ. active population, ‘000     0.013***   0.012**     0.013***  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Unemployed, % of econ. active ppl -0.287 0.705 -0.777 
 (0.63) (0.70) (0.82) 
(ii)
 
Inf Factor 1[Urbanization]      0.656*** (0.08) 
      0.879*** 
(0.20) 












SME share in GRP    0.254* 0.004     0.329** 
 (0.12) (0.19) (0.13) 
Gross Regional Product, billion UZS -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industrial production, % of GRP      1.117*** 0.063      1.286*** 
 (0.33) (1.05) (0.37) 
Trade saldo, million USD  0.000* 0.000   0.000* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Manufacturing sales, ’000 UZS p. c. -1.428e-09 1.698e-11 -2.304e-09 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Retail sales, ’000 UZS p. c.  1.235e-08*** 5.896e-09 1.410e-08*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant   -4.3138** -4.2121* -5.0358*** 
 (1.33) (1.66) (1.47) 
 
 Number of obs. 184 184 184 
 Pseudo R2 0.45 0.38 0.41 
 DoF 9 9 9 
 LR chi2 190 102 157 
Note: The table reports estimation results from a truncated Poisson regression model for count data, with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is 
an MFI number (number of MCOs and CUs), MCO number and CU number in districts. Non-bank MFIs include Microcredit Organizations (MCO) and 
Credit Unions (CU). All models passed the goodness-of-fit specification test. Equality of means and variances of dependent variables have been tested 
and confirmed. Infrastructure variables have been replaced by Factor 1 based on factor analysis. Local currency is the Uzbek soum (UZS). The official 
exchange rate is 2100 UZS/USD, as of September 2013. Summary statistics of supply-side determinants are presented in Table 6. Standard errors in 



















Chapter 3  
 
Better Access to Microcredits: 




Despite substantial improvements in access to finance, the geographical distance of a household to 
financial institutions still constitutes a significant obstacle in many developing countries.  This chapter aims 
to measure the causal impact of improved access to microcredits as it relates to the distance to the nearest 
microfinance institution in the case of Uzbekistan. Geographical proximity to microfinance institutions is 
also considered as a proxy for knowledge spillover effects of microcredits that have not been investigated 
before, given the challenges of measurement. The methodology is based on propensity score matching 
using initial covariates that are re-created retrospectively in a cross-sectional survey which is considered as 
a novel and robust approach for impact assessment. The findings suggest that households located closer 
to microfinance institutions are more likely to start a new business, and to generate higher revenue, but to 
reduce the number of employees of their enterprises. On the consumption side, households are found to 
invest more in human capital such as education and health and to reduce expenditures on non-durable 
items such as weddings and other social events. 
 
 
JEL Codes: O16, C34 
 























1. Introduction and Motivation  
  
According to Global Findex Data (2012), around 2.5 billion adults, roughly half of the world’s adult 
population, do not have a formal bank account (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012). This indicates the 
existence of various obstacles, including information asymmetries between borrower and lender, cost of 
transactions, legal, and geographical barriers. Market structure and interaction between formal and informal 
financial institutions account for these market failures (Karlan & Morduch, 2010).  
Over recent decades, the microfinance movement has gained worldwide recognition as an 
important tool for economic development and improved access to finance. While numerous attempts45 have 
been made to measure the direct impact of microcredit on microenterprises and consumer wellbeing, the 
evidence on learning and spillover effects is quite thin. Households with access to microcredits not only 
benefit directly from funds but more importantly learn to run microenterprise, perform financial transactions, 
and improve their financial literacy (Bauchet et al. 2011). The spillover effects occur when these information 
and learning effects spread to nearby non-recipients of microfinance programs. Therefore inferences on 
such spillover effects of microcredits are important as they may bring even more valuable and sustainable 
effects just those of the short-term effects. Group lending and peer monitoring are important tools specific 
to microfinance models that enhance knowledge spillover effects different from conventional banking 
(Barboza & Barreto, 2006). Microfinance institutions (MFIs) hold a particular niche among formal financial 
intermediaries such as banks, insurance companies and informal moneylenders. The niche is particularly 
important as consumers interact more and thus have greater opportunities to peer monitor each other than 
do formal financial institutions. This is one of the important reasons for the efficiency of nonmarket 
institutions where formal institutions fail (Besley 1995). 
This chapter is aimed at measuring the causal impact of improved access to microcredits in terms 
of the distance to the nearest MFI. Geographical distance affects spillover and learning effects of 
microfinance programs that are hard to capture directly. Proximity matters because of travel, time and other 
pecuniary costs, and, more importantly in terms of knowledge diffusion and (dis)connection from the 
microfinance network causing “signal dissipation”. Within current empirical literature this is the first 
evidence quantifying the impact of geographical obstacles on a full set of household indicators, capturing 
their business enterprise and consumption patterns.   
The evidence is based on the specific microfinance environment in Uzbekistan, Central Asia 
region. The particular market evolution in the country provoked the emergence of two types of non-bank 
                                                          




MFIs: microcredit organizations (MCOs) that operate similarly to a traditional form microfinance model 
under group lending though without external donor support, and credit unions (CUs) that function similarly 
to commercial SME finance models. The analysis therefore provides additional insights into microcredit 
impact assessment literature and specifically on the SME lending model, which is an emerging trend in the 
literature (Bauchet & Morduch, 2011; Bateman, 2010).  
The primary objective is to estimate the causal effect of better geographical proximity. Therefore 
propensity score (p-score) matching is employed as a second best solution for program evaluation in the 
absence of experimental intervention. 25% of households residing the closest to MFIs are matched with the 
25% residing the farthest, which defines the “treatment” as having easy geographical access to 
microcredits. To ensure proper implementation of matching technique, initial level covariates are re-created 
using a set of retrospective questions embodied in a single cross-sectional design. The accuracy and 
memory recall of retrospective data is ensured by the use of “fundamental events” that are discrete and 
significant in the life of households and therefore are easy to recall by survey respondents. The supply-side 
selection stemming from non-random placement of MFIs is addressed by using district level socio-
economic determinants.   
The findings indicate that in households with better access to microcredits, clients run more 
profitable enterprises in terms of significant increase in income and profits. On the other hand, they reduce 
the number of employees of their businesses. On the consumption side, households are found to make 
more rational resource allocation by investing more in human capital, captured by larger expenditures on 
health and education and reduction of non-durable items such as weddings and other social events. Overall 
results indicate a positive and significant effect of improved access to microcredits. The dataset, however, 
is limited to clearly distinguishing the extent of the underlying mechanism - whether the effect is due to 
geographical proximity or knowledge diffusion, which calls for further research.  
 
 
2. Literature Review   
2.1. Theory of Market Structure and Spillover Effects  
 Buera et al. (2012) develop a General Equilibrium model to assess the potential impact of 
economy-wide microfinance availability and credit expansion. According to theoretical predictions, typical 
microfinance programs can have significant aggregate and pro-poor redistributive impacts: benefiting the 




potentially hurting the most able and richest entrepreneurs through higher factor prices. Theoretical 
predictions are confirmed in recent experimental evaluations of microfinance programs in India (Banerjee et 
al., 2010), Thailand (Kaboski & Townsend, 2011, 2012), Mongolia (Attanasio et al., 2011), Morocco 
(Créponet al., 2011), and the Philippines (Karlan & Zinman, 2010). Experimental expansion of microcredit 
programs in these countries is found to cause an increase in investment, entrepreneurship and 
consumption of households. The findings potentially indicate that microcredit beneficiaries are indeed able 
to learn to run business enterprises more efficiently and to change their consumption behaviour towards 
more rational resource allocation.  
 Other dimensions of learning and spillover effects come from the specific nature of microfinance 
networks that are different from conventional banking. In particular, microfinance programs offer strong 
solutions for asymmetric information and moral hazard in credit markets. The underlying mechanism is 
related to social networks, the role of joint liability group lending which facilitates screening, monitoring and 
enforcement of contracts, thus reducing agency costs for MFIs (Karlan & Morduch, 2009). Using data from 
Mexico, Barboza and Barreto (2006) find that learning by association is at the core of the success of 
microcredit programs. Microcredits work as a tool, teaching clients how to manage funds, develop 
entrepreneurial skills and succeed in a market-based society. Moreover, spillover learning effects occur 
both within and across microcredit borrowing groups. Successful small entrepreneurs can educate 
members of the group who perform poorly by sharing their managerial skills and work habits. Wydick 
(1999) provides evidence from Guatemala on the role of social networks, where higher loan repayment is 
observed when borrowers are more connected to each other. Karlan (2007) shows that microcredit groups 
with greater levels of social connections such as ethnic ties and geographical proximity have lower default 
and higher savings rates. Wydick, Karp & Hilliker (2011) analyze the role of social networks as a 
determinant of MFI outreach in Guatemala. The authors find that households that belong to the same 
church also have a higher probability of obtaining the microcredit.  
 All of this evidence suggests the important role of microfinance programs and learning through 
social networks, which is lacking in conventional credit institutions. Therefore, it might be valid to assume 
that geographical proximity to MFIs serves as a “radar signal,” dissipating with distance from the network. 
The strength of learning and spillover effects, which is challenging to measure directly, could be captured 






2.2. The Role and Impact of Distance in Microcredit  
In most developing countries, geographical or physical access is among the barriers that prevent 
small businesses and poor households from accessing financial services. While some financial institutions 
allow clients to access financial services over the phone or via the Internet, most financial institutions 
including MFIs require clients to visit a branch, ensuring repayment and collection of hard and soft 
information (World Bank, 2008; Presbitero, 2012). 
The role of geographical distance has been widely investigated in commercial banking as a proxy 
for transportation costs and informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers (Allesandrini, 
Fratianni, Zazzaro, 2009; Allesandrini, Fratianni, Zazzaro, 2010). Decentralized banking systems and 
geographical proximity is considered a key factor for access to credit, given that local bank branches 
guarantee personal contacts with borrowers through which hard and soft information is collected. This 
allows financial institutions to reduce the costs of monitoring of borrowers (Presbitero & Ravellotti, 2012).   
Compared to conventional banks, the geographical outreach of microfinance institutions has been 
less studied, mainly due to a general assumption that MFIs are close to beneficiaries and locally embedded 
in the communities they operate in (Bateman & Chang, 2009). Gulli & Berger (1999) find that poor 
infrastructure, unfavorable geographic conditions and low population density hinders the outreach of MFIs 
in remote and rural areas.  
As noted previously, there are few studies measuring the direct effect of geographical distance on 
access to microcredit and on loan outcomes. Few studies evaluate the impact of the distance on loan 
repayment rates but find contrasting results: while distance is negatively correlated with microcredit 
repayment in Nigeria (Oke, Adeyemo & Agbonlahor, 2007), the same effect has not been found in Malaysia 
(Roslan & Karim, 2009).  Providing evidence from Niger, Pedrosa and Do (2011) consider the physical 
distance between borrowers and MFI as a proxy for transportation costs and information asymmetries. To 
counter with the effects of geographical distance, MFIs adapt their policies through more restrictive loan 
conditions, higher interest rates and more intensive screening. Providing evidence from Mexico, Barboza 
and Trejos (2009) find that urban versus rural location of MFIs, and thus geographical barriers, have a 
significant influence on group lending and peer monitoring in microcredit repayment. Presbitero and 
Rabellotti (2012) estimate the effect of distance on a borrower’s self-assessed outcome of a microcredit 
project in Colombia and confirm the presence of moral hazard where agency cost is found to increase with 




There are two recent non-experimental studies which examine the impact of geographical distance 
to an MFI on financial inclusion.  Allen et al. (2013) employ household survey and bank penetration data 
from Equity Bank in Kenya. The findings suggest that the presence of Equity Bank has a positive and 
significant impact on households’ use of bank accounts and bank credit, especially for those who are 
ignored by traditional commercial banks. Brown et al. (2013) study the expansion of the branch network of 
ProCredit banks in South-East Europe between 2006 and 2010. In particular, the authors examine how 
geographical proximity to a microfinance bank affects the use of bank accounts by low-income households. 
The findings suggest that microfinance banks promote financial inclusion even in emerging markets where 
conventional banks perform their lending activities well. Compared to studies that measure the effect of 
distance, this chapter contributes to the literature in the following aspects. First, within current empirical 
findings this is the first evidence of the impact of geographical distance on business indicators and 
household consumption behavior. This might convey important policy perspectives given the vast donor 
interest in the microfinance sector and the choice of location for establishing a microfinance institution. 
More importantly, the causal impact is assessed by addressing both demand and supply side selection bias 
of microcredit participation, thus ensuring the robustness of results.  Second, distance is used as a proxy 
for broader learning and spillover effects of microcredits that have not been investigated before given the 
challenges of the measurement. In contrast to other empirical studies, the sample includes not only 
borrowers, but also non-borrowers. The specific microfinance environment in Uzbekistan provides evidence 
of private commercial non-bank MFIs supporting both consumer and business loans. The country’s 
heterogeneous geographical landscape is beneficial as it validates the use of distance to the nearest MFI 
as an informative proxy.  
 
2.3. Why Distance is a Good Proxy 
 There are several indicators that measure geographical access to finance, including average 
distance from household to branch (or ATM), the density of branches per square kilometer or per capita, 
and average time necessary for the borrower to reach an MFI branch (World Bank, 2008).  In this paper, 
geographical access to microcredit is measured in kilometer distance to the nearest non-bank MFI. The 
following factors justify the use of this measure as an informative proxy to capture learning effects of 
households.   
 With an area of 447,400 km2 Uzbekistan is the 56th largest country in the world. The country has a 




district centers are based on established paved road connections. Therefore the minimum distance to the 
nearest non-bank MFI consists of at least a few kilometers, which makes the cost of travel significant46.  
According to the World Bank (2011), Uzbekistan is a lower middle-income country. Being on the 
developing path the country’s infrastructure provision (i.e. credit facilities, collateral appraisal offices and 
other registries required for loan application and enterprise development) are potentially unevenly 
distributed, being most likely concentrated in regional and district centers. Therefore, geographical barriers 
constitute significant obstacles not only to accessing MFIs, but also related infrastructure, which in turn 
determine the demand for microcredits. It may be valid to expect that there is no need for microcredits if 
there is no related credit registry infrastructure.  
 
3. Country Context and Microfinance Institutions  
Uzbekistan is a lower middle-income country located in the heart of the Central Asia and a former 
member of the Soviet Union, having gained its independence in 1991. With 28.2 million inhabitants, the 
country accounts for almost 40% of the population of the Central Asia region. Microfinance programs in the 
country were first pioneered by United Nations Development Programs in 1998, with the conventional 
mission to alleviate poverty, smooth the transition period and boost employment, especially in remote 
areas. Over the 1998 - 2011 period, the microfinance landscape in Uzbekistan changed substantially, 
driven mainly by legal changes, and the microfinance sector became an important non-bank segment of the 
financial system.47 These changes provoked the emergence of two types of private and for profit non-bank 
microfinance institutions. Credit Unions (CUs) issue individual microcredits for both business and 
consumption needs and attract deposits. Differing from international practice, in Uzbekistan CUs are open 
to the general public and are not limited to a close, “professional” membership. Microcredit Organizations 
(MCOs) operate similarly to Grameen type group lending under joint liability and a small collateral 
requirement with dynamic incentives and greater female participation. CUs and MCOs hold a particular 
microcredit niche between commercial banks and informal money lenders. The average loan size is USD 
2200 in CUs and USD 530 in MCOs, compared to USD 3500 in bank microlending.  
While conventional banks serve the higher-end segment and corporate clients, non-bank MFIs 
target economically active households and those above the official poverty line (UNDP, 2011). Canonical 
microfinance lending, supported by international donors and subsidies, has a basic mission to reduce 
                                                          
46There might be, however, a potential measurement error and bias given that geographical distance is not necessarily 
equivalent to road connection. 




poverty and therefore targets households of the lowest income group. In contrast, in this chapter, the 
impact of commercial, SME microlending is measured - the segment that serves the middle range of the 
population above the poverty line. Therefore, different effects on business and consumption outcomes 
might be expected than those of canonical microlending48.  
In addition to their private nature, both MCOs and CUs are subject to uniform licensing from a 
regulatory body – the Central Bank. The license requirement implies that MFIs have to meet the 
established minimum standards for microfinance operations. The uniform provision of microcredits in turn 
helps to address the heterogeneity on the supply side in impact assessment.  
 
4. Methodology  
 
4.1. Conceptual Framework and Outcome Indicators 
 
The overall approach for impact assessment is based on retrospective design with the aim of re-
creating the covariates for matching procedure (Figure 1).  
 















                                                          
48 Specifically critics of microcredits suggest that job creation that boosts economic growth and hence reduces poverty is better 
done by larger enterprises, defined as small and medium enterprises, rather than conventional microenterprises (Karnani 2007). 
M. Yunus’ original model assumed that small, informal microenterprises supported by microloans can be unlimitedly absorbed by 
weak local economies of developing countries. However, being tiny, unskilled, informal start-ups, these microenterprises 
eventually did not have enough capacity to scale-up, diversify and innovate, leading to an unproductive underdeveloped 
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The building blocks of impact evolution start with the supply side and MFI establishment. First, an 
MCO or CU is established institutionally and evolves steadily, expanding its loan portfolio. Acknowledging 
institutional growth cycles, MFIs of similar age are selected for this study, which ensures that they are in a 
similar development stage. Clients joining MFIs could be of two types - newcomers and those switching 
from other types of institutions. Once an MFI is opened, clients start taking credits for business or 
consumption purposes. The retrospective time window of 10 years is chosen to capture these changes and 
evolution of the impact of microcredits. The window could not be too large given the trade-off between 
accuracy of retrospective data and memory recall (Beckett et al. 2001).    
The aggregate impact of access to microcredits is divided into business and consumption behavior. 
For both MCOs and CUs, portfolio expansion comes from issuing credits for individual entrepreneurship 
and small businesses. In particular, the retail nature of these businesses yields high turnover and profit 
(UNDP, 2005). Therefore, a significant impact of microcredits on business revenue, profit and employment 
is expected. For consumption behaviour, the portfolio of household expenditure is studied, with a detailed 
break-down of education, health, consumer durables and other items. The choice of business and 
consumption channels is made according to theoretical predictions claiming that credits are fungible within 
households and that once borrowed for self-employment purposes, they may be used instead to cover 
immediate household needs such as expenditures on basic needs, health and education, purchase of 
consumer durables, and social events (Karlan & Goldberg, 2011).  
 
4.2. Parameters of Interest 
 The objective is to estimate the causal impact of distance to microcredits. In this regard, there are 
two possible parameters to estimate: [1] the ATT (average treatment on the treated) effect. This would be 
the average effect of borrowing on consumption and entrepreneurial activity of those which borrow. In this 
case, to estimate ATT, the consumption and business activities of borrowers to that of non-borrowers has 
to be compared. Given the non-random assignment of borrowing, respondent distance to the next MFI 
could then be used as an instrument for borrowing in an IV framework or a conditioning variable in a 
matching framework of borrowers vs. non-borrowers. [2] An alternative approach would be to estimate the 
ITT (intention to treat) effect which is commonly used in experimental studies. In this case, the estimation 
strategy would imply a comparison of consumption and business activity of households which are close to 




account for non-random location of MFI branches. A matching procedure based on region-level 
characteristics would be an appropriate estimation strategy.   
 Acknowledging the nature of the survey and the data collection, in this chapter the parameter to 
estimate is similar to ITT but of different intensity to treat which is proxied by geographical proximity. Thus 
we match 25% of respondents living closest to MFIs to 25% of respondents living farthest from MFIs.  
There are two sources of the bias that plague consistent estimates of the causal impact of 
microfinance programs: (i) demand side selection, given that microfinance clients are not a random sample 
of the population and are self-selected into MFIs based on unobserved characteristics, and (ii) supply side 
selection,  given that MFIs are non-randomly established in districts. Addressing the demand side selection, 
microfinance impact assessment literature and findings are broadly divided into experimental, so-called 
randomized control trials (RCT) and non-experimental methods. A detailed overview and the trade-off 
between consistencies of experimental versus non-experimental studies can be found in Smith and Todd 
(2005), Dehejia and Wahba (2002), and, specific methods applied in the microfinance context are 
thoroughly discussed in Armenda ́riz and Morduch (2010) and Armenda ́riz and Labie (2011). 
Propensity score matching is employed as a second best solution for demand side selection bias in 
the absence of experimental intervention (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983)49. The notion of “treatment” in this 
case is related to the distance to the nearest non-bank MFI. Therefore, the 25% of households residing the 
closest to MFIs are matched with the 25% residing the farthest, using a set of pre-treatment covariates, 
household characteristics and supply-side determinants, thus ensuring the robustness of results for both 
demand and supply side selections. Given the variety of the matching technology (i.e., nearest-
neighborhood, kernel, stratification, radius, caliper) a matching algorithm is chosen, considering the trade-
offs between the bias and efficiency. In this chapter, kernel matching (equation below) is applied, as it has 
the major advantage of lower variance, given that the common support condition is fully satisfied (Caliendo 
& Kopeinig, 2008): 
                                                          
49While matching is the second best solution for impact assessment in the absence of experimental design, alternative 
verification could be a regression analysis using instrumental variables to control for selection and endogeneity of microcredit 
participation decision. The regression approach, however, imposes strong functional form (linearity) over the common support 
area while matching is non-parametric. Regressions also use functional form to work off the common support, which can be 
highly misleading (Jurajda, 2012). Effectively, what matters the most is not the estimation method itself (regression or matching), 
but whether the data is balanced. The latter is ensured in p-score matching, which is verified in matching results as well. Despite 
this methodological expectation, we still use two stages least square [2SLS] regression analysis which is performed 
instrumenting an “easy-difficult access” treatment dummy in the first stage. Neither selected instrument passed the Sargan test 





















Matching involves comparison of treated and control groups with respect to their observable 
characteristics, which are similar for both groups. When the treatment participation and outcome variables 
are independent, conditional on pre-treatment covariates, and the relevant differences are captured in the 
observable covariates, the matching method can result in an unbiased estimate of the treatment impact 
(Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). There are two important assumptions that validate the application of p-score 
matching: (1) Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) – which implies that,  given the probability of an 
individual participating in the treatment based on observed covariates, potential outcome variables are 
independent of assignment to treatment. In other words, conditioning on observable characteristics, 
assignment to treatment can be taken “as if” random; (2) sufficient common support condition implies that 
treatment and control groups should have sufficient overlap after matching. Matching on the propensity 
score is essentially a weighting scheme, which determines what weights are placed on comparison units 
when computing the estimated treatment effect (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983; Dehejia & Wahba 2002). The 
complete algorithm for implementing p-score matching consists of at least six stages and is well described 
in Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). 
 
4.3. Supply Side Selection 
In addition to the demand-side selection of microfinance clients, there is a potential bias stemming 
from a non-random placement of microfinance institutions (Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Armenda ́riz & Morduch, 
2010). The direction of supply-side selection could go in either direction. Poverty oriented donor MFIs are 
established in poorer areas, thus causing a downward bias. In contrast, an upward supply-side bias stems 
from the fact that profit oriented MFIs evolve in economically advantageous areas or places with better 
credit infrastructure. Given the absence of donor participation and the commercial focus of non-bank MFIs 
in Uzbekistan, there is evidence of upward supply-side selection50. Using district level data, a truncated 
Poisson regression is estimated, given the uneven distribution of MFIs across regions. Non-bank MFIs are 
found to be placed in districts with higher population density and a greater share of economically active 
people, areas with better infrastructure and industrially developed regions. Therefore supply-side 
                                                          




determinants are included in matching algorithm and thus ensure the robustness of the impact.  
 
On the methodology side, we try to ensure the robustness of control of the supply-side selection by 
inclusion of the determinants. In particular there are three equations: first, an MFI opens the branch. 
Second, given that a branch is opened in a district – clients apply for microcredits. Third, given the 
application - microcredits are awarded. In our case we estimate the reduced form equation treating the 
location of MFIs in districts as endogenous. According to our results, MFIs are to be opened in districts with 
favourable conditions of microlending. Therefore we have tried to capture the most significant determinants 
of MFIs’ placement and believe that in this way we capture the supply-side selection. Meanwhile, to find a 
pure supply-side selection bias an experimental approach could have been applicable.    
We believe that coefficients of the supply-side determinants found in our chapter are potentially 
higher than if there was a pure random placement of MFIs in districts or experimental assessment. This 
could be due to increased female participation, the effect of greater wealth and better infrastructure - MFI 
determinants found in this chapter. Moreover we do not have valid instruments to control for potential 
reverse causality between MFIs’ placement and the determinants. Therefore, we believe that the 
determinants found correctly address the supply-side selection though the coefficients are potentially higher 
than if they had been estimated using experimental solutions.  
 
4.4. Retrospective Methodology 
 
The propensity score matching employed in this chapter is based on covariates measured by a set 
of retrospective questions embodied in a cross-section survey design. The retrospective covariates control 
for initial conditions that determine the decision of the borrowers for taking microcredits and distance to the 
nearest MFI.  
In the context of microfinance there are only a few studies which use the retrospective approach. 
McIntosh et al. (2011) survey households in Guatemala to examine the access to microcredit on dwelling 
improvement. The authors include major diseases, deaths, school enrolments, and major asset purchases 
among memorable events, while considering changes in profits and revenues among those which are more 
difficult to remember with precision. The authors find that access to microfinance causes a small but 
positive increase in the probability of housing improvement. Becchetti & Castriota (2011) evaluated the 
effectiveness of microcredits as a post tsunami recovery tool in Sri Lanka. Applying a similar retrospective 




and hours worked after microcredit financing. The authors define four retrospective periods in relation to the 
occurrence of the tsunami and obtained microcredit. The authors find microloans obtained from MFI after 
the tsunami has a positive and significant effect on real income and hours worked. Becchetti & Conzo 
(2010) ask retrospectively about the years of schooling and age of children of microfinance borrowers and 
comparison group of non-borrowers in Buenos Aires. The authors find a positive and significant effect of 
microcredit history on child schooling.  
Hermes & Lensink (2011) acknowledge the importance of a retrospective approach as a cost 
effective way of microfinance impact assessment. In contrast to previous studies, the value added of this 
approach is that respondents from the non-borrower group are included. The retrospective methodology 
also goes beyond measuring 1-0 discrete data on fundamental events as in McIntosh et al. (2011) to 
measuring the magnitude of changes, which enables one to quantify the actual margins of the impact. 
Moreover, there is no exogenous identification of retrospective periods as in Becchetti & Castgriota (2011). 
Respondents were asked about the year and cost incurred of an associated fundamental event which 
minimizes the memory recall bias.   
Proper retrospective data collection is one of the fundamental challenges, as measurement error 
and accuracy of recall should be minimized. This is directly linked to an understanding of the structure of 
autobiographical memory. In particular, there are hierarchical thematic and temporal structures that define 
human memory and mechanisms of recall51. Acknowledging such structures of autobiographical memory, 
there are two distinct ways to collect retrospective data. The first is “Event history calendar” method or 
simply calendar interviewing. This method is based on the hierarchical network of the memory that includes 
extended, summarized and specific events, and therefore permits retrieval of past events through multiple 
pathways that work top-down in the hierarchy, sequentially within life themes that unify extended events, 
and in parallel across life themes that involve contemporaneous and sequential events (Belli 1998; Belli 
2007). The second is a standardized interviewing method, which is based on traditional survey questions 
that tend to segment related aspects of autobiographical events from one another and do not reflect the 
interrelatedness of events as indicated within the structure of autobiographical memory.  
Given the objectives of impact assessment and the aim of retrieving general events, the 
standardized interview method was applied, where retrospective questions are embodied in a survey 
                                                          
51There are three fundamental levels that define the structure of autobiographical memory: (i) lifetime periods - reflect long-term 
extended events, thematic divisions of one’s autobiography (ii) general events - short-term extended events and summarized 
events which are lifetime periods that nest general events (iii) episodic memories – consists of a pool of detailed sensations and 




questionnaire. Specifically, the retrospective questions were designed to ask respondents about the year of 
and cost incurred for particular events which are psychologically significant, discrete, and therefore easily 
memorable in the lives of respondents52. The accuracy of recall was additionally ensured through 
application of timelines, public landmarks53 and specific training of interviewers. Acknowledging country-
specific traditions, historical changes in the following fundamental events are assumed to capture the 
immediate effect of microcredits: (i) weddings and other family ceremonies (ii) housing renovation and 
construction; (iii) purchase of major consumer durables54; (iv) business income, profit and size in terms of 
number of employees. In addition, a retrospective borrowing history (i.e. loan amount, interest paid, 
maturity, collateral pledged) from formal (bank, MCO, CU) and informal financial sources (friends, relatives, 
moneylenders) was collected.  
Retrospective covariates are re-created using a set of retrospective questions embodied in a cross-
sectional survey. Based on the record of weddings and tracking the births of children, the year-by-year 
dynamics of family structure and household size are re-created. For household wealth55 covariates, the 
year, magnitude of change (i.e. cost of acquisition, expenditure) and current market values are used. 
Therefore, households with similar demographics and initial wealth conditions are matched. The dynamic 
retrospective panel is re-created in several steps based on the following segments:  
(a) Household demographics: a family grid, which records all family members, is combined with 
their gender and age, and the weddings track to generate the dynamics of household size and 
composition56. The leading adjustment in family demographics is based on births and weddings57.   
(b) Wealth: reconstruction of wealth is based on the record of household and business assets. For 
each of 12 types of consumer durables and housing premises, current market value, a retrospective record 
of their year and cost of purchase are used to re-create year-by-year values. The assets are then re-
                                                          
52 As a matter of pride and self-esteem respondents were keen to share and therefore recalled easily weddings of their children, 
possession and acquisition of consumer durables. Therefore inaccuracy of recall is assumed to be minimal.  
53 It is a tradition in Uzbekistan to proclaim each calendar year with a particular social agenda, which is promoted heavily 
throughout the whole year and is uniform across regions. Therefore, for each retrospective question, respondents were reminded 
by the corresponding “public landmark”.   
54 The list of consumer durables comprised 12 items including furniture, major household appliances, vehicles, livestock and 
poultry. The list is also in line with national poverty indicators.  
55 Household wealth is a sum of major consumer durables, livestock, vehicles, residential premises.   
56 One member is dropped for a particular year if there is a female in the family between the age of 17 and 30, and a wedding is 
recorded in the same year; one member is added for particular year if there is a male in the family between the age of 20 and 35, 
the wedding is recorded and a childbirth is recorded shortly after the marriage. Additional coordinates for precise identification of 
the male wedding come from cost-free record of furniture sets which according to local traditions brides bring into their husbands’ 
household as part of their dowry. All newborn children are dropped when re-creating initial values retrospectively. 
57 There are other sources of changes in family demographics such as death, migration and divorce. However, in light of the 




grouped into major categories such as durables, vehicles, livestock and housing. All assets are then 
collapsed to generate overall wealth dynamics. A similar methodology was used for home renovations and 
constructions.  
(c) Timing: the timing of receiving microcredits is not imposed exogenously but is rather allowed to 
be endogenously identified based on a complete borrowing history both from formal and informal lending 
sources. This enables implicit estimation of the level of substitution on the market between the sources. 
Retrospective covariates represent the lagged values where the timing is tied to the year when microcredit 
is received from non-bank MFI. The timing is defined as a year when a first credit from CU was taken and 
second if borrowed from MCO58. Given that group lending and dynamic incentives applied in MCOs it is 
assumed that only after the second borrowing the impact will be internalized and therefore captured.  
 
4.5. Full List of Covariates  
Validity of the conditional independence (CIA) assumption and overall matching quality is directly 
linked to appropriate inclusion and exclusion of covariates. The matching strategy is built on CIA, requiring 
that outcome variables must be independent of treatment conditional on the propensity score. Therefore, 
implementing matching requires the choice of a set of variables that credibly satisfy this condition (Caliendo 
& Kopeinig, 2005). Neither too many covariates, nor a too “trimmed” model is recommended. Therefore, 
covariates are chosen based on economic theory, features of microfinancing and lending policy of MFIs in 
Uzbekistan. To estimate the impact, the following covariates are employed, and are grouped into three 
major blocks. A detailed list of all covariates, definitions and the methodology of construction of the score 
(index) based variables can be found in the appendix, Table 8.  
(i) Observable characteristics: this group of covariates includes the standard, observed variables 
that determine the probability of obtaining the credit from any type of lender [age, age square, occupation 
dummies, household size]. To capture the economic power of families of similar size [household size, 
considering household members in economic age] is included. [Household assets per capita] is a proxy for 
borrowing capacity, wealth and collateral requirements for microcredit contract. To account for business 
entrepreneurship activity [business possession] over the previous 5 years and the total number of 
businesses in the family for the past 10 years [business number] is included to capture any substitution 
                                                          
58 This is primarily justified by the lending methodology of these institutions. CUs focus on higher value transaction, and the 
average credit size is USD 2200. Given the focus on group lending and dynamic incentives, average credit size in MCOs 





effects and overall repayment capacity of the respondents. The registration status of the business makes a 
fundamental difference not only at the credit application stage, which is defined by law for tax reporting 
purposes, but also for any potential legal liabilities and the possibility of screening  by the lender. To 
capture this effect, the dummy for household possession of any registered business [registered business] 
and their quantity [registered business number] is employed.  
(ii) Qualifications, skills characteristics: Education is an important determinant of the success of 
business enterprises and the probability of obtaining credit. This set of covariates (dummies) aims to 
capture the level of education and to account for the transition period from the former Soviet system in the 
early 1990s. It is assumed that the quality of provision of public services such as health, education, and 
social safety net deteriorated in the early transition period, given the change from a planned to a 
competitive market economy. Therefore the following interaction dummies are introduced: interaction of 
major education types with male/female dummies [education • gender] and pre- and post-transition age of 
the respondents [education • age in transition].  
(iii) Behavioural characteristics: Any entrepreneurship activity is tightly related to risk tolerance and 
business savvy. Therefore, these aspects are captured in the methodology based on the recent findings on 
behavioural aspects of microfinance and consumer lending (Bauer et al 2011; Ashraf et al. 2006; Lusardi 
2008). In particular [financial literacy], [trust to MFIs], [locus of control] and [risk aversion] aim to capture 
important cognitive abilities of the respondents and thus address the demand side selection bias, which is 
mostly based on unobserved features.  Most of these covariates represent the score (index) earned by 
survey respondents on related questions.  
 
5. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
The data was collected during January-March 2011 in three regions of Uzbekistan. Given the 
absence of donor-funded microfinance programs, all CUs and MCOs emerged for commercial purposes 
and their geographical distribution is quite uneven. The survey regions have been identified based on the 
density and maturity of MFIs: the capital Tashkent (72 non-bank MFIs), Tashkent region (16 non-bank 
MFIs), and Fergana region (25 non-bank MFIs). The survey included two groups of respondents and the 
following sampling procedures were applied for each group respectively:   
Sampling of borrower’s group: In each survey region, one CU and one MCO was selected based 
on maturity, size measured by total assets portfolio, and total number of clients. Selection of MFIs based on 




years. The borrower’s group constituted only active clients with sufficient credit history and outstanding 
loans. The borrowers’ group is comprised of borrowers from MCOs and borrowers from CUs sub-samples.  
Sampling of non-borrowers’ group: Both CUs and MCOs issue loans for entrepreneurship activity 
and consumption purposes. A comparison group of non-borrowers is comprised of two sub-groups: (a) non-
borrower entrepreneurs - identified as individuals who have entrepreneurship activities that  generate profit 
and assumes self-employment; (b) non-borrower households without entrepreneurship activities - the 
respondent was identified as a household head, the most knowledgeable person in the family of 
economically active age59. For the non-borrower’s group a multi-stage random quota sampling was used. 
The total sample size of the survey constituted 1086 observations. The distribution of the sample across 
four types of respondents is as provided in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Respondents’ group and sample size  






Organization [MCO]   
microcredit borrowers who have been active over the  past few 
years 
224 [21%] 
Borrower of Credit 
Union [CU]  







respondent was identified as an individual engaged in 







respondent was identified as the household head - the most 
knowledgeable person in the family of an economically active age 
[for women 18-55 years old, for men 18-60 years old]   
288 [27%] 
  Total: 1086 [100%] 
 
 Table 2 further summarizes the location of the respondents across four distance quantiles, where 
comparison of those living the nearest (first quantile) and the farthest (fourth quantile) to non-bank MFI is 
important for impact assessment. Therefore, the respondents of the first quantile are defined as having 
easy access to microcredits and those in the fourth quantile as having difficult access. The difference in the 
sample size across the 3rd [279 respondents] and 4th [259 respondents] distance quantiles reflect sampling 




                                                          




Table 2. Four quantiles of distance to nearest MFI  
Distance 
quantiles: 














1 [nearest] 3.9 1.4    55 [20%]    101 [37%]     59 [22%]  59 [22%]  274 [100%]  
  2 15.5 8.0    100 [37%]  89 [32%]     42 [15%]  43 [16%]  274 [100%]  
  3 50.5 12.8      24 [9%]  35 [12%]         125 [45%]  95 [34%]  279 [100%]  
4 [farthest] 87.5 22.6    45 [17%]  37 [14%]           86 [33%]  91 [35%]  259 [100%]  
        
      224 [21%]    262 [24%]         312 [29%]  288 [26%] 1086 [100%]  
 
Further household characteristics and outcome variables across distance quantiles are compared 
(Table 3).  An interesting observation is that more female clients [60%] reside in the first distance quantile. 
This could be due to sampling procedures and MCO clients, 80% of which are woman. Overall, it is visible 
that those households with better access to microcredits are more female, of younger age, have higher 
skills, are better educated and make up a significant share of entrepreneurship activity. This has a potential 
indication on learning and spillover effect of the presence of MFIs in nearby area, in line with the initial 
hypothesis. While the effect of defiers is not expected, proximity to microfinance institutions therefore could 
be a proxy for information and learning spillover. 
 
Table 3. Business and household consumption indicators across distance quantiles 
 Variables:  
Var. mean across four quantiles of distance 
to nearest MFI  
1 
nearest  
2 3 4 
farthest  
Total:  
Demographics  Respondent age  [years] 39  41  43 40 41  
Female dummy  0.62 0.41 0.35 0.40 0.45 
Household size 4.23 4.75 5.33 5.00 4.82 
Education  Basic secondary education  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 
Complete secondary education  0.25 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.26 
Secondary vocation education  0.38 0.38 0.46 0.48 0.42 
Higher education  0.32 0.34 0.23 0.17 0.27 
Occupation  Has own business   0.54 0.56 0.58 0.45 0.55 
Has hired job   0.33 0.22 0.20 0.32 0.26 
Self-employed   0.02 0.03 0.10 0.15 0.08 
Unoccupied  0.12 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.11 
Behavioural  Financial literacy   12.02 12.02 11.75   10.65 11.62 
Trust to MFIs 0.61 0.66 0.33    0.50 0.53 
Locus of control  0.23 0.13 0.17   0.15   0.17   
Risk aversion   0.45 0.51    0.47 0.47 0.47 
Initial 
covariates   
Household wealth, -1 lag [‘000 UZS]   992  1645   695 1903 1299   
Household wealth, -2 lag [‘000 UZS]   801     1244 603    1820 1110   
Wedding expenditures, -1 lag [‘000 UZS]   1110    436   691 551    517 
Wedding expenditures, -2 lag [‘000 UZS]   354  390 662   511 480 




Construction expenditures, -2 lag [‘000 UZS]   296  346 394 269    326 
Business 
outcome var. 
Business revenue [‘000 UZS]   33229  37469 17231 49507 33893 
Business profit [‘000 UZS]   12886    14875 5800 25948 14519 
Business size [no. of employees]  2.23 2.70     3.84   4.48 3.28 
 Number of businesses per household  0.74 0.84 0.79 0.71 0.77 
 Number of registered businesses per household  1.16   1.08 1.01 1.09 1.08   
Consumption 
outcome var. 
Total household expenses [‘000 UZS]   22601  24398   39741 31964   29651 
Education  expenses [‘000 UZS]   1616  2665 1805 1095 1792   
Health expenses [‘000 UZS]   320    317 255 224 279 
Social expenses [‘000 UZS]   4771  5952 10357 6764 6955 
Expenses on housing [‘000 UZS]   6500  5806   13936 8055    8587    
Expenses on basic needs [‘000 UZS]   5960    5971   6802 7212 6481    
Total income [‘000 UZS]   1321  1656 897 932 1201 
Total assets [business and household assets, 
‘000 UZS]  
91319  90699 73544 73954  82441 
Notes: The official exchange rate is 2100 Uzbek soums to US dollar, in September 2013. 
 
 
6. Results  
 
6.1. Substitutions on the Market   
 
 First, the market structure is analysed in order to make inferences regarding spillover effects of 
non-bank MFIs. Following the theoretical predictions of Tirole (2006) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), 
once a new formal and competitive lender appears, a substitution effect between formal and informal 
lending sources is expected. At first glance a noticeable substitution effect is observed in the sample. 
Given that the microlending market in Uzbekistan is segmented across formal and informal 
sources, the microcredit take-up effect (i.e., amount borrowed, interest paid, maturity) is therefore 
contrasted across these sources, as well as across the respondents’ group (Table 9). A noticeable 
substitution effect is observed. In districts where a non-bank MFI is located, the probability of borrowing 
from an informal lender constitutes 3%. In contrast, the same probability is 17% in districts where there is 
any non-bank MFI. The pattern is consistent across all survey regions. The maximum effect is observed in 
region 2 where this probability is 1.4% in districts where non-bank MFI is located versus 35% probability in 
districts where non-bank MFI is not located. The result indicates that households having access to 
microfinance institutions tend to reduce borrowing from informal sources, which are found to be the most 
expensive60 and less secure61. This suggests, first, a significant take-up effect and second, a large 
                                                          
60According to the qualitative survey of the author, the interest rate per month for credit from informal sources varies from 80% - 
90% in contrast to 1.8% in banks, 4% - 5% in MCOs and 3% - 4% in CUs.  
61Qualitative research reveals a high level of abuse of collateral and property rights of the clients when borrowed from informal 




untapped demand for credit. More importantly, the evidence indicates learning behavior of the households 
and potential spillover effects of microfinance programs. The next step is actually measuring this impact.  
 
 
6.2. Business Impact  
 First, the business channel of the impact is explored. Table 4 reports estimation results from p-
score matching for the set of business enterprise outcomes such as revenue, profit and size captured by 
the number of employees. Dependent (outcome) variables represent average values for the year 2010.  
 
Table 4. Impact of better access to microcredit on business outcomes   
 











ATT SE bootstrapped  ATT p>|z| 
[1] Business revenue [‘000 UZS]   274 259 17065.3*** 2021.6 0.000 
[2] Business profit [‘000 UZS]   274 259 5309.2***    1103.6         0.000 
[3] Business size [no.  of employees] 274 259       -0.05    0.081     0.538 
Notes: The table represents estimates of propensity score matching implemented by kernel matching using covariates listed 
in Tables 8. Respondents in the 1st [top 25% living nearest to MFI] and 4th distance quantiles [bottom 25% living farthest from 
MFI] are matched, respondents from the 2nd and 3rd distance quantiles are excluded. Business income and profits are 
measured in local currency, thousands of Uzbek soums. The official exchange rate is 2100 Uzbek soums to a US dollar, in 
September 2013.  *, **, *** denotes 10%, 5% and 0% significance levels.  The number of observations is based on re-created 
retrospective panel structure. Estimated pseudo R2 is 0.19. Quality of matching and balancing test results is reported in Table 
10.  
 
The primary observation is that better access to microcredits has a positive and significant impact 
on business revenue and profits. No significant impact is observed on the size of micro-enterprises 
captured by the number of persons employed. This could be interpreted as a cost reduction following the 
expansion of the business after obtaining the microcredit. Another plausible explanation is related to the 
micro, family scale of business.  Typical entrepreneurship activity supported by microcredits relies first on 
the help of family members and then externally hired employees, who are more costly for the business. 
The obtained results are in line with the findings of Banerjee et al. (2010), which confirm that 
existing business owners benefit from access to credit and are able to expand their enterprises.  An 
observed positive impact on profits and insignificant impact on business employment confirms the previous 
findings of Karlan and Zinman (2010), claiming that successful business entities which have successfully 




concept of the business start-up model of microfinance intervention and specifically the country context of 
commercially oriented MFIs that serve middle-income class clients.  
 
6.3. Consumption Behaviour  
 The second channel is based on the analysis of consumption patterns at household level. The 
impact is estimated both on aggregate measures such as total household expenses, total income and total 
assets and by disentangling them into individual expenditures items (Table 5). Dependent (outcome) 
variables represent average values for year 2010.  
 
 
Table 5. Impact of better access to microcredit on consumption behaviour 
    
Outcome  variables: 
No. of 
respondents 





living in 4st 
distance 
quantile 
ATT SE bootstrapped  ATT p>|z| 
[1] Total HH expenses62 [‘000 UZS]   274 259 -4331.9***    1109.1     0.000 
[2] Education  expenses [‘000 UZS]   274 259 346.1***    81.3      0.000 
[3] Health expenses [‘000 UZS]   274 259 114.1***    12.4        0.000 
[4] Social expenses [‘000 UZS]   274 259    -683.3**     313.3       0.029 
[5] Expenses on housing [‘000 UZS]   274 259    -1153.7   775.7 0.137 
[6] Expenses on basic needs [‘000 UZS]   274 259 503.3***       96.5 0.000 
[7] Total income [‘000 UZS]   274 259 496.5***    23.3     0.000 
[8] Total assets [‘000 UZS]   274 259 40772.8***     1895.9 0.000 
Notes: The table represents estimates of propensity score matching implemented by kernel matching using covariates listed 
in Tables 8. Respondents in the 1st [top 25% living nearest to MFI] and 4th distance quantiles [bottom 25% living farthest from 
MFI] are matched, respondents from the 2nd and 3rd distance quantiles are excluded. Business income and profits are 
measured in local currency, thousands of Uzbek soums. The official exchange rate is 2100 Uzbek soums to a US dollar, in 
September 2013.  *, **, *** denotes 10%, 5% and 0% significance levels.  The number of observations is based on re-created 
retrospective panel structure. Estimated pseudo R2 is 0.21. Quality of matching and balancing test results is reported in Table 
10. 
 
Matching statistically close households on observable characteristics, better access to MFIs is 
found to produce positive and significant impacts on household consumption behavior and assets. The 
result is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Kaboski and Townsend (2012) of an overall increase 
in consumption.  
The impact on total household expenditures is found to be negative and significant, which might be 
a potential indication of re-allocation of the resources within households toward a reduction of expenditures 
on non-durables and an increase on durable expenses. This is confirmed by a positive increase in 
                                                          




expenses on education and health, indicating greater investment in human capital. On the contrary, 
households with better access to microcredits reduce expenses on social events such as weddings, family 
ceremonies and other social events. Expenses on basic needs such as food, purchase of detergents and 
hygiene products, and daily transportation has increased, which indicates that microcredits are fungible and 
clients sometimes use them to satisfy basic household needs.   
Impact on household income and assets is found to be positive and significant, which indicates an 
overall effect of improved access on household consumption and welfare. In comparison to conventional 
microfinance programs, whose welfare effect is found to be marginal or zero63, positive results are 
expected, given that MFIs in Uzbekistan operate on a commercial basis, serving many households which 
are far above the poverty line.  
While the findings indicate an overall change in the consumption behavior of households after 
having better access to microcredits, the dataset does not fully allow identification of the dynamics and prior 
state. The results possibly capture already adapted behavior of households, given their location in district 
centers where MFIs are localized. Consumption patterns and household expenditures in fact are different in 
urban and rural locations.  
Summarizing the impact of improved access to microcredits, the overall effect is found to be 
positive. The dataset, however, does not allow one to distinguish the intra-household allocation of 
resources for business and consumption purposes. The important conclusion to be drawn is that better 
access to microcredits measured, in terms of the distance to the nearest MFI, has a positive effect on 
household welfare and business enterprise. Given that geographical distance is considered as a proxy for 




6.4. Diffusion Effect 
To conclude the empirical analysis, the diffusion effect of the distance to the nearest MFI is 
analysed. This is done by comparing the set of outcome variables between two sets of distance quantiles: 
1st-3rd and 1st-4th (Table 6). The indicative distance between two quantiles equals roughly 40 km, which 
allows for tracing the learning behaviour and spillover effects.   
                                                          




The primary observation is that there are similar patterns of business and consumption behaviour 
across two distance quantiles, which indicates uniformity of effect, i.e. the “signal” goes in the same 
direction. There are, however, noticeable changes in selected outcome variables, which is also a potential 
indication of learning behaviour of microcredit recipients.  
 
Table 6. Diffusion effect of the distance 
 
 Mean distance to nearest MFI:    50.5 km   87.5 km  
   
Business 
Impact  
Comparison group of respondents in 
matching  
1st  and 3rd distance 
quantiles 
1st and 4th  distance 
quantiles 







[1] Business revenue [‘000 UZS]   15266.03***    
[0.000] 




[2] Business profit [‘000 UZS]      6181.9***    
[0.000] 
706.4   5309.2*** 
[0.000] 
1103.6 















[5] Education  expenses [‘000 UZS]   -102          
[0.228] 
84.6  346.1*** 
[0.000] 
81.3 
[6] Health expenses [‘000 UZS]   85.6***        
[0.000] 
17.7  114.1*** 
[0.000] 
12.4 
[7] Social expenses [‘000 UZS]     -8417.4***    
[0.000] 
1875.8  -683.3** 
[0.029] 
313.3 
[8] Expenses on housing [‘000 UZS]     -8235.9***    
[0.000] 
1630.2  -1153.7 
[0.137] 
775.7 
[9] Expenses on basic needs [‘000 
UZS]   
-983.9**       
[0.003] 
331.3   503.3*** 
[0.000] 
96.5 
[10] Total income [‘000 UZS]    443.6***      
[0.000] 
21.5   496.5*** 
[0.000] 
23.3 
[11] Total assets [‘000 UZS]   -6385.2      
[0.187] 
4840.8 40772.8***    
[0.000] 
1895.9 
R2 0.13 0.19 
Notes: The table represents estimates of propensity score matching implemented by kernel matching using covariates listed 
in Tables 8. Respondents in the 1st [top 25% living nearest to MFI] and 4th distance quantiles [bottom 25% living farthest from 
MFI] are matched, respondents from 2nd and 3rd distance quantiles are excluded. Business income and profits are measured 
in local currency, thousands of Uzbek soums. The official exchange rate is 2100 Uzbek soums to a US dollar, in September 
2013.  *, **, *** denotes 10%, 5% and 0% significance levels.  The number of observations is based on re-created 
retrospective panel structure. The quality of matching and balancing test results is reported in Table 10 and 11. 
 
On the business side, significant impact is observed on the size of businesses in 1st-3rd distance 
quantile, which dissipates when it reaches 1st – 4thquintile. The result is in line with the previous findings of 
Karlan and Zinman (2010) on enterprise efficiency and the reduction of the number of employees. Another 
                                                          




explanation could be framed in terms of geographical location. Enterprises with closer proximity to MFIs, 
have greater exposure and interaction with other, more mature businesses and therefore benefit from 
greater efficiency by learning and knowledge spillover. The efficiency is potentially lost the farther one goes 
away from an MFI, i.e. by reaching the 1st – 4th distance quantile. A further plausible explanation could be a 
wage effect. Wages and salaries are usually higher in cities, and district centers where most MFIs are 
localized. Therefore, businesses with better access to microcredits might reduce number of employees 
aiming to increase the efficiency of their enterprises.  
On the household consumption side, the differences between the 1st – 3rd and 1st – 4th distance 
quantiles are observed on expenditures on health, weddings, and basic needs. The differences reflect 
different consumption patterns, which is likely an indication of the learning and the effect of proximity to the 
network.  
In contrast, no significant effect is observed on education expenses and household assets. A 
plausible explanation could be that households in the 1st – 3rd distance quantile live in urban areas or 
district centers where MFIs are localized and with better access to education65. The different effect on 
assets level could be explained similarly. Households living closer to MFIs reside in areas with different 
valuation of assets and income levels. Therefore this might explain why no impact is observed in the 1st – 
3rdquantile, but impact becomes positive and significant in the 1st – 4thquantile. 
Overall results suggest the presence of a diffusion effect and the concept that geographical 
proximity matters. While the findings in this chapter provide potential evidence of the boundaries of the 
distance, the dataset and survey was not designed specifically to capture the spillover effect. Nevertheless, 
the research agenda conveys important policy relevance, thus motivating further research.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite substantial improvement of access to finance, physical barriers reaching financial 
institutions continue to constitute significant impediments. Over recent decades, microfinance institutions 
have gained worldwide recognition, reaching billions of poor who are ineligible for traditional banking 
services. Despite greater flexibility, geographical barriers to access to MFIs constitute an important 
obstacle. Greater distance increases the direct cost of traveling for potential microcredit beneficiaries and 
increases the cost of monitoring for MFIs.  
                                                          
65Another reason could be derived from the side of microfinance institutions given that MFIs advertise their education loans at 




This chapter is aimed at measuring the causal impact of better access to microcredits in terms of 
distance to the nearest MFI on business indicators and household consumption behavior. Additionally, the 
direct effect distance is considered as a proxy for broader learning and spillover effects of microcredits, as 
beneficiaries share their knowledge and experience with others. Close or distant location from the nearest 
MFI thus indicates the strength of the knowledge diffusion operating as a “dissipating signal”.  
The data is based on a survey of 1086 microcredit borrowers and non-borrowers in Uzbekistan. 
The microfinance environment in Uzbekistan provides evidence of private commercial non-bank MFIs 
supporting both consumer and business loans. The country’s geographical landscape validates the use of 
distance to nearest MFI as an informative proxy.  
 The results indicate positive and significant effects of better geographical access to microcredits. In 
particular, households with easier access to MFIs reveal more likelihood of starting a new business. A 
positive effect is found on business revenue and profit but not enterprise size, as entities reduces the 
number of employees. The findings are in line with the conventional microcredit model that centers 
entrepreneurship activity as a primary channel for the impact. This is also justified by the private and 
commercial nature of MFIs in the study, which operate mostly with higher profile clients with income levels 
above the poverty line.  
On the consumption side, households with better access to microcredits are found to engage in 
more rational decision making. They invest more in human capital such as education and health and 
reduce spending on non-durable items such as weddings and other social events. The findings are in 
accord with experimental studies in the field that, having access to microcredits, households shift 
consumption patterns, reducing expenditures on temptation goods and re-investing more into business and 
other durable items.  
Finally, the diffusion effect of the distance to nearest MFI is analysed by comparing business and 
consumption outcome variables between the 1st- 3rd and 1st- 4th distance quantiles. The indicative distance 
between two quantiles equals roughly 40 km, which allows the tracing of the learning effects. Similar 
patterns of business and consumption behaviour across two distance quantiles is found, revealing the 
uniformity of the “radar signal” going in the same direction. This is a potential indication of a diffusion effect 
and the concept that geographical proximity matters.  
 The overall results in the study are in line with theoretical predictions of credit expansion and 




dataset does not provide a clear division of the mechanism, i.e. whether it is entirely due to geographical 
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Table 7. List and definition of covariates used for p-score matching 
  
Covariate name:  Definition, construction:  
(i) Observable characteristics:    
Age is an important determinant both for obtaining the credit and running the entrepreneurship activity. We also include age2 to control for concavity 
Female  gender dummy equals “1” if respondent is female and “0” is male 
Occupation 
following from summary statistics as well as labor economic policies occupational choice and possession of 
formal job is a fundamental. 13 classifications used in original survey instrument are regrouped into the four  
major ones and respective dummies (occup1_own business, occup2_hired, occup3_self-employed, 
occup4_unemployed, occup5_students)   
Household size 
is an important determinant of family demographics which determines the need for microcredits. We 
distinguish total household size when all members of the family are considered including children, 
pensioners, students 
Household size, in 
economic age   
captures economic power of the families with the same size. It also captures any changes in demographics 
ex post the transition. We consider only family members in economically active age of 18 to 60 years old 
Household assets 
per capita 
measures wealth conditions and is also a good proxy for collateral requirements for getting the credit. 
Household assets per capita is the sum of current market value of household assets (i.e. consumer 
durables, vehicle, livestock) and housing divided by the number of members in households   
Density   
measured as total population over the territory of the district where the respondent resides. As such density 
is a proxy for rural vs. urban types of location characteristics. In this case the districts are identified in line 
with the sampling framework 
Business 
possession 
current or past possession of any entrepreneurship activity  critically determines the need for the credits. 
From descriptive statistics it follows that most of the credits are used for business start-ups and therefore 
prior business experience is an important determinant of probability of getting the credit. Dummy equals “1” 
if the respondent has done any entrepreneurship activity for the 5 years and “0” if none 
Business number 
is an average number of all and any type of business/entrepreneurship activities done in the family. 




dummy equals “1” if there is at least one registered business in the family and “0” if none. The registration 
status of the business is an important determinant of success in credit markets as it reflects the level of 
transparency, tax status and legal accountability. Loan terms and lending attitude of MFIs is indeed different 
depending on whether a business is registered.  Business registration includes patent (i.e. self-employed 
individual entrepreneurship) or legal entity (i.e. micro enterprise) 
Registered 
business number 
is the number of registered businesses in the family 
(ii) Qualifications, skills characteristics: 
Education 
is an important determinant of the success of business enterprise  and the probability of getting the credit. 
Education is captured through the following dummies representing classification by type of education: 
educ1_not finished basic education, educ2_basic (7-9 grades), educ3_secondry (10-11 grades), 
educ4_vocational (lyceum, college), educ5_higher (university, post doc) 
Education • gender represent  a set of interaction dummies of male/female gender and education categories. This is to account for potential heterogeneity and gender biased selection 
Education • age in 
transition 
represent set of interaction dummies of respondents’ age born before or after transition  and education 
categories: educ2_basic_tran (<16 years), educ3_secondary_tran (<20), educ4_vocational_tran (<20 
years), educ5_higher_tran (<35) 
(iii) Behavioural characteristics: 
Financial literacy 
is a composite score obtained from 3 questions in the questionnaire measuring different level  and 
competence in financial matters. Financial literacy and basic calculus (accounting) knowledge is an 
important factor of not only getting the credit but in its further management and successful repayment. We 
distinguish three levels of financial literacy based on the composite score: “1” fully literate, composite 




Trust to MFIs 
access and use of non-bank credits is importantly determine whether households have trust these 
institutions which are relatively new on the market in comparison to conventional banks or other forms of 
informal lending sources. The variable is a dummy based on a composite score measuring the trust of 
MFIs. Beyond measuring the trust this indicator also captures the knowledge of respondents about these 
institutions 
Locus of control 
represents a simplified version of a general Rotter’s test of locus of control (Rotterr,1966). An important 
assumption is that people who better control their lives are self-selected and therefore it is an important 
determinant of the probability of getting the credit. Three levels of locus of control are defined: “1” strong, 
score equals to 3-6, “2” moderate, score equals to 7-9, “3” weak, score equals to 10-12 




Table 8. Summary statistics of covariates used for business and welfare impact estimation 
 Total Sample: Borrowers’ Group:   Non-borrowers’ Group:  
(i) Observable characteristics:    
Age 40.51 10.51 39.75 10.49 41.13 10.50 
Age2 1751 906 1690 878 1801 926 
Male/female dummy 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.43 0.50 
Business owner occup. dummy   0.54 0.50 0.64 0.48 0.46 0.50 
Hired employee occup. dummy 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45 
Self-employed occup. dummy 0.08 0.26 0.03 0.18 0.11 0.31 
Unemployed occup. dummy 0.10 0.31 0.06 0.23 0.14 0.35 
Students 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 
HH size  4.76 1.76 4.73 1.65 4.79 1.85 
HH size, in economic age  2.99 1.35 3.06 1.31 2.93 1.38 
HH assets per capita [‘000 UZS] 15478 17832 17236 17258 14055 18173 
Density of district of residence  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Business possession  0.69 0.46 0.83 0.38 0.58 0.49 
Business number per HH   0.76 0.53 0.89 0.45 0.65 0.57 
Registered business 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.45 0.21 0.40 
Registered business number per 
HH  1.08 0.34 1.08 0.35 1.08 0.33 
(ii) Qualifications, skills characteristics: 
Basic education dummy  0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.21 
Basic education, males  0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.12 
Basic education, females 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.18 
Basic education, transition period  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Secondary education dummy 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45 
Secondary education, males  0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.37 
Secondary education, females 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.32 
Secondary education, transition 
period  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Vocational education dummy  0.43 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.46 0.50 
Vocational education, males  0.24 0.43 0.19 0.39 0.28 0.45 
Vocational education, females 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 
Vocational education, transition 
period  0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 
Higher education dummy 0.25 0.43 0.31 0.46 0.21 0.40 
Higher education, males  0.12 0.32 0.15 0.36 0.09 0.29 
Higher education, females 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.37 0.11 0.32 





(iii) Behavioral characteristics: 
Financial  literacy  11.77 3.44 11.22 3.04 12.21 3.67 
Trust to MFI  0.54 0.50 0.73 0.44 0.39 0.49 
Locus of control  0.18 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.20 0.40 
Risk aversion 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.50 
No. obs.  1086 486 600 
Notes:   Business income and profits are measured in local currency, thousands of Uzbek soums. The official exchange rate is 2100 Uzbek 
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Table 10. Balancing test results [matching respondent in 1st and 4th distance quantiles]    
Variable Sample Mean % reduct t-test Treated Control % bias | bias | t p-value 
Household wealth -1 Unmatched  1287.8 2990.6 -12.4  -4.13 0.000 
 Matched 1297.3 1025.1 2.0 84.0 1.12 0.263 
Household wealth -2 Unmatched 914.71 2644.5 -13.4  -4.45 0.000 
 Matched 921.8 571.26 2.7 79.7 1.90 0.057 
Wedding expenditures -2 Unmatched 399.9 411.59 -0.6  -0.18 0.855 
 Matched 396.13 482.53 -4.1 -639.5 -1.29 0.196 
Industrial production [district] Unmatched 1355.2 2735.5 -90.9  -29.99 0.000 
 Matched 1370.5 1327.8 2.8 96.9 1.02 0.309 
Financial literacy  Unmatched 11.22 9.60 55.0  17.97 0.000 
 Matched 11.22 10.84 9.3 83.0 3.23 0.001 
Notes: The table reports the balancing test result for propensity score matching. The last column shows the comparisons of 
treated and control groups: bold-type p-value clearly indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the equality of 




Table 11. Balancing test results [matching respondent in 1st and 3rd distance quantiles]   
Variable Sample Mean % reduct t-test Treated Control % bias | bias | t p-value 
Wedding expenditures -1 Unmatched  481.87 833.25 -10.0  -3.36 0.001 
 Matched 483.82 579.1 -2.7 72.9 -1.21 0.228 
Wedding expenditures -2 Unmatched 399.9 749.65 -10.4  -3.49 0.000 
 Matched 401.52 449.27 -1.4 86.3 -0.69 0.492 
Gas [district] Unmatched 82.6 80.5 11.6  3.91 0.000 
 Matched 82.6 81.5 5.9 49.3 2.10 0.036 
Industrial production [district] Unmatched 1355.2 2286.3 -67.7  -22.8 0.000 
 Matched 1359.3 1412.3 -3.9 94.3 -1.45 0.148 
Number of businesses  Unmatched 1.09 1.10 -1.4  -0.46 0.646 
 Matched 1.09 1.09 1.3 1.4 0.46 0.647 
Female dummy  Unmatched 0.60 0.32 58.0  19.56 0.000 
 Matched 0.60 0.60 -1.3 97.7 -0.44 0.659 
Financial literacy  Unmatched 11.2 10.6 18.6  6.27 0.000 
 Matched 11.2 11.5 -9.6 48.6 -3.04 0.002 
Risk aversion  Unmatched 0.40 0.42 -3.5  -1.17 0.240 
 Matched 0.40 0.43 -5.5 -58.0 -1.83 0.067 
Notes: The table reports the balancing test result for propensity score matching. The last column shows the comparisons of 
treated and control groups: bold-type p-value clearly indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the equality of 



















Survey Implementation, Field works and Logistics  
 
 
 Motivation:  
The survey on microfinance was initiated by the author as being an integral part of the Dissertation and 
providing additional empirical evidence on microfinance impact from new country setting, i.e. Uzbekistan.  
The original phase of developing the conceptual framework of the survey, research question and 
objectives was commenced in 2009.   
 
 Funding Agencies:  
There were several agencies that supported the data collection and survey implementation. In particular, 
GDN grant implemented jointly by CERGE-EI (Prague, Czech Republic) and EERC (Kiev, Ukraine) 
covered the direct cost of data collection, payment for interviewers and other field logistics. The University 
Meets Microfinance (UMM) project of the European Microfinance Network co-financed by European Union 
grant covered travel expenses from Prague to the field.   
 
 
 Fieldwork:  
During 2010 part of the survey implementation, including background work and acquaintances with the 
microfinance sector, microfinance institutions, regulators and other sector infrastructure was conducted 
together with the United Nations Development Program’s ““Support to Microfinance Sector Development” 
project. Actual data collection and interviews were conducted during January - March 2011.  
 
 
 Survey Team:  
It should be acknowledged that the proclamation of year 2011 as the “Year of small business and private 
entrepreneurship” as well as institutional support from Westminster International University in Tashkent 
greatly facilitated of the data collection process and communication with relevant parties. The survey was 
implemented in sequential order from Region 1, 2 and 3 during January-March 2011. This allowed for 
efficiency of field supervision and better control of the data collection process including arrangements with 
local microfinance institutions (MFIs). The researcher was the principle field supervisor. In each survey 
region both treatment and control groups were surveyed simultaneously. The majority of treatment group 
respondents were surveyed on the premises of MFIs which facilitated the pre-contact and information 
disclosure. Each interviewer was allocated a quota of respondents meeting the survey objectives. 
Engagement of local interviewers in the regions (i) facilitated pre-contact with respondents in the regions; 
(ii) helped to overcome interviewer fatigue by allocating a reasonable amount of questionnaires; (iii) 
helped to minimize the expenses without paying for lodging by having only travel and per diem expenses; 
and (iv) this cost saving allowed an increase in sample size.   
In each survey region the local survey team was screened and recruited from the pool of professional 
interviewers.  All together there were 15 professional interviewers employed. The Center for Social 
Research “TAHLIL” was outsourced for all other services except for actual data collection given the 
constraints on permission letters from national authorities. 
 
 
 Qualitative Research:  
Complementary to a structured survey, qualitative research by means of in-depth interviews as well as 
additional statistics were collected. The main objective of the qualitative research is to unveil qualitative 
aspects of microfinance which are not well captured in quantitative analysis as well as to complement the 
impact assessment.  The quantitative analysis shall also serve as a reference for unique features of 
micro-lending in Uzbekistan which has not been well documented before and therefore can serve as a 





In-depth interviews: Qualitative research was done by the researcher based on face-to-face in-depth 
interviews from the following group of respondents:  
1. Experience with "money-lenders" 
2. Microfinance "clients" of credit unions, microfinance institutions, track of microfinance impact 
3. Reasons and profile of "drop-outs" of credit unions and microfinance institutions  
4. Reasons and profile of those "rejected" by credit unions and microfinance institutions  
5. Experience with conventional "bank" type of microfinance lending  
6. Reasons for "delinquency and (in)formal procedures for loan enforcement", particularly in non-bank MFIs 




 Survey Questionnaire:  
The primary survey instrument is a structured questionnaire, a single version adapted for all 4 types of 
respondents with appropriate filter questions. Meeting the research objectives all questions distinguish 
between the microfinance impact dynamics at the household and business levels. Conceptually the 
questionnaire is designed to collect data for “observed” impact assessment variables as well as behavioral 
aspects related to access/use of financial services such as time preference, risk aversion, trust in MFIs, 
financial literacy, locus of control, i.e., so-called “unobserved” variables. These questions also intend to 
measure the degree of self-selection and heterogeneity of comparison groups based on unobservables. 
Other details of the survey questionnaire are as follows:   
 
 The questionnaire consists of 5 thematic blocks fitted into 12 pages.  
 The duration of the interviews varied given that certain blocks were not covered for the control group. The 
average duration for the treatment group constituted 40-80 minutes and 30-60 minutes for the control 
group.  
 90% of the questionnaire was printed in the Uzbek language, the remaining 10% in Russian. All 
interviewers were bilingual and 95% of all interviews were done in the Uzbek language.  
 All monetary questions (income, expenses, cost of purchase) were asked in local currency. Items stored 
or costs incurred in US dollars were calculated by interviewers into local currency using the official 
exchange rate for that period. It was prohibited to do any calculations during the interview.   





























Hello! My name is ___________. In the framework of state program “2011 year of small business and private entrepreneurship” we 
would like to invite you to participate in this academic survey. The objective is to identify the demand for microcredits and the ways 
they support small business and family welfare. There are no correct or incorrect answers; all we are interested in is your own 
experience. We guarantee that no personal information will be disclosed and the responses will be used in aggregated form only. 
We hope you will participate in the survey since your opinion is very important and will be rewarded.    
 















Q7. Telephone:  ________________________________________________________________________________  
 
Q8. Interview date:               day |___|___|        month |___|___|                  year|___|___|___| 
                                   Start time: |___|___:___|___|                                          End time:  |___|___:___|___| 
 
Q9. Interviewer name: _____ ______________________________________________________ |___|___| 
 




«Impact of Nonbank Microlending» ® 
 
Q1|___|___|___| 
  questionnaire № 
Q2. Quota 1. Region:   
Region 1 ........................................................... 1 
Region 2 ........................................................... 2 
Region 3  .......................................................... 3 
Q4. Quota 2. Respondent type:    
MCO client   .................................................................. 1 
CU client  ....................................................................... 2 
Non-client, entrepreneur    ............................................ 3  
Non-client, household (w/o entrepreneurship)    ........... 4  
 
Q5. MFI name  
MCO_____________________________________ |__|__| 
CU ______________________________________  |__|__| 
Q3. Name of district, town in regions:    
 
________________________________ |__|__| 
INTERVIEWER! ASK D8 AT THE END OF INTERVIEW!  
 
D8. You have a choice: you can receive 10,000 soums or participate in the game. In case you choose the 
game you may win the present or nothing. Terms of the game: there are two balls in the bag – red and 
green. One ball is randomly drawn. If it is red ball - you get nothing, if it green ball – you get the present. 
What do you choose?  
to receive 10,000 soums   1  
to play the game with balls      2    record outcome of the game: 1 - win  or  2 – loss   











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A8. Who is the head of your household?                          _____________________  
                                                                                                     HOUSEHOLD HEAD № FROM COLUMN А1 OF FAMILY GRID  
  
A9. Respondent’s marital status?       
married  1 
single  2 
divorced  3 
widow(er)  4 
 
 
A10.  Type of the dwelling you live in (where interview takes place)? 
house  1 
   flat / apartment  2 
 
A11. How long have you lived in this house/flat?  _____________number of years   
 
A12. Who is the official owner of this house/flat?   
this house/flat is a property of a household member living with us  1 
this house/flat is a property of a relative/ household member living separate from us  2 
this house/flat is aproperty of the state  3 
this house/flat is rented from an individual  4 
 
 
A13. If you would like to purchase in your neighborhood the same house/flat you live in what minimal price 
would you pay?  Do you or any household members living with you possess other residential and non-residential 
premises? If yes, than how many and what is their minimal market price?  How do you use them?         
            (EXCHANGE RATE IS 1600 SOUMS/DOLLAR)  
 




0 = none  














1-not used   
2-used for family needs 
only  
3-used to generate 
income only  
4-used both for family 
needs and income 
generation  
When did you 








97-if bought before 
year 2000  
How much did 
you pay for 








before year 2000 
1 House/flat you live in including all additional premises  1 
 1….…2….…3….…4   
2 Other home/flat     1….…2….…3….…4   
3 Cottage (dacha)     1….…2….…3….…4   
4 Garage (separate and outside of the house) 
  1….…2….…3….…4   
 
A14. For the past 10 years (2000-2010) please recall which family events you conducted and what was the cost 
incurred? Also, have you done any major repair and home reconstruction? If yes, when you have done them and 
what was the cost incurred?   
INTERVIEWER! IF THERE WERE SEVERAL EVENTS IN ONE YEAR, THEN SUM UP THE COSTS FOR ONE YEAR! 
 
 Year of event   
 
SEPARATE BY COMMA!  
 
97-if was before year 2000  
Total cost incurred  
thousand sums 
SEPARATE BY COMMA!  
 
97-if was before year 2000 
1 Wedding    
2 Other significant family events    
3 Repair  of residential premises, public utilities 
  





A15. Do the members of your family own the following (functional) items as well livestock and poultry? If yes, 
than how many items are there? What is their current market value? How do you use them? When did you buy them 

















1-not used   
2-used for family needs 
only  
3-used to generate 
income only  
4-used both for family 
needs and income 
generation 
When did you 








97-if bought before 
2000  
How much did 
you pay for 









1 Furniture set     1….…2….…3….…4   
2 
Refrigerator, freezer    
1….…2….…3….…4   
3 TV,  home TV theater    1….…2….…3….…4   
4 
Audio-video  appliances  (music 
centre, DVD-player, video 
camera) 
  
1….…2….…3….…4   
5 Washing machine    1….…2….…3….…4   
6 Sewing machine    1….…2….…3….…4   
7 Microwave oven, kitchen set, grill 
  1….…2….…3….…4   
8 Satellite antenna   1….…2….…3….…4   
9 PC, lap-top    1….…2….…3….…4   
10 Car    1….…2….…3….…4   
11 Lorry, truck    1….…2….…3….…4   
12 
Livestock and poultry (cattle, 
sheep, goats, horses, chicken 
etc.)  
  
1….…2….…3….…4   
 
A16. Now I would like to ask about your family expenses. Besides monthly expenses there are significant and 
irregular expenses incurred only several times during the year. Now I will read you the list of such expenses. 
Could you please recall how much money your family spent on them in 2010?  
 
I. Type of yearly expenses:  Expenses 
(thousand sums) 
1 Purchase of clothes and footwear  
2 Tuition payment for higher education (including payment for those members of the household  living apart  from family) 
 
3 Expenditures on public education and purchase of school stationery, uniform, books, required payments to school/college/lyceum, private tutoring fees, courses etc.   
 
4 Payments for utilities, property and land taxes   
5 Medical treatment, drugs, diagnostics, service of doctors and nurses  
6 Home repair, construction, purchase of construction materials   
7 Expenditures on maintaining peasant farm/tomorqa, including livestock and poultry  DO NOT INCLUDE EXPENDITURES ON FARM!   
 
8 Expenses on significant family events (wedding, anniversary celebration etc.)   
9 Gratuitous help to relatives, neighbors, charity   
10 Lending to relatives, friends, acquaintances etc.   
11 Other expenses (record)  
 
A17. Now I will read the list of expenses incurred every month. Please try to recall how much money your family 
spend on them in regular month?   
 Type of monthly expenses:  Expenses 
(thousand soums) 
1 Expenses on food including the meals outside the home   
2 Purchase of detergents, sanitation and hygiene products   
3 Payment for communication services (telephone, mobile phones, Internet)   
4 Expenses on public transport, taxi and fixed-route-taxi, gasoline    
5 Leisure and entertainment (parties, “gap”, choyhona, going out to parks, cinema, etc.)   






A18. Could you please tell what is the regular monthly income (both cash and transfer to plastic card) of all family 
members including salaries, pensions, allowances, stipends and all other sources?  
 Type of income per month:  Income 
(thousand soums) 
1 Employment in agriculture  sector (in shirkat, peasant /dehqon farm, farm not belonging to the family 
members, including earnings from seasonal agriculture work/mardikor)   
 
2 Employment in non-agriculture  sector (enterprises, organizations, firms, including earnings from 
seasonal non-agricultural work/mardikor)  
 
3 Remittances abroad   
4 Sales of own agricultural products, including livestock products   
5 Non-agricultural entrepreneurship activity (including resale of agricultural products of others)   
6 Property income (rent of dwelling, household premises, automobile, other property, land lease)    
7 Deposit income (bank, credit union, money lending)  
8 Pension and allowances (for retirement, seniority, disability, loss of survivor/breadwinner, community 
(mahalla) benefits, unemployment benefits, stipends etc. )  
 
9 Gratuitous help from relatives, friends  
10 Borrowing from relatives, friends   
11 Other income (record)  
 
A19. How do you rate the wellbeing of your family/households in …..? SINGLE ANSWER IN EACH COLUMN!  
 in 2010 
(Year of harmoniously 
developed generation) 
in 2008 
(Year of social 
protection) 
in 2006 
(Year of charity and 
medical workers) 
Income is sufficient for everything/fully sufficient  5 5 5 
Income is sufficient for foodstuffs, clothing and other 
basic needs  4 4 4 
Income is sufficient only for very basic needs- 
foodstuffs, clothing and utility payments  3 3 3 
Income is sufficient only for foodstuffs 2 2 2 
Income is not sufficient even for foodstuffs 1 1 1 
 
 
Now I would like to ask you about entrepreneurship activity. Under “business” or “private entrepreneurship” it is 
understood the activity that generates income and envisages self-employment.  
 
INTERVIEWER! BESIDES LEGAL ENTITIES AND PATENT HOLDERS SELF-EMPLOYED AND OWNERS OF 
UNREGISTERED BUSINESS ALSO REFER TO ENTREPRENEURS! 
 
B1. For the past 5 years have you done any entrepreneurial activity?   
    
Yes, I have and am doing now  1 
Yes, I have but not doing nowadays  2 
No, I haven’t  3  В18 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B9. What was the start-up amount of the business?   __________ thousand sums 
 
B10. What were the sources of this start-up? Indicate in percents:  
  % in percent of total start-up amount  
1 Own funds   
2 Gratuitous help from relatives, friends, acquaintances                                                   
3 Borrowed money  from relative, friends, acquaintances  
4 Borrowed goods/raw materials   
5 Credit from bank  
6 Credit from Credit Union  
7 Credit from Microcredit Organization   
8 Borrowed from moneylender   
9 “Gap” (rotating savings circle, emergency fund)   
 Other (record)    
 
B11. How many people are employed (regularly/usually) in this business?   
1. Total, including you    __________number of people  
2. Of which family members except you  __________number of people 
 
B12. Now let’s talk about assets of this business:  
 
Type of business assets:  Currently 
possessed? 
 
1- yes  




market value:  















97-if bought before 
year 2000  
How much did 
you pay for 








before year 2000 
1 Building and premises (offices, shops, drug-stores, workshops, greenhouses etc.) 1………2    
2 Vehicles (except for agricultural machinery) 1………2    
3 Equipment, machinery for manufacturing and processing 1………2    
4 Agricultural machinery (tractor, combine and other major machinery)  1………2    
5 Stock, raw materials  1………2    
6 Inventory (including the stock for resale)  1………2    
7 Other (record) 1………2    
 
B13. What were the total expenses for this business in 2010?  ___________ thousand sums 
 
B14. What was the total income from this business in 2010? What was the total amount of sales of goods and 
services in year 2010?             ___________ thousand sums 
 
 
B15. What share of profit of this business in 2010 did you spend on your family needs?  
                                                                                                                ___________ % percent of profit  
 
B16. How do you rate profitability of your business …?  
For those who took credit/ borrowed:  Before the credit/borrowing:  After the credit/borrowing: 
Business is (was) rather profitable  4 4 
There is (was) income but not too high  3 3 
Income barely cover(ed) business expenses  2 2 
Business is (was) unprofitable  1 1 
Business did not exist  99  
For those who did not take credit and did not 
borrow: Start of enterpreneurship activity:  Currently:  
Business is (was) rather profitable  4 4 
There is (was) income but not too high  3 3 
Income barely cover(ed) business expenses  2 2 






B17. For the next 12 months do you plan……  







B18. What business type is the most profitable in your location/district of the city?  



















B19. Do you have barrier-free access to the following quality services in your location?  
INTERVIEWER! THIS IS AN EVALUATION OF ACCESS TO SERVICES, AND NOT THEIR CURRENT USE OR  
NEED FOR!   
 Type of services: There is access  There is noaccess 
1 Centralized gas supply  1 2 
2 Centralized water supply 1 2 
3 Electricity 1 2 
4 Asphalt roads in proper conditions  1 2 
5 Sales markets (demand, resellers, markets)  1 2 
6 Transportation services   1 2 
7 Services of appraiser, insurance company, cadastre 1 2 
8 Repair  and maintenance of machinery/equipment  1 2 
9 Warehouse services  1 2 
10 Legal services, notary 1 2 
 
C1. Nowadays many people often a borrow money. For the past 5 years have you borrowed or taken the credit for 
any purposes to the amount of a minimum 50.000 soums from friends, relatives, banks, microcredit 






To expand the business (increase the scale of production, services, sales)  1 
Don’t plan to change anything  2 
To decrease the business (decrease the scale  of production, services, sales) 3 
To liquidate this business and start a new one  4 
To terminate entrepreneurship activity at all  5 
Trade (except for livestock and poultry resale)   1 
Public catering  2 
Transportation of people and goods  3 
Construction and repair works 4 
Production of non-foodstuffs  5 
Production of foodstuffs (including processing of agricultural and livestock products)   6 
Crops 7 
Livestock and poultry fattening for resale  8 
Livestock and poultry resale  9 
Craftsmanship 10 
Public services (hairdressing, dry cleaning, laundry, repair of clothing and footwear, etc.) 11 
Repair  of  household appliances 12 
Other  (record)  13 
None of the businesses is profitable  14 
Every business is profitable  15 
Borrowed or took credit  1  
Did not borrow or take credit  2  С12 
  
 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   

























































































































































































































































































C11. What changes happened with you and your family after your borrowed/took credit(s)?  
        MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE!  
 1. POSITIVE CHANGES   2. NEGATIVE CHANGES  
1 family wellbeing has improved      1 family wellbeing has deteriorated     
2 repaired house/flat   2 relationship in the family have worsened  
3 purchased dwelling, built the house   3 business expenses have increased  
4 purchased vehicle    4 business profits have decreased  
5 paid for education/tuition fee   5 business scale have decreased  
6 conducted wedding, other family events   6 business went bankrupt   
7 purchased consumer durables   7 ended-up with burden of debt  
8 covered expenses for medical treatment, drugs   8 credit group has been dissolved  
9 business turnover has increased     other (record)  
10 business profit has increased   
11 started new business  
 other (record)  
99 – No positive changes have occurred  99 – No positive changes have occurred 
 
C12. Now let’s talk about financial organizations and indivudals lending the money.  




1-yes, there is   
 
2-don’t know  
3-no, there is no  
4-never heared about 
  next row  
In 2010 how many 
times did you refer  
to/consulted for any 
reasons?  
quantity per year  
 
 0 =if did not refer/consult  
 next row  
Are you 
satisfied with 
thier work?   
 
1-yes 
 next row  
2-no    
 
 
II. Why not satisfied?  
MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE!  
1- too much bureucracy 
2- incompetent personnel 
3-unacceptable products/services  
4-insufficient collateral   
5-no trust    
6- distant location     
7-required  unofficial payments  
8-low quality services    
9-other  
1 Bank 1……2……3……4  1……2 1…2…3…4…5…6…7…8…9 
2 Credit Union  1……2……3……4  1……2 1…2…3…4…5…6…7…8…9 
3 Microcredit Organization  1……2……3……4  1……2 1…2…3…4…5…6…7…8…9 
4 Pawnshop  1……2……3……4  1……2 1…2…3…4…5…6…7…8…9 
5 Moneylender  1……2……3……4  1……2 1…2…3…4…5…6…7…8…9 
 
C13. Do you need credit?    
no, do not need  1 С17 
do not need now, but need sometimes   2  
yes, need very much  3  
 
C14. For what purposes do you need the credit?  
          MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE!   
 FOR BUSINESS PURPOSES    FOR HOUSEHOLD PURPOSES  
1 To start new business    1 To purchase vehicle  
2 To expand existing business    2 To purchase, build dwelling  
3 To purchase machinery, equipment, spare parts    3 To repair dwelling  
4 To purchase livestock    4 To purchase livestock   
5 To purchase raw materials, stock   5 To purchase consumer durables    
6 To repair, expand business premises    6 To pay tuition fees  
7 To pay the rent for business premises    7 To cover medical treatment expenses  
8 To repay other debts   8 To conduct family events, leisure  
9 Does not need credit for business   9 Do not need credit for household   











C15. Where do you prefer to get the credit?   
 FOR BUSINESS PURPOSE  FOR HOUSEHOLD PURPOSE  
Bank   1  1 
Credit Union  2  2 
Microcredit Organization  3  3 
Pawn-shop    4  4 
Moneylender    5  5 
Friends, neighbors, acquaintances   6  6 
Relatives  7  7 
Does not matter  99  99 




C16. Under which terms do you prefer to take the credit?  
1 What is the minimum amount of credit you need? thousand soums                              
2 What is the minimum term (period) you prefer? months                             
3 What is the maximum interest rate you can pay? % per month                           




C17. Imagine that a financial organization (bank, CU, MCO, pawn-shop) offers credit to the amount of 3 million 
sums. Which of the following options would you choose?  
INTERVIEWER! SHOW CARD! SINGLE RESPONSE ONLY! DO NOT READ/SHOW  OPTIONS 10 AND 11!  
Options:  % rate p.a.  Maturity  Total amount to repay including interest payment, soums  Required collateral value:  
1 7% 6 months 3,105,000  
                      170% of credit amount  2 10% 18 months 3,360,000  
3 12% 36 months 3,720,000  
4 18% 6 months 3,270,000  
150% of credit amount 5 21% 18 months 3,756,000  
6 23% 36 months 4,380,000  
7 30% 6 months 3,540,000  
120% of credit amount 8 33% 18 months 4,188,000  
9 35% 36 months 5,100,000  
10 I would rather borrow from relatives or friends as I do not trust financial organizations  
11 I would not borrow the money under any circumstances      
 
 
C18. Would you like to deposit money in a bank, credit union or give to an individual to earn profit?  
 
 
IF ALL ARE «NO» С20 
 
 
C19. Under which terms would you prefer to deposit money in bank or credit union or give to an individual to 
earn profit?  
1 Amount, thousand soums                                     
2 Maturity, months     
3 Interest per month, %                                    
 
 
C20. Imagine you decided to deposit 1 million soums to earn profit. A financial organization offers you the 
following options. Which one would you choose?  
         INTERVIEWER! SHOW CARD! SINGLE RESPONSE ONLY! DO NOT READ/SHOW  OPTIONS 10 AND 11! 
Options % rate p.a. Maturity  Total amount to receive including interest payment, soums Safety  of deposit: 
1 5% 3 months   1,012,500  100%   guarantee; you receive profit in cash and 
on time   2 10% 12 months   1,100,000  3 20% 18 months   1,300,000  
           1-yes        2-no 
Bank 1…………2 
Credit Union  1…………2 





4 18% 3 months   1,045,000  100%   guarantee; you receive part of the profit 
on (local) plastic card  5 36% 12 months   1,360,000  6 46% 18 months   1,690,000  
7 30% 3 months   1,075,000  there is a 5% probability that the financial 
organization could not repay you; in this case you 
will receive only 100,000 sums instead of the 
required amount  
8 60% 12 months   1,600,000  
9 70% 18 months   2,050,000  
10 I would like to deposit, but there are no suitable options    
11 I do  not want to deposit at all   
 
 
C21. Which of the following savings services do you currently use?  




Section D. Respondent’s life experience    
 
D1. Now I would like you to make a simple choice. Would you prefer to receive 100.000 soums today or ….   
INTERVIEWER! ASK EACH PAIR SEPARATELY!  SINGLE RESPONSE FOR EACH PAIR!   
Receive 100.000 soums today  1 or   2 115.000 soums in 3 months (Мarch 2011)?  
Receive 100.000 soums today    1 or 2 130.000 soums in 3 months (Мarch 2011)? 
Receive 100.000 soums today    1 or 2 150.000 soums in 3 months (Мarch 2011)? 
Receive 100.000 soums today     1 or 2 180.000 soums in 3 months (Мarch 2011)? 
Receive 100.000 soums today     1 or 2 225.000 soums in 3 months (Мarch 2011)? 
 
D2.   Now please make a similar choice. Would you prefer to receive 100.000 soums in one year  or ….   
INTERVIEWER! ASK EACH PAIR SEPARATELY! SINGLE RESPONSE FOR EACH PAIR!   
Receive 100.000 soums in one year (January 2012)    1 or 2 115.000 soums in one year and 3 months (Мarch 2012)?  
Receive 100.000 soums in one year (January 2012)    1 or 2 130.000 soums in one year and 3 months (Мarch 2012)? 
Receive 100.000 soums in one year (January 2012)    1 or 2 150.000 soums in one year and 3 months (Мarch 2012)? 
Receive 100.000 soums in one year (January 2012)    1 or 2 180.000 soums in one year and 3 months (Мarch 2012)? 
Receive 100.000 soums in one year (January 2012)    1 or 2 225.000 soums in one year and 3 months (Мarch 2012)? 
 
D3. Please rate your trust to the following institutions and people in general based on the scale from 1 to 5 
where “1” means “I don’t trust at all”, “5” means “I trust completely”   
 
D4. How well do you know (understand and able to perform) the following matters?  
  very good  good  bad DON’T KNOW  
1 Planning the family budget   1 2 3 4 
2 Accounting and bookkeeping   1 2 3 4 
3 Developing the business plan  1 2 3 4 
4 Managing the business  1 2 3 4 
5 Marketing, sales   1 2 3 4 
 
I have a  deposit account in bank  1 
I have a deposit account in a credit union  2 
I participate in “gap” (rotating circle, emergency fund)  3 
I do not use savings services of organizations because I prefer to invest in property, livestock etc.  4 
I do not use savings services of organizations because I do  not trust them  5 
I do not use savings services of organizations because there is no access to them  6 
I do not use savings services of organizations because terms for savings are unsatisfactory (% rate, maturity etc.)  7 
I do not use savings services because do not have extra money to save  8 
other  (record  
  I don’t trust at all    I trust completely DO NOT KNOW  
1 Banks 1 2 3 4 5 0 
2 Credit Unions  1 2 3 4 5 0 
3 Microcredit Organizations   1 2 3 4 5 0 





D5. How much is 30% of 3.000 soums? 
   
300 sums 3 
600 sums 2 
900 sums 1 
DO NOT KNOW   0 
 
D6. Imagine you have 100.000 soums in a bank account. Annual 
interest rate is 5%. How much money will be in your account 
after 2 years? (it is assumed that you will not withdraw the 
interest in between)  
more than  110.000  sums 1 
exactly       110.000  sums 2 
less than    110.000  sums 3 
DO NOT KNOW   0 
 
 
D7. How much do you agree with the following statements?   
  strongly 
agree agree disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
1 “I have little control over what will happen to me in my life” 1 2 3 4 
2 “I have a hard time saving money, even though I know I want to save money” 1 2 3 4 
3 “Good things tend to happen to other people, not to me or my family” 1 2 3 4 
 
Thank you very much for the interview!   
INTERVIEWER! GO TO D8! 
 
